McWeeny v. City of Hartford

• Decision Date: 20 May 2008
• Docket Number: No. 17888.,17888.
• Citation: 287 Conn. 56,946 A.2d 862
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Robert F. McWEENY v. CITY OF HARTFORD et al.

946 A.2d 862

287 Conn. 56

Robert F. McWEENY v. CITY OF HARTFORD et al.

No. 17888.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 26, 2007.

Decided May 20, 2008.

Leon M. Rosenblatt, West Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Denise Aguilera, general counsel, and Helen Apostolidis, senior assistant corporation counsel, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).

PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA, SCHALLER and SULLIVAN, Js.

PALMER, J.

Under General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(1),¹ a provision of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (act), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to refuse to hire, to discharge from employment or to discriminate against any individual in the terms, conditions or privileges of employment on account of, inter alia, the individual's marital status. This appeal requires us to determine whether the recipient of a surviving spouse pension allowance has standing under § 46a-60(a)(1) to file a marital status discrimination complaint against the former employer of his deceased spouse and its agents because they terminated his surviving spouse pension allowance upon his remarriage. The plaintiff, Robert F. McWeeny,² appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his appeal from the decision of the commission on human rights and opportunities (commission) dismissing his complaint against the named defendant, the city of Hartford (city), the defendant municipal employees retirement fund (retirement fund), and the defendant Hartford pension commission.³ The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that only an employee or prospective employee who has suffered an injury due to an alleged discriminatory employment practice by his or her employer or prospective employer has standing under § 46a-60(a)(1) to bring an employment discrimination claim. The plaintiff contends that, contrary to the determination of the trial court, § 46a-60(a)(1) authorizes any person who is injured by an employer's discriminatory employment practice to bring a claim against the employer, regardless of whether the discriminatory practice affected the circumstances or conditions of the person's employment. We reject the plaintiff's claim and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are set forth in the trial court's memorandum of decision. "The plaintiff . . . and H. Maria Cone married on March 9, 1984. . . . Cone worked for the city . . . from February 6, 1978, until May 6, 1994, when she retired from municipal service. Pursuant to the terms of the pension plan offered by the city . . . Cone qualified for retirement pension benefits and began receiving those benefits from the city . . . through [the] . . . retirement fund . . . after she retired from city service . . . . Cone and [the plaintiff] remained married until the time of [Cone's] death.⁴ Because [the plaintiff] and . . . Cone were married at the time of her death, [the plaintiff] applied for and began receiving the surviving spouse allowance, which was equal to one half of Cone's monthly pension benefit. [The plaintiff] is not a current or former employee of the city . . . and he has never sought employment with the city.

"Pursuant to the terms of [the city's] pension plan, the surviving spouse pension allowance terminates upon the death or remarriage of the surviving spouse. On September 13, 2003, [the plaintiff] remarried and the city shortly thereafter stopped paying [him] the survivor's benefit because of his remarriage.

"On February 11, 2004, [the plaintiff] filed a complaint with the commission, pursuant to [General Statutes] § 46a-82(a)⁵ . . . . [The plaintiff essentially claimed] that the defendants [had] engaged in an alleged discriminatory employment practice by discriminating against him on account of his marital status by terminating his surviving spouse allowance. Significantly, [the plaintiff did] not claim that the defendants [had] discriminated against his former spouse, [Cone], in any way, including [on the basis of] her marital status. [The plaintiff also did] not claim that . . . Cone received a less favorable pension benefit package than any other employee of the city. Instead, his complaint [was] limited to the sole contention that the defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his marital status.

"The defendants filed an answer denying that they had discriminated against [the plaintiff] on the basis of his marital status or otherwise. After a preliminary investigation, an investigator of the commission, pursuant to [General Statutes] § 46a-83,⁶ determined that there was reasonable cause to believe that the defendants had committed a discriminatory practice. On September 29, 2004, the complaint was certified to the commission's executive director and to the attorney general.

"A public hearing was held before a human rights referee assigned by the commission. The parties presented testimony, and the referee admitted various documents into the record. Following the close of evidence, the parties submitted written briefs.

"On August 2, 2005, the referee issued a written decision dismissing [the plaintiff's] complaint on the [ground] that [the plaintiff] lacked standing to bring his claim of marital status discrimination before the commission [because the plaintiff never had or sought an employment relationship of any kind with the city].

"[The plaintiff] filed [an] administrative appeal on September 13, 2005. In his appeal, [the plaintiff maintained] that he has standing to bring [his] . . . [claim] and that he [was] entitled, as a matter of law, to reinstatement of his surviving spouse pension allowance, with back payments and interest." (Emphasis in original.)

After a hearing on the plaintiff's administrative appeal, the trial court rejected his contention that he has standing under § 46a-60(a)(1) to bring his claim against the defendants. The court explained that, in order to seek relief under a statutory scheme, a complainant must fall within the zone of interests that the statute was intended to protect. After examining the language of § 46a-60(a)(1), the trial court concluded that, "[b]y its plain terms . . . § 46a-60(a)(1) prohibits an employer from refusing to hire or employ, or to bar or discharge from employment `any individual' because of, inter alia, the individual's marital status. This statutory language . . . focuses on employers and their hiring (and refusal to hire) and firing of employees or prospective employees. The language does not address or even mention individuals who fall outside this relationship. These words express, therefore, a clear and unambiguous intent by the legislature to regulate the relationship between employers and employees [or] employers and prospective employees and to prevent employers from discharging from employment, or refusing to hire, individuals because of, inter alia, their marital status." The trial court then observed that the plaintiff "made no allegations in this case that the city refused to hire or employ him, or barred or discharged him from employment." The court further stated that the plaintiff had not brought his claim "in a representative capacity on behalf of [his deceased spouse] or her estate, alleging that the city discriminated against her regarding her compensation or in [the] terms, conditions or privileges of her employment." Rather, the court explained, the plaintiff's sole contention was that the city had discriminated against him personally by terminating his surviving spouse pension allowance. The court concluded that, because § 46a-60(a)(1) does not regulate an employer's relationship with anyone other than an employee or prospective employee, the plaintiff was not within the zone of interests that the statute was intended to protect.

In reaching its conclusion, the trial court rejected the plaintiff's contention that § 46a-82(a), which governs the filing of complaints with the commission, conferred standing on him to bring his claim because it authorizes "[a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged discriminatory practice . . . [to] file with the commission a complaint . . . ." General Statutes § 46a-82(a). The court explained that the plaintiff "can only be an individual claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged discriminatory practice if he falls within the class of individuals against whom a discriminatory practice could be committed. Because the class of individuals against whom a discriminatory practice could be committed is, in this instance, defined and limited by § 46a-60(a)(1), which governs discriminatory employment practices, the plaintiff's standing to bring [his claim] rises and falls on the meaning and construction of § 46a-60(a)(1)." The court also rejected the plaintiff's contention that federal case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII),⁷ the federal counterpart to the state act, supports the claim that individuals other than employees or prospective employees have standing under §§ 46a-60(a)(1) and 46a-82(a) to challenge an employer's discriminatory practices.

On appeal to this court,⁸ the plaintiff challenges the trial court's determination that employee or prospective employee status is a prerequisite to bringing a claim under § 46a-60(a)(1). Because we agree with the conclusion of the trial court, we affirm its judgment.

As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable standard of review. "The issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss. Practice Book § 10-31(a). [I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor . . . clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute. . . . Because a determination regarding the trial court's subject matter...