McVay v. Stefanou

• Decision Date: 30 July 2021
• Docket Number: 3:20-cv-00764 (CSH)
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: DARYA MCVAY, Plaintiff, v. ANDREAS STEFANOU and SPA THEA, LLC, Defendants.

DARYA MCVAY, Plaintiff, v. ANDREAS STEFANOU and SPA THEA, LLC, Defendants.

No. 3:20-cv-00764 (CSH)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

July 30, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE

HAIGHT, Senior District Judge

Plaintiff Darya McVay (“McVay”) filed this action against Andreas Stefanou (“Stefanou”) and Spa Thea, LLC (“Spa Thea, ” and collectively with Stefanou “Defendants”), asserting employment-related discrimination claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as pendant state-law claims for violation of McVay's rights under Conn. Gen Stat. § 46a-60(b)(1), for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and for negligent infliction of emotional distress. See generally Doc. 1 (“Compl.”). Defendants thereafter moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. See generally Doc 12 (“Defs.' Mot.”). McVay did not immediately oppose Defendants' motion, filing a response only after this Court docketed a notice pursuant to Local Civil Rule 41(a). See Doc. 14 (“Pl.'s Opp.”). Defendants have moved to strike McVay's opposition for failure to comply with the Local Rule. See Doc. 15 (“Defs.' Obj.”). This Ruling resolves these motions.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

The following factual allegations are drawn from McVay's Complaint and are accepted as true for the purposes of this motion only.

McVay is a licensed hairstylist and a resident of Ridgefield, Connecticut. Compl. at 1 ¶ 1, 3 ¶ 8. Stefanou is the proprietor or “owner/manager” of Andrew Stefanou Salon and Spa, which maintains locations in Darien and Orange, Connecticut. Id. at 2 ¶ 2, 3 ¶ 9. Spa Thea is a limited liability company that owns and operates Andrew Stefanou Salon and Spa. Id. at 3 ¶ 10. McVay alleges that Defendants employ at least 15 individuals, and that they began to employ McVay as a hairstylist at both the Darien and Orange locations on or about November 17, 2019. Id. at 3 ¶¶ 11-12. McVay believes that, at all relevant times detailed in her Complaint, Stefanou was acting on behalf of Spa Thea. Id. at 4 ¶ 20.

At some time after McVay began to work at the Andrew Stefanou Salon and Spa, Stefanou instructed McVay not to disclose to clients that she practices the Pagan religion. See Id. at 3 ¶ 13. Stefanou repeated this instruction to McVay during a meeting that occurred on December 22, 2019. Id. During the December 22, 2019 meeting, Stefanou also accused McVay of selling her own products to salon clients. Id. at 3 ¶ 14. McVay denied Stefanou's charge that she was selling her own products to clients of the salon. Id.

At a meeting with Stefanou that occurred on January 20, 2020, McVay requested permission to work full-time at the salon's Darien location, in view of the fact that that branch was busier. Id. at 3 ¶ 15. Stefanou deferred responding to this request to a later date. Id. Stefanou meanwhile asked McVay if she would take classes offered by the salon. Id. at 3 ¶ 16. McVay said that some of the salon's classes possibly conflicted with her modeling assignments at Western Connecticut State University. Id. Stefanou thereupon asked McVay if she modeled in the nude. Id.

During the January 20, 2020 meeting, McVay additionally mentioned to Stefanou that she recently had attended a Russian Orthodox religious service with her family. Id. at 4 ¶ 17. Stefanou then asked McVay whether the church's religious icons had fallen off the walls when she entered the building; whether McVay's boyfriend was a warlock; whether McVay's boyfriend's mother was a witch; whether McVay's sisters were witches; and whether McVay wanted Stefanou to buy her a broomstick. Id. Stefanou further asked McVay if she was “crazy, ” in the process pointing his finger at his head while making a circular motion. Id. at 4 ¶ 18.

