McZeal v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank
| Decision Date | 07 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-6754 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
| Parties | ALFRED MCZEAL v. J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, NA, STACY C. WHEAT, LOUIS GRAHAM ARCENEAUX, GRAHAM, ARCENEAUX & ALLEN, LLC |
Before this Court is Defendant J.P Morgan Chase Bank's1 Motion for More Definite Statement Pursuant to Rule 12(e) (R. Doc. 27) and Defendants Louis Graham Arceneaux; Stacy C. Wheat; and Graham, Arceneaux & Allen's2 Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (R. Doc. 32). Having considered the motions, memoranda, exhibits, record, and applicable law, the Court hereby GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for More Definite Statement for the reasons stated herein.3
This case arises out of a real estate foreclosure in Lafayette on property owned by the Plaintiff, Alfred McZeal, Jr.,4 and the Plaintiff's father, Alfred McZeal, Sr. Alfred McZeal, Sr. executed a mortgage with BankOne on June 18, 2004 in conjunction with a promissory note in the amount of $50,000.00. (Def. Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, R. Doc. 32, Ex. 1 ). J.P. Morgan Chase ("Chase Bank") became the holder of the note and mortgage and sought to enforce the mortgage on the property on December 22, 2009, through representative counsel, Defendants Louis Graham Arceneaux, Stacy C. Wheat, and Graham, Arceneaux & Allen, LLC, who filed aPetition for Executory Process with the Louisiana Civil District Court of the 15th Judicial District of Louisiana. Id.
On January 4, 2010, the Louisiana District Court ordered the issuance of a writ of seizure and sale. (R. Doc. 32, Ex. 2). In response, on April 1, 2010, both McZeal and his father filed an "Injunction to Arrest the Seizure and Sale & T.R.O." (R. Doc. 32, Ex. 4). The Louisiana District Court denied the injunction and the Sheriff sale was rescheduled. (R. Doc. 32, 2). Alfred McZeal, Sr., alone removed that matter to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana; however the Western District remanded the case to the 15th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Lafayette on January 7, 2011. (R. Doc. 32, 2). Thereafter, on September 30, 2013, Alfred McZeal, Jr., a resident of California, filed the instant matter in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Los Angeles Division. (Compl., R. Doc. 1). On December 19, 2013, the suit was transferred to the Eastern District of Louisiana.
McZeal's Complaint alleges no less than twenty-one separate causes of action and seeks relief in the form of a declaratory judgment as well as damages.5 In response, Defendant Chase Bank filed a Motion for More Definite Statement, asserting that the Plaintiff asserts no facts supporting his twenty-one causes of action and that full and proper allegations must be made for each cause of action, seeking all appropriate relief, including dismissal, under Rule 12(e). (Def.Mot. Def. Statement, 2). The Arceneaux Defendants acknowledge the merit of Chase Bank's motion for more definite statement but, on the belief that McZeal will not ever be able to adequately state a viable cause of action, filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). (R. Doc. 32). In their 12(b)(6) motion, the Arceneaux Defendants argue primarily that all of McZeal's claims are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as they are impermissible collateral attacks on a final state court judgment. (Def. Mem., R. Doc. 32, 4). Secondarily, the Arceneaux Defendants argue that McZeal specifically fails to state any claim under any allegation made in the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). (Def. Mot., R. Doc. 32, 2).
Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8). In addition, Rule 8(d) provides that, in general, "each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d). "[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Likewise, a complaint that articulates "naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement" is similarly insufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal punctuation omitted).
When the complaint does not meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8, Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a civil action for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." McManaway v. KBR, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 2d 654, 660 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2012). Alternatively, when a complaint does not meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8, it may be dismissed under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Santos v. Texas Workforce Comm'n., No. 08-1869, 2008 WL 4937572 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2008) (citing McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir.1996)); see also Nevijel v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 1981). Rule 41(b) states that "if the plaintiff . . . fails to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it." The district court also has the inherent authority to dismiss an action under Rule 41(b) sua sponte, without motion by a defendant. Chevalier v. David Wade Corr. Ctr. Sec., No. 12-2954-P, 2014 WL 769297 (W.D. La. Feb. 26, 2014) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1388-89, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962)). "The power to invoke this sanction is necessary in order to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and to avoid congestion in the calendars of the [d]istrict [c]ourts." McCullough v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir.1988).
The pleading standard under Rule 8 does not apply, however, when the plaintiff specifically alleges fraud in his complaint; under Rule 9(b) the plaintiff "must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake." Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). "Rule 9(b) is an exception to the liberal federal court pleading requirements embodied in Rule 8(a)." American Realty Trust, Inc. v. Hamilton Lane Advisors, Inc., 115 Fed.Appx. 662, 668 (5th Cir. 2004). While the particularity necessarily differs depending on the facts of each case, the Fifth Circuit has established that "Rule 9(b) requires the plaintiff to allege the particulars of time, place, andcontents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation and what that person obtained thereby." Id. citing Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1068 (5th Cir.1994). In addition, even as to pleading scienter generally, "a plaintiff must set forth specific facts that support an inference of fraud." Id. For example, simply alleging that a defendant "made false statements during negotiations" leading up to an event to induce "someone to enter into a contract with him—without any additional factual support—does not allege the particular time and place of the false representations, nor does it set forth any 'specific facts' to support the inference of fraud. Id. at 668. If the plaintiff fails to plead with particularity in accordance with Rule 9(b), a dismissal is treated as a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim. Lovelace v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017 (5th Cir.1996).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) provides that "[a] party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response." The motion must state the defects in the pleading and the details desired. Id. A party, however, may not use a Rule 12(e) motion as a substitute for discovery. See Mitchell v. E-Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 132 (5th Cir.1959). As a result of the liberal pleading standard set forth in Rule 8, Rule 12(e) motions are disfavored. See id. Nevertheless, Rule 12(e) motions are necessary when "the pleadings are unintelligible rather than suffer from a want of detail." Tipton v. Reynolds, No. 13-0509, 2013 WL 4854372 (E.D.La. Setp. 10, 2013). Further, the court is given considerable discretion in deciding whether to grant a Rule 12(e) motion. See Newcourt Leasing Corp. v. Reg'l Bio-Clinical Lab., Inc., No. 99-2626, 2000 WL 134700 (E.D. La. Feb. 1, 2000); Fleming v. Transocean Offshore USA Inc., No. 04-2740, 2004 WL 2984325 (E.D.La. Dec. 14, 2004)
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff, and all well-pleaded facts in the original complaint must be taken as true. Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1980). However, a court is not bound to accept legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986), and the plaintiff must plead "specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations." Tuchman v. DSC Commc'ns Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). As the Fifth Circuit...
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