McWilliams v. Campbell

• Decision Date: 17 April 2013
• Docket Number: Case No.: 7:04-CV-2923-RDP-RRA
• Parties: JAMES E. McWILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. DONAL CAMPBELL, COMMISSIONER OF THE ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

JAMES E. McWILLIAMS, Petitioner,

v. DONAL CAMPBELL, COMMISSIONER OF THE ALABAMA DEPARTMENTOF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

Case No.: 7:04-CV-2923-RDP-RRA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA WESTERN DIVISION

Dated: April 17, 2013

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is before the court on limited remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit which found that while this court specifically addressed some of Petitioner James E. McWilliams' ("McWilliams" or "Petitioner") claims, it failed under Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1992), to address Petitioner's other claims. (Doc. 83). After remand, McWilliams has filed a Motion to Permit Supplemental Pleadings (Doc. 84) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) and that motion has been briefed by the parties. (Docs. 89 & 92). Based on an examination of the remand order and the arguments raised in McWilliams' motion, the court finds that both require: (1) a judgment as to the remaining claims identified as the subject of Clisby error in the Eleventh Circuit's remand order; and (2) a determination as to whether this court has jurisdiction to consider McWilliams' Motion to Permit Supplemental Pleadings, and if so, analysis of (and a decision regarding) whether to grant or deny that motion. The court addresses these two issues in turn after providing some background information.

I. BACKGROUND

Before addressing the issues raised by the parties, the court reviews the procedural history of this case prior to remand. This case involves a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on behalf of Petitioner, who has been convicted of the brutal capital murder of Patricia Vallery Reynolds and sentenced to death.¹ The Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendation on February 1, 2008 recommending that all of Petitioner's claims (Claims I-XXX) and his requests for an evidentiary hearing be denied. (See Doc. 55). In doing so, the Magistrate Judge instructed, "[i]n order to save everyone concerned time and effort, if the substance of an objection is that which has been set out in pleadings or argument, the party objecting may simply refer to his previous argument, instead of repeating his argument in the full form of objections." (Id. at 181) (emphasis in original).

McWilliams filed objections (Doc. 57), supplemental objections, and notices to the Report and Recommendation. To the extent he requested permission to file the supplemental objections and notices, those requests (Docs. 59, 61, 63, 67 and 68) were granted by this court in its August 25, 2010 Order and Memorandum Opinion (Doc. 75 at 3-4). That Memorandum Opinion expressly addressed and denied Claims I, II, III, IV, XX, XXIII, XXV(a), XXV(b) and XXVIII of the habeas petition. (Id. at 4-24). In the conclusion of the Memorandum Opinion,² the undersigned overruled McWilliams' objections and accepted the Magistrate Judge's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (Id. at 24).

Following Petitioner's first appeal, the Eleventh Circuit entered a Remand Order which vacated this court's judgment and remanded this case in order to allow this court to address all of McWilliams' objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, and thereafter enter a final judgment regarding the claims in McWilliams' habeas petition that were not specifically addressed in the August 25, 2010 Memorandum Opinion. The Remand Order reads as follows:

Petitioner James McWilliams filed a motion asking this Court to vacate and remand the district judge's order because he failed to address each of the claims in McWilliams' habeas petition as required by Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc). In Clisby, we determined that the district court must "resolve all claims for relief raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . . . , regardless [of] whether habeas relief is granted or denied." Id. at 936. If a case is referred to the magistrate judge, the district court must rule on the "preserved issues," i.e., those claims Petitioner objected to from the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation. See Callahan v. Campbell, 396 F.3d 1287, 1288-89 (11th Cir. 2005). That does not require the district court, however, to provide a detailed explanation as to why it is overruling each of petitioner's objections. See e.g., Hillary v. Sec'y for Dept. Of Corr., 294 F. App'x 569, 572 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curium).

