McWilliams v. Dunn

• Citation: 198 L.Ed.2d 341,137 S.Ct. 1790
• Decision Date: 19 June 2017
• Docket Number: No. 16–5294.,16–5294.
• Parties: James E. McWILLIAMS, Petitioner v. Jefferson S. DUNN, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

137 S.Ct. 1790

198 L.Ed.2d 341

James E. McWILLIAMS, Petitioner

v.Jefferson S. DUNN, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al.

No. 16–5294.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued April 24, 2017.

Decided June 19, 2017.

Stephen B. Bright, Atlanta, GA, appointed by this Court, for Petitioner.

Andrew L. Brasher, Solicitor General, for Respondents.

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Michael B. DeSanctis, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP, Washington, DC, Joshua S. Meltzer, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP, San Francisco, CA, Stephen B. Bright, Mark Loudon–Brown, Patrick Mulvaney, Atlanta, GA, for Petitioner.

Steven T. Marshall, Alabama Attorney General, Andrew L. Brasher, Solicitor General, Henry M. Johnson, Megan A. Kirkpatrick, Assistant Attorneys General, Office of the Alabama Attorney General, Montgomery, AL, for Respondents.

Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

Thirty-one years ago, petitioner James Edmond McWilliams, Jr., was convicted of capital murder by an Alabama jury and sentenced to death. McWilliams challenged his sentence on appeal, arguing that the State had failed to provide him with the expert mental health assistance the Constitution requires, but the Alabama courts refused to grant relief. We now consider, in this habeas corpus case, whether the Alabama courts' refusal was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We hold that it was. Our decision in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), clearly established that, when certain threshold criteria are met, the State must provide an indigent defendant with access to a mental health expert who is sufficiently available to the defense and independent from the prosecution to effectively "assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense." Id., at 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087. Petitioner in this case did not receive that assistance.

I

McWilliams and the State of Alabama agree that Ake (which this Court decided in February 1985) sets forth the applicable constitutional standards. Before turning to the circumstances of McWilliams' case, we describe what the Court held in Ake . We put in italics language that we find particularly pertinent here.

The Court began by stating that the "issue in this case is whether the Constitution requires that an indigent defendant have access to the psychiatric examination and assistance necessary to prepare an effective defense based on his mental condition, when his sanity at the time of the offense is seriously in question." Id., at 70, 105 S.Ct. 1087 (emphasis added). The Court said it would consider that issue within the framework of earlier cases granting "an indigent defendant ... a fair opportunity to present his defense" and "to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake." Id., at 76, 105 S.Ct. 1087. "Meaningful access to justice," the Court added, "has been the consistent theme of these cases." Id., at 77, 105 S.Ct. 1087.

The Court then wrote that "when the State has made the defendant's mental condition relevant to his criminal culpability and to the punishment he might suffer, the assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial to the defendant's ability to marshal his defense." Id., at 80, 105 S.Ct. 1087. A psychiatrist may, among other things, "gather facts," "analyze the information gathered and from it draw plausible conclusions," and "know the probative questions to ask of the opposing party's psychiatrists and how to interpret their answers." Ibid. These and related considerations

"lea[d] inexorably to the conclusion that, without the assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a professional examination on issues relevant to the defense, to help determine whether the insanity defense is viable, to present testimony, and to assist in preparing the cross-examination of a State's psychiatric witnesses, the risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is extremely high. With such assistance, the defendant is fairly able to present at least enough information to the jury, in a meaningful manner, as to permit it to make a sensible determination." Id., at 82, 105 S.Ct. 1087 (emphasis added).

The Court concluded: "We therefore hold that when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense .... Our concern is that the indigent defendant have access to a competent psychiatrist for the[se] purpose[s] ." Id., at 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087 (emphasis added).

Ake thus clearly establishes that when its threshold criteria are met, a State must provide a mental health professional capable of performing a certain role: "conduct[ing] an appropriate examination and assist [ing] in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense." Ibid. Unless a defendant is "assure[d]" the assistance of someone who can effectively perform these functions, he has not received the "minimum" to which Ake entitles him. Ibid.

