McTighe v. Mechanics Educational Soc. of America, Local 19, AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO

• Decision Date: 04 September 1985
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO,No. 84-3854,84-3854
• Citation: 772 F.2d 210
• Parties: 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2364, 38 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1477, 103 Lab.Cas. P 11,640 Thomas J. McTIGHE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MECHANICS EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY OF AMERICA, LOCAL 19,; the National Acme Company; Acme-Cleveland Corporation; Ivan L. Melnak; Louis A. Bohn; Ron Godinsky; Robert T. Koches; Robert LaRicca; Ida Maltese, Employment Manager; Edward Parulis, Kenneth Stevens; Michael Willingham; "John Doe"; and "Richard Roe", Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 210

772 F.2d 210

120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2364, 38 Fair

Empl.Prac.Cas. 1477,

103 Lab.Cas. P 11,640

Thomas J. McTIGHE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.MECHANICS EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY OF AMERICA, LOCAL 19, AFL-CIO the National Acme Company; Acme-Cleveland CorporationIvan L. Melnak; Louis A. Bohn; Ron Godinsky; Robert T Koches; Robert LaRicca; Ida Maltese, EmploymentManagerEdward Parulis, Kenneth Stevens; Michael Willingham; "John Doe"; and "Richard Roe", Defendants-Appellees.

No. 84-3854.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued July 11, 1985.

Decided Sept. 4, 1985.

Theodore M. Mann, argued, Theodore M. Mann & Associates, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellant.

Thurlow Smoot, argued, Bruce G. Heary, Speith, Bell, McCurdy & Newell Co., L.P.A., Dianne Hearey, argued, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendants-appellees.

Before MARTIN and WELLFORD, Circuit Judges, and PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM.

AppellantThomas J. McTighe appeals from the order of the district court granting summary judgment for appellees in this action alleging breach of a collective bargaining agreement and age discrimination.For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

McTighe was hired by the National Acme Company("Company") as a machine tool operator in the Cleveland, Ohio plant in August 1966.He became a member of Mechanics Educational Society of America, Local 19, AFL-CIO, with the terms and conditions of his employment set forth in a collective bargaining agreement.After working for twelve years as a machine tool operator, McTighe accepted a promotion to a supervisory position with the Company.He worked in this position, which was not covered by the collective bargaining agreement, for four years until March 5, 1982, when the Company terminated his employment.This termination apparently was the result of a general reduction in the number of employees due to economic conditions.At the time of his termination, the Union did not advise or represent McTighe in any manner.McTighe received four months' severance pay.¹He promptly obtained employment as a machinist with another company but was laid off after approximately six months, in September 1982.

In late October 1982, McTighe met with Michael Willingham, president of the Union, to explore the possibility that he could return to his former job as a machine tool operator with the Company.He also contacted the Company on or near the same date, requesting that he be allowed to return to the collective bargaining unit as a machine tool operator.Although the facts are somewhat in dispute, apparently some agreement was reached with the Company whereby the Company agreed that McTighe could rejoin the collective bargaining unit, provided that he returned the severance pay and obtained Union approval of his re-employment.The Union, however, objected to McTighe's return to the collective bargaining unit and he was not re-hired by the Company.

On March 30, 1983, McTighe filed the instant lawsuit against the Company, ² the Union, and various agents and officers of each.McTighe alleged breach of the collective bargaining agreement by the Company and breach by the Union of its duty of fair representation.He contended that he was protected by certain terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement because of his prior seniority of twelve years as a member of the collective bargaining unit.He further alleged a civil conspiracy to deprive him of his job and post-severance rights.Finally, he alleged age discrimination, claiming that his discharge was motivated by the Company's scheme to financially benefit by reducing its vested pension fund obligations by discharging older employees.He sought equitable relief, money damages and punitive damages.Jurisdiction was based upon Sec. 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,29 U.S.C. Sec. 185.

On May 24, 1983, the Union and Union-related co-defendants moved for summary judgment.This motion was granted on May 23, 1984, the district court finding that at the time of McTighe's discharge, the Union had no duty to represent him or seek his return to the collective bargaining unit.Similarly, a motion for summary judgment filed by the Company ³ was granted on September 14, 1984, on the grounds that because McTighe was a supervisor not covered by the collective bargaining agreement at the time of his discharge, he possessed no rights under the agreement.The district court further held that the age discrimination claim was barred by the statute of limitations.

I.

The undisputed facts establish that McTighe was a supervisor and therefore was not a member of the collective bargaining unit when his employment was terminated on March 5, 1982.NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 279-82, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1764-66, 40 L.Ed.2d 134, 145-47(1974).McTighe asserts that the Union had an established past practice of allowing foremen, upon loss of that position, to return to the bargaining unit based on seniority.He claims that this past practice was an integral part of the labor contract between the Union and the Company and the failure of the Union to allow him to return to the unit raises a duty of fair representation question.McTighe also relies upon the following language in the collective bargaining agreement:

Section 8--Transfer Out of the Unit.

A. Supervisors--Servicers--Demonstrators:

When an employee covered by this Agreement has been or is in the future elevated to a salaried supervisory position or the salaried position of Servicer-Demonstrator which classifications are excluded from this Agreement, his/her seniority shall be frozen as of the time of such elevation, and the Company's personnel records will be marked accordingly, and should the employee be returned to a position which is covered by this Agreement, he/she shall pick up the seniority he/she had at the time it was frozen.This is to be retroactive with respect to all present salaried supervisory and Servicer-Demonstrator employees.

McTighe argues that this language also supports his contention that the Union owed him a duty of fair representation.The district court disagreed:

This provision merely provides that should the Company elect to return plaintiff, or someone in similar circumstances, to his original job, he would maintain the seniority he had acquired prior to his promotion.Words in a collective bargaining agreement should be given their ordinary and reasonable meaning.Penn Packing Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 195, 497 F.2d 888(3d Cir.1974).

The district court further concluded that because McTighe was a supervisor at the time of his termination, to impose upon the Union a duty of fair representation would cause a conflict with its duty to represent the...