Here, however, we do not encounter a situation where the district judge categorically overruled all objections because his order demonstrates that he was not aware of all objections. The magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation states: "In order to save everyone concerned time and effort, if the substance of an objection is that which has been set out already in pleadings or argument, the party objecting may simply refer to his previous argument, instead of repeating his argument in the full form of objections." In response, McWilliams' objections to the Report and Recommendation ("Objections Filing") begin by stating: "The Magistrate on February 5, 2008, held that petitioner could object by simply referencing his earlier argument. Hence, [McWilliams] objects to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation and refers to his [earlier] argument including but not limited to: 1. [McWilliams'] federal habeas petition" and numerous other filings he made. Furthermore, the Objections Filing offered "additional objections" to some of the magistrate judge's conclusions. Therefore, based on the Objections Filing, which complied with the magistrate judge's directions, McWilliams objected to the resolution of each of the claims in the Report and Recommendation because each ran counter to the contentions in his habeas petition.

The district judge, however, did not acknowledge that McWilliams objected to the magistrate judge's resolution of each claim. Instead, the district judge stated that McWilliams "objected to the Magistrate Judge's recommendations as to Claims I, II, III, IV, XX, XXIII, and XXV(a)." Those claims were the select few given extensive treatment in the "additional objections" sections of the Objections Filing.³ It is clear, therefore, the district judge viewed the "additional objections" as the only objections since he enumerated them in an exhaustive list. The inclusion of "additional" in the Objections Filing makes clear, however, that is not the case. Therefore, since the district judge's opinion demonstrates he was not aware of the existence of objections to the claim, he necessarily could not resolve them in accordance with Clisby. See 960 F.2d at 936.

We acknowledge that this is an unusual circumstance that could have been avoided at two junctions. First, the magistrate judge's decision to allow McWilliams to object to a claim's resolution by simply referring to previous arguments made on the claim created an opportunity for McWilliams to object without explicitly drawing the district judge's attention to the objection. Second, had the district judge not explicitly listed each of the objections he believed McWilliams made, his languagerejecting "all" objections would have captured the claims we now deem unresolved.

Therefore, out of an abundance of caution, we vacate and remand the district judge's order so that he may resolve the remaining claims alleging a constitutional violation. We note that the district judge already possesses the magistrate judge's thorough Report and Recommendation and McWilliams' habeas petition which contains his arguments on each remaining claim. After the district court resolves the remaining claims, McWilliams, should he choose, is permitted to file a request for a new certificate of appealability from the district court and this court.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

(Doc. 83 at 1-5) (emphasis in original) (additional footnotes omitted).

After remand, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), McWilliams moved to permit supplemental pleadings. (Doc. 84). Specifically, McWilliams sought leave to brief and argue the applicability of Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012), and Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), to this court's earlier determination that McWilliams' multiple and extensive claims asserting Brady and Giglio violations were procedurally defaulted because they were not presented, in the first instance, to the Rule 32 circuit court.

After full briefing on the issues raised by McWilliams' motion, the court heard oral argument. After careful review, and with the benefit of argument, the court finds the motion to supplement the pleadings is due to be denied for the following reasons.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Judgment as to the Remaining Claims in Compliance with Clisby v. Jones

In accordance with the Eleventh Circuit's remand order, this court has carefully reviewed and considered de novo all the materials in the court file pertaining to all remaining claims, and all objections to those remaining claims as that term specifically is defined by the Magistrate Judge in his Report and Recommendation. The court finds that Petitioner has not raised any meritoriousclaims. Indeed, during the hearing on January 16, 2013, even the Petitioner's attorney, while discussing procedural implications possibly imposed by Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), and Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012), conceded that he is not entitled to relief on his Clisby claims, which were the subject of the limited review:

COURT: All right. From your pleadings and your argument today, I get this much. The heart of your argument in this court is going to revolve around Maples and Martinez, right?

ATTORNEY: At least as to their defaulted Brady claims, yes, Your Honor.

COURT: Sure. All right. Let's step back for a second. Let's get on the other track for just one second. Let's say Martinez and Maples had never been decided and that my order had not addressed all of the objections, whether

...