Md. Shall Issue, Inc. v. Hogan

• Citation: 963 F.3d 356
• Decision Date: 29 June 2020
• Docket Number: No. 18-2474,18-2474
• Parties: MARYLAND SHALL ISSUE, INCORPORATED; Paul Mark Brockman; Robert Brunger; Caroline Brunger; David Orlin, all of the above individually named plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs – Appellants, v. Lawrence HOGAN, in his capacity of Governor of Maryland, Defendant – Appellee. Giffords Law Center To Prevent Gun Violence, Amicus Supporting Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

963 F.3d 356

MARYLAND SHALL ISSUE, INCORPORATED; Paul Mark Brockman; Robert Brunger; Caroline Brunger; David Orlin, all of the above individually named plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs – Appellants,

v. Lawrence HOGAN, in his capacity of Governor of Maryland, Defendant – Appellee.Giffords Law Center To Prevent Gun Violence, Amicus Supporting Appellee.

No. 18-2474

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: January 29, 2020

Decided: June 29, 2020

ARGUED: Mark William Pennak, MARYLAND SHALL ISSUE, INC., Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellants. Adam Dean Snyder, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Cary J. Hansel, Erienne A. Sutherell, HANSEL LAW, P.C., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General, Jennifer L. Katz, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Scott A. Edelman, Los Angeles, California, Kathryn Cherry, Dallas, Texas, Vivek R. Gopalan, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, San Francisco, California; Hannah Shearer, San Francisco, California. J. Adam Skaggs, GIFFORDS LAW CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, New York, New York, for Amicus Curiae.

Before FLOYD, THACKER and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Thacker wrote the opinion, in which Judge Floyd joined. Judge Richardson wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.

THACKER, Circuit Judge:

On its own behalf and on behalf of its members, Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. ("MSI") challenges a Maryland statute banning "rapid fire trigger activators" -- devices that, when attached to a firearm, increase its rate of fire or trigger activation. MSI argues the statute violates the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution as well as Maryland's takings provisions. And because the statute does not define "rate of fire" or "trigger activation," MSI also argues it is void for vagueness. The district court held MSI did not have organizational standing to pursue these claims on its own behalf and also rejected its substantive contentions.

Because we agree with the district court that MSI lacks standing and that the Complaint otherwise fails to state a claim, we affirm for the reasons detailed herein.

I.

On April 24, 2018, Maryland Governor Lawrence Hogan ("Appellee" or "Maryland") signed Senate Bill 707 ("SB-707") into law. SB-707 makes it unlawful for any person to "manufacture, possess, sell, offer to sell, transfer, purchase, or receive a rapid fire trigger activator" or to "transport" such a device into the state. SB-707, sec. 2, § 4-305.1(a). Violation of SB-707 is a criminal misdemeanor subject to a term of imprisonment of up to three years, a fine of up to $5,000, or both. Id. , sec. 1, § 4-306(a).

SB-707 defines "rapid fire trigger activator" as "any device, including a removable manual or power-driven activating device, constructed so that, when installed in or attached to a firearm the rate at which the trigger is activated increases; or the rate of fire increases." SB-707, sec. 1, § 4-301(M)(1). In addition to any other device which increases the rate of trigger activation or fire, SB-707 specifies that the following enumerated devices are rapid fire trigger activators: "a bump stock, trigger crank, hellfire trigger, binary trigger system, burst trigger system, or a copy or a similar device, regardless of the producer or manufacturer." Id. § 4-301(M)(2). Further, SB-707 exempts from the definition any "semiautomatic replacement trigger that improves the performance and functionality over the stock trigger." Id. § 4-301(M)(3).

