McWilliams v. City of Chi.

• Decision Date: 31 March 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 14 C 3902
• Parties: Kevin MCWILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Scott J. Celani, James Tucker, and Dawn Hubbard, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

451 F.Supp.3d 867

Kevin MCWILLIAMS, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF CHICAGO, Scott J. Celani, James Tucker, and Dawn Hubbard, Defendants.

Case No. 14 C 3902

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed March 31, 2020

Robert Bruce Thompson, Kenneth James Sophie, Jr., Harrington, Thompson, Acker & Harrington, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Melissa Freddi Gold, Scott A. Cohen, City of Chicago Department of Law, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HON. JORGE ALONSO, United States District Judge Plaintiff Kevin McWilliams brings this lawsuit against defendants the City of Chicago and defendants Scott J. Celani, James Tucker, and Dawn Hubbard (the "Defendant Officers"), alleging claims of evidence fabrication under § 1983¹ and malicious prosecution. Before the Court is defendants' motion for summary judgment [106]. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion is granted.

FACTS

On the evening of February 21, 2013, while sitting in a car parked on the street in the 6400 block of South Eggleston Avenue in Chicago, Illinois, the Defendant Officers approached plaintiff, directed him to exit his vehicle, and subjected him to a custodial search. During the search, the Defendant Officers recovered two pairs of brass knuckles, which are illegal in Illinois. 720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(1). Under Illinois law, possession of brass knuckles is generally a misdemeanor, 720 ILCS 5/24-1(b), but the offense is a felony for any person who has been previously convicted of a felony. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a), (e). Plaintiff admits to having had two pairs of brass knuckles on his person on February 21, 2013, and to having been previously convicted of a felony.

Defendant Celani completed a form stating in part that plaintiff was seated in a vehicle parked 3-4 feet from the curb and that he had brass knuckles in his lap. The Cook County State's Attorney's Office ("CCSAO") approved charges against plaintiff, two counts of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (one for each pair of brass knuckles). Defendant Celani signed a criminal complaint. A traffic ticket for improper parallel parking was also issued to plaintiff. The traffic ticket included a unique identifier of "TB 650-057," date, time and location of issuance, offense listing, and the signature and unique star number for Defendant Celani.

Plaintiff spent the night of February 21, 2013 in jail. The following day, on February 22, 2013, plaintiff attended a bond hearing and was released from custody after posting $500 bond. During the bond hearing, the prosecutor stated that it was a brass knuckles case.

On February 28, 2013, plaintiff attended a hearing for his criminal case. During the hearing, Defendant Celani testified, and Defendant Tucker's name was identified as an arresting officer. Plaintiff's traffic ticket was nonsuited during the hearing.

On July 16, 2013, plaintiff attended a status hearing where a judge modified his bond requirements by imposing additional conditions on plaintiff, including a curfew requiring plaintiff to stay at home from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. On September 17, 2013, plaintiff attended another status hearing where Pretrial Services advised the court that plaintiff had not complied with the curfew (he was not in his apartment on five separate occasions in August and September). The criminal-court judge increased plaintiff's bond from $5,000 to $100,000. Plaintiff was not able to post bond and was remanded to the Cook County Department of Corrections to await trial in his criminal case.

A hearing on plaintiff's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence was held on February 11, 2014. During the hearing, plaintiff testified that he was sitting in the driver's seat of a legally parked car when an unmarked police car drove the wrong way down a one-way street and stopped next to his car. Plaintiff testified that he was playing a game on his cell phone and did not have brass knuckles on his lap. According to plaintiff, officers approached the car, told him to get out of the car, searched him, and found brass knuckles in his coat pocket. Plaintiff admitted having brass knuckles on his person, testifying that he had one in each of his coat pockets. He said they were not visible when the officers approached the car. Defendant Celani testified during the hearing, stating that the arresting officers had recovered two pairs of brass knuckles from plaintiff's person. He identified Defendant Tucker and Defendant Hubbard as the co-arresting officers for plaintiff's underlying arrest. The state court judge granted the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. On February 14, 2014, the Cook County State's Attorney's Office dismissed the unlawful use of a weapon charges against plaintiff pursuant to nolle prosequi .