II

A

One month after this Court decided Ake, the State of Alabama charged McWilliams with rape and murder. The trial court found McWilliams indigent and provided him with counsel. It also granted counsel's pretrial motion for a psychiatric evaluation of McWilliams' sanity, including aspects of his mental condition relevant to "mitigating circumstances to be considered in a capital case in the sentencing stage." T. 1526. ("T." refers to the certified trial record; "P.C.T." refers to the certified court reporter's state postconviction proceedings transcript.) The court ordered the State to convene a "Lunacy Commission," which would examine McWilliams and file a report with the court. See id., at 1528–1529.

Subsequently a three-member Lunacy Commission examined McWilliams at a state hospital, the Taylor Hardin Secure Medical Facility. The three members, all psychiatrists, concluded that McWilliams was competent to stand trial and that he had not been suffering from mental illness at the time of the alleged offense. Id., at 1544–1546. One of them, Dr. Kamal Nagi, wrote that "Mr. McWilliams is grossly exaggerating his psychological symptoms to mimic mental illness."Id., at 1546. Dr. Nagi noted that McWilliams' performance on one of the tests "suggested that [McWilliams] had exaggerated his endorsement of symptoms of illness and the profile was considered a ‘fake bad.’ " Ibid.

McWilliams' trial took place in late August 1986. On August 26 the jury convicted him of capital murder. The prosecution sought the death penalty, which under then-applicable Alabama law required both a jury recommendation (with at least 10 affirmative votes) and a later determination by the judge. See Ala. Code § 13A–5–46(f) (1986). The jury-related portion of the sentencing proceeding took place the next day. The prosecution reintroduced evidence from the guilt phase and called a police officer to testify that McWilliams had a prior conviction. T. 1297, 1299–1303. The defense called McWilliams and his mother. Both testified that McWilliams, when a child, had suffered multiple serious head injuries

. Id., at 1303–1318, 1320–1335. McWilliams also described his history of psychiatric and psychological evaluations, reading from the prearrest report of one psychologist, who concluded that McWilliams had a "blatantly psychotic thought disorder" and needed inpatient treatment. Id., at 1329–1332.

When the prosecutor, cross-examining McWilliams, asked about the neurological effects of his head injuries

, McWilliams replied, "I am not a psychiatrist." Id., at 1328. Similarly, when the prosecutor asked McWilliams' mother whether her son was "crazy," she answered, "I am no expert: I don't know whether my son is crazy or not. All I know, that my son do need help." Id., at 1317.

The prosecution then called two of the mental health professionals who had signed the Lunacy Commission's report, Dr. Kamal Nagi and Dr. Norman Poythress. Dr. Nagi testified that he had found no evidence of psychosis

, but did not appear to be aware of McWilliams' history of head trauma. See id., at 1351–1352. Dr. Poythress testified that one of the tests that McWilliams took was "clinically invalid" because the test's "validity scales" indicated that McWilliams had exaggerated or faked his symptoms. Id., at 1361–1363.

Although McWilliams' counsel had subpoenaed further mental health records from Holman State Prison, where McWilliams was being held, the jury did not have the opportunity to consider them, for, though subpoenaed on August 13, the records had not arrived by August 27, the day of the jury hearing.

After the hearing, the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of 10 to 2, the minimum required by Alabama law. The court scheduled its judicial sentencing hearing for October 9, about six weeks later.

B

Five weeks before that hearing, the trial court ordered the Alabama Department of Corrections to respond to McWilliams's subpoena for mental health records. Id., at 1619. The court also granted McWilliams' motion for neurological and neuropsychological exams. Id., at 1615–1617. That motion (apparently filed at the suggestion of a University of Alabama psychologist who had "volunteer[ed]" to help counsel "in her spare time," P.C.T. 251–252) asked the court to "issue an order requiring the State of Alabama to do complete neurological and neuropsychological testing on the Defendant in order to have the test results available for his sentencing hearing." T. 1615.

Consequently, Dr. John Goff, a neuropsychologist employed by the State's Department of Mental Health, examined McWilliams. On October 7, two days before the judicial sentencing hearing, Dr. Goff filed his report. The report concluded that McWilliams presented "some diagnostic dilemmas." Id., at 1635. On the one hand, he was ...