In response to Stefanou's statements, McVay believed that her working conditions had become hostile and intolerable, and that she was subject to a constructive dismissal. Id. at 4 ¶ 19. McVay thereupon left the premises in tears. Id.

B. Procedural Background

McVay filed her Complaint on June 2, 2020, bringing five claims based on the facts set forth above. McVay claims that she was subject to a discriminatory employment practice based on her religion, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Id. at 4-5 ¶¶ 21-25. McVay also claims that the same conduct violated her rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991), and that it constituted a discriminatory employment practice based on her religious creed in violation of Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (“CFEPA”), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(b)(1). Id. at 5 ¶¶ 26-28. Finally, McVay brings common law claims both for intentional infliction of emotional distress and for negligent infliction of emotional distress, again arising out of the same conduct. Id. at 5-6 ¶¶ 29-40. McVay seeks damages for all of her claims, including punitive damages. Id. at 7.

McVay asserts that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over her federal law claims on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the CFEPA claim on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1367.^[1] Id. at 2 ¶¶ 4-6. Although not explicitly stated in the Complaint, it appears that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 additionally would be the appropriate basis for jurisdiction over McVay's Connecticut common law claims. See Id. at 1-2 ¶¶ 1-6. McVay received a Dismissal and Notice of Rights (“Notice of Suit Rights”) from the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on March 4, 2020. Id. at 2 ¶ 7; see also Id. at 9 (“Ex. A”).

Defendants were served with process on June 23, 2020, see Doc. 10, and timely moved to dismiss the Complaint on July 14, 2020 pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally Defs.' Mot. In their memorandum supporting their motion, Defendants articulate two arguments: first, that because McVay has not exhausted her administrative remedies before the EEOC and the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (“CCHRO”), this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over all of McVay's claims; and second, that all of McVay's claims against Stefanou individually must be dismissed for failure to state a claim, because individual agents of an employer-defendant are not subject to liability under Title VII. See Doc. 12-1 (“Defs.' Mem.”) at 2-7.

McVay did not respond to Defendants' motion within the 21 days contemplated by this District's Local Rules. See D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(a)(2). After more than six months of inactivity by McVay, the Clerk of Court docketed a notice pursuant to Local Rule 41(a), warning McVay of the case's possible dismissal. See Doc. 13. McVay thereafter filed a document styled as an objection to Defendants' motion to dismiss. See generally Pl.'s Opp. The next day, Defendants moved to strike McVay's submission, and additionally requested that the Court enter an order dismissing the action with prejudice. See Defs.' Obj. at 1. Defendants argue that McVay's response to the Local Rule 41(a) notice should be stricken because “Plaintiff has not provided any satisfactory explanation of why this case should not be dismissed, ” and additionally state that “[t]he objection does not address the merits of the Motion to Dismiss.” Id. at 2.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000).^[2] “In reviewing a facial attack to the court's jurisdiction, we draw all facts-which we assume to be true unless contradicted by more specific allegations or documentary evidence-from the complaint and from the exhibits attached thereto.” Amidax Trading Grp. v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, 671 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citing L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 422 (2d Cir. 2011) and Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 67 (2d Cir. 2004)). However, “where jurisdictional facts are placed in dispute, the court has the power and obligation to decide issues of fact by reference to evidence outside the pleadings, such as affidavits.” Tandon v. Captain's Cove Marina of Bridgeport, Inc., 752 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting APWU v. Potter, 343 F.3d 619, 627 (2d Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks and emendation omitted). Ultimately, “[a] plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists.” Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113 (citing Malik v. Meissner, 82 F.3d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 1996)).

Meanwhile “[a] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is designed ‘merely to assess the legal feasibility of a complaint, not to assay the weight of evidence which might be offered in support thereof.'” Zuro v. Town of Darien, 432 F.Supp.3d 116, 121 (D. Conn. 2020) (quoting Ryder Energy Distrib. Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 1984)). In order to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In determining whether a plaintiff has met this standard, the Court accepts the factual allegations in a...