On May 28, 2014, plaintiff submitted his original complaint in this matter, along with an application to proceed in forma pauperis . He named the City of Chicago and the Chicago Police Department as defendants in his complaint. On July 17, 2014, the Court denied plaintiff's IFP application. On September 15, 2014, the Court granted plaintiff's second motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis , finding that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1915(A), plaintiff had pled plausible claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution, and his complaint was filed. On March 13, 2015, Defendant City of Chicago and Defendant Chicago Police Department were served. On April 10, 2015, attorneys for the City of Chicago filed appearances. On June 3, 2015, the Court dismissed the matter for want of prosecution. The case was reinstated on September 8, 2015.

On September 28, 2015, a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") response regarding the underlying arrest was sent to plaintiff's sister, Bianca Armstead. Included in the FOIA response was information identifying all three Defendant Officers by name and star. During the September 30, 2015 status hearing, plaintiff was advised to serve interrogatories to Defendants City of Chicago and the Chicago Police Department.

On October 26, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion of addendum where he identified the following defendants for the first time: Cook County Sheriff Thomas J. Dart, Unknown Case Prosecutors for Criminal Case #9018284, Officer Scott J. Celani Star #3733, Officer Tucker Star #5542, Officer Hubbard Star #6062, and Circuit Court of Cook County Judge William Gamboney. On November 2, 2015, the Court denied plaintiff's motion and noted that, if plaintiff wanted to amend his complaint, he would need to file a new complaint that stood on its own. The Court also denied plaintiff's motion for a court-appointed attorney. On November 10, 2015, the City propounded to plaintiff its Initial Rule 26(a) Disclosure Statement and thirty-five pages of CPD records regarding the arrest.

On January 29, 2016, plaintiff, through recruited counsel, filed his First Amended Complaint and summonses were issued. The Defendant Officers were served in February 2016.

STANDARD

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In considering such a motion, the court construes the evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Kvapil v. Chippewa Cty. , 752 F.3d 708, 712 (7th Cir. 2014). "Summary judgment should be denied if the dispute is ‘genuine’: ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ " Talanda v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co. , 140 F.3d 1090, 1095 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ); see also Bunn v. Khoury Enters., Inc. , 753 F.3d 676, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2014). The court will enter summary judgment against a party who does not "come forward with evidence that would reasonably permit the finder of fact to find in [its] favor on a material question." Modrowski v. Pigatto , 712 F.3d 1166, 1167 (7th Cir. 2013). It is well settled that at the summary judgment stage, the court does not make credibility determinations, weigh evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts; those are jury functions. See Gibbs v. Lomas , 755 F.3d 529, 536 (7th Cir. 2014).

ANALYSIS

I. Whether plaintiff's claims are time-barred

Defendants first challenge the timeliness of plaintiff's claims. The Court will evaluate each claim in turn.

A. Pretrial wrongful detention claim based on evidence fabrication under the Fourth Amendment and § 1983

The parties agree that there is a two-year statute of limitations period for this claim. See Gekas v. Vasiliades , 814 F.3d 890, 894 (7th Cir. 2016) ("The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Illinois is two years."). The parties also agree that plaintiff's § 1983 claim accrued when his detention ended. See Manuel v. City of Joliet ("Manuel II "), 903 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2018) (an individual's Fourth Amendment claim for wrongful pretrial detention accrues when the detention ends). But the parties disagree as to when, exactly, plaintiff's detention ended. Defendants say that this claim accrued when plaintiff was released on bond (on February 22, 2013) and, therefore, is time-barred because he did not name the individual officers as defendants by February 22, 2015. Plaintiff counters that this claim accrued when he was released from custody (on February 14, 2014) and, therefore, is timely because he named the individual officers as defendants in his amended complaint on January 29, 2016.

The Court previously addressed this issue when it ruled on defendants' motion to dismiss. (See dkt. 99.) In denying defendants' motion to dismiss on the basis of timeliness, the Court noted that defendants have the burden to establish that plaintiff's claim is time-barred and that the Seventh Circuit had recently held that the accrual date for a Fourth Amendment claim involving...