SB-707 contains an exception clause which purports to permit individuals to continue to possess the otherwise prohibited devices, provided that the individual "(1) possessed the rapid fire trigger activator before October 1, 2018; (2) applied to the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ["ATF"] before October 1, 2018, for authorization to possess a rapid fire trigger activator; (3) received authorization to possess a rapid fire trigger activator from the [ATF] before October 1, 2019; and (4) is in compliance with all federal requirements for possession of a rapid fire trigger activator." SB-707, sec. 1, § 4-305.1(b). However, on the day SB-707 went into effect, October 1, 2018, the ATF released a "Special Advisory" on its website indicating, "ATF is without legal authority to accept and process [the exception] application." J.A. 13.¹ Consequently, the ATF asked Maryland residents to not file any such applications and advised that any it received would be "returned to the applicant without action." Id.

On June 11, 2018, MSI and four individual plaintiffs (collectively, "Appellants") filed the instant putative class action complaint in the District of Maryland (the "Complaint"). The Complaint alleged five counts, which the district court characterized as follows:

• In Counts I and II, [Appellants] argue that [SB-707] is a per se taking without just compensation under the United States Constitution, as well as the Maryland Constitution, to the extent its Takings Clause follows federal law.

• In Counts II and V, [Appellants] put forward a separate per se takings theory under the State Constitution—that [SB-707] retrospectively abrogates vested property rights in violation of Article 24, which also constitutes a taking under Maryland law.

• In Count IV, [Appellants] argue that [SB-707] is unconstitutionally vague, because its terms can be read to encompass a number of devices that have only "minimal" impact on a firearm's rate of fire and are otherwise functionally and operationally dissimilar to bump stocks and other devices named in the Act.

• In Count III, [Appellants] argue that ATF's refusal to process applications and grant authorizations for continued lawful possession makes it "legally impossible to comply" with [SB-707]’s exception clause, thus imposing a "legally impossible condition precedent" that violates due process and cannot be severed from the rest of [SB-707].

J.A. 232–33.

Appellee moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). After a hearing, the district court granted Appellee's 12(b)(6) motion with respect to all counts except Count IV. Thereafter, the district court sua sponte dismissed Count IV pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) after determining that all plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue the vagueness claim. Although the district court also determined that MSI lacked organizational standing to sue on its own behalf, it nonetheless concluded that MSI did have representative standing to sue on behalf of its members.

Appellants noted a timely appeal to this court.

II.

We review dismissals pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo. Ott v. Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services , 909 F.3d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 2018). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain enough facts " ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level’ and ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Occupy Columbia v. Haley , 738 F.3d 107, 116 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "[A]lthough a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in a complaint, such deference is not accorded legal conclusions stated therein," and "[t]he mere recital of elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements is not sufficient." Walters v. McMahen , 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012).

A dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is also reviewed de novo. See Demetres v. East West Const., Inc. , 776 F.3d 271, 272 (4th Cir. 2015). When reviewing a complaint dismissed for failure to allege facts supporting subject matter jurisdiction, we afford the plaintiff "the same procedural protection as she would receive under a Rule 12(b)(6) consideration, wherein the facts alleged in the complaint are taken as true, and the defendant's challenge must be denied if the complaint alleges sufficient facts to invoke subject matter jurisdiction." Beck v. McDonald , 848 F.3d 262, 270 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

III.

A.MSI's Organizational Standing

Appellants’ first claim of error is that the district court wrongly determined MSI lacked organizational standing to sue on its own behalf.

An organization can sue on its own behalf rather than as a representative of its members when it independently satisfies the elements of Article III standing: (1) "the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical"; (2) "there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of"; and (3) "it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "[A] mere interest in a problem, no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient [to establish standing]." Sierra Club v. Morton , 405 U.S. 727, 739, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court determined MSI failed to meet the first prong of Article III standing -- injury in fact. In the Complaint, MSI alleged "SB 707 requirements directly harm MSI as an organization by undermining its message and acting as an obstacle to the organization's objectives and purposes." J.A. 11–12. In support, MSI alleged it

seeks to educate the community about the right of self-protection, the safe handling of

...