McVicker v. City of Lewiston, 24724.
| Decision Date | 23 February 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 24724.,24724. |
| Citation | 995 P.2d 804,134 Idaho 34 |
| Parties | William and Margaret McVICKER, a marital community, and Dorothy McGee, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF LEWISTON, a municipal entity; and Jan Vassar, Lewiston City Manager, Charles Borcich, Lewiston Building Official, Steve Watson, Lewiston Interim Community Development Director, Jerry Hume, Assistant Lewiston City Planner; and James Cook, d/b/a Cook Construction Company; and Kevin Dotson, d/b/a American Dream Construction Company, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Clearwater Law Offices, Lewiston; Burton Contract Legal Services, McCall, for appellants. Earl L. McGeoghegan argued.
Jones, Brower & Callery, Lewiston, for respondent City of Lewiston. Thomas W. Callery argued.
Don L. Roberts, Lewiston, for respondent Cook.
This is an appeal from the district court's order granting summary judgment to the defendants/respondents City of Lewiston (City) and James Cook (Cook). The underlying lawsuit by the plaintiffs/appellants, William and Margaret McVicker and Dorothy McGee (collectively referred to as the McVickers), alleged that the City had improperly granted a building permit to Cook for the construction of an accessory building.
The McVickers own real property at 1719 5th Avenue, Lewiston, Idaho, which is adjacent to rental real property owned by Cook at 1418 8th Street, Lewiston, Idaho. On October 21, 1996, Cook applied to the Lewiston community development department for a building permit in order to construct a 1,980 square foot pole building for the purpose of parking "pleasure vehicles." Cook filed building plans with the application, depicting a building set nine feet back from the north property line, five feet from the south property line and twenty feet from the west property line. Notes on the plans indicate a revised setback of at least six feet from the south property line (the original "5'" being crossed out and replaced with "6'"). The plans reflect an eave height of sixteen feet. Cook, however, attached an extension to the roof trusses which reduced the eave height to fifteen feet. Preliminary construction of the building began prior to issuance of a building permit.
The McVickers became aware of construction on Cook's property on October 25, 1996. Margaret McVicker met with Charles Borcich, head of Lewiston's building department, and was informed that Cook planned to build an accessory building, which could not be used for commercial purposes because the neighborhood was zoned residential.
A City code enforcement officer inspected the Cook building site and issued a stop work order on October 28, 1996, because no building permit had been issued and because the building plans showed no plumbing work was contemplated. The community development department then issued a building permit on November 8, 1996. The permit described a "1980 sq. ft. pole building" which "may not be used for commercial purpose ... without a conditional use permit."
On November 11, 1996, the McVickers contacted the City and learned that a building permit had been issued. The McVickers met with the Lewiston city manager and city attorney on November 13, 1996 and on that same date, the McVickers delivered a letter to the city manager, with copies to the city attorney and Charles Borcich. The McVickers also met informally with the Lewiston mayor and other city council members concerning the size and location of Cook's building. The City took no action.
The McVickers' attorney, Earl McGeoghegan, addressed the Lewiston city council at a public meeting on November 26, 1996, and contended that the six-foot setback was out of compliance with the Lewiston City Code and that the building could not be sixteen feet high and still meet the setback requirements because of the lot size. The city council took no action. Earl McGeoghegan sent a letter to the City on November 26, 1996, demanding that an immediate stop work order be issued.
The McVickers filed an appeal with the Lewiston planning and zoning commission on January 26, 1997, contesting the size of Cook's building and asserting violations of the setback requirements. The community development director returned the notice of appeal on January 29, 1997, stating that it was untimely filed because more than fifteen days had elapsed since the building permit was issued on November 8, 1996.
The McVickers filed this lawsuit with the district court in Nez Perce County on December 3, 1996. The McVickers alleged that the City had improperly granted a building permit to Cook for the construction of the accessory building. The McVickers further alleged that Cook's accessory building violated City setback, height and use ordinances. The McVickers sought a writ of mandamus to compel the City to require modifications to the Cook accessory building and setbacks in a manner consistent with the McVickers' interpretation of Lewiston City Code § 37-131. The McVickers also sought a declaratory judgment declaring that (1) City officials had misinterpreted the Lewiston zoning ordinance; (2) the Lewiston zoning ordinance applies to the Cook accessory building; and (3) the Cook accessory building construction be stopped and modifications made. The McVickers also requested a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction but withdrew these requests shortly after filing suit because the building was substantially completed at the time of filing.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City and Cook on January 22, 1997, ruling that no mandate can issue to compel a discretionary act and that declaratory relief and a writ of mandamus were inappropriate because the McVickers had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The district court later denied the McVickers' Motion to Reconsider, to Amend, and for New Trial on March 30, 1998. The McVickers filed a Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice of Appeal on May 8, 1998, and May 13, 1998, respectively.
When this Court reviews the district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment it employs the same standard used by the district court in ruling on the summary judgment motion. Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745, 747, 890 P.2d 331, 333 (1995). All disputed facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Once the movant has established a prima facie case that, on the basis of uncontroverted facts, the movant is entitled to judgment, the opposing party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and cannot merely rest on the pleadings. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Theriault v. A.H. Robins Co. Inc., 108 Idaho 303, 306, 698 P.2d 365, 368 (1985).
The McVickers argue first that Lewiston ordinances do not provide for or mandate any administrative procedures which they should have followed. Secondarily, they argue that their November 13 letter was sufficient to comply with any procedural requirements.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies generally requires that a case run the full gamut of administrative proceedings before an application for judicial review may be considered. Grever v. Idaho Telephone Co., 94 Idaho 900, 903, 499 P.2d 1256, 1259 (1972). Lewiston City Code § 37-192(c) affords an administrative procedure by which to appeal a ruling of the community development department to the planning and zoning commission. Lewiston City Code § 37-192 states in pertinent part:
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