Mead v. Commissioner of Correction

• Decision Date: 08 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 17632.,17632.
• Citation: Mead v. Commissioner of Correction, 920 A.2d 301, 282 Conn. 317 (Conn. 2007)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Harold W. MEAD v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

920 A.2d 301

282 Conn. 317

Harold W. MEAD v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

No. 17632.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 19, 2006.

Decided May 8, 2007.

Temmy Ann Pieszak, chief of habeas corpus services, for the appellant (petitioner).

Madeline A. Melchionne, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Henri Alexandre, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (respondent).

BORDEN, NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA and SULLIVAN, Js.

SULLIVAN, J.

The petitioner, Harold W. Mead, appeals¹ from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claims on appeal that the habeas court improperly concluded that General Statutes § 53a-35b,² which defines a sentence of life imprisonment as a definite sentence of sixty years, does not apply retroactively to persons who committed crimes prior to that statute's enactment. We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. On March 8, 1971, the petitioner was indicted on three counts of murder in the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1968) § 53-9 for offenses committed on or about August 12, 1970.³ On April 6, 1972, the petitioner changed his pleas of not guilty as to the three counts of murder in the first degree to guilty of three counts of murder in the second degree. On April 11, 1972, the petitioner was sentenced to three concurrent life sentences, under General Statutes (Rev. to 1968) § 53-11,⁴ and was confined to the custody of the respondent, the commissioner of correction (commissioner), pursuant to a mittimus issued on that date. As of the date of the petitioner's crimes, a sentence of life imprisonment was regarded as a sentence of imprisonment for the duration of the defendant's natural life. General Statutes (Rev. to 1968) § 53-11.

Thereafter, as part of the Penal Code that became effective on October 1, 1971, the legislature adopted Public Acts 1969, No. 828, § 35, codified at General Statutes (Rev. to 1972) § 53a-35, which provides in relevant part that, "(a) [a] sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be an indeterminate sentence...." The statute also sets a maximum term of life imprisonment and a minimum term of not less than ten nor more than twenty-five years for a class A felony. See General Statutes (Rev. to 1972) § 53a-35 (b) and (c). In 1980, as part of the legislature's comprehensive revision of the state's sentencing structure abolishing indeterminate sentencing and creating definite sentencing, the legislature enacted § 53a-35b and amended § 53a-35 (a) to provide in relevant part: "For any felony committed prior to July 1 1981, the sentence of imprisonment shall be an indeterminate sentence...." Public Acts 1980, No. 80-442, § 9, now codified at General Statutes § 53a-35 (a). Accordingly, the commissioner recalculated the petitioner's sentence for murder, a class A felony,⁵ from a sentence of life imprisonment to an indeterminate sentence with a minimum term of twenty-five years and a maximum term of life imprisonment pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-35.

Accounting for statutory good time credits, jail credit, and earned seven day job credit, the twenty-five year minimum portion of the petitioner's sentence expired on February 25, 1985, making him parole eligible on that date.⁶ The petitioner was first denied parole on April 2, 1985, and subsequently denied parole on six more occasions.⁷ The petitioner's next parole eligibility date is 2011.

On January 15, 2004, the petitioner filed the present second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus.⁸ The petition alleges, in relevant part, that the commissioner's custody of the petitioner is unlawful because the commissioner has not calculated the petitioner's sentence of life imprisonment in accordance with the current version of § 53a-35b, which provides in relevant part that "[a] sentence of imprisonment for life shall mean a definite sentence of sixty years...." The petitioner seeks a recalculation of his life sentence to a definite sentence of sixty years, and the reduction of such sentence by all applicable credits, pursuant to General Statutes § 18-7.⁹ The commissioner opposed the petition on the grounds that § 53a-35b does not apply retroactively to the petitioner's sentence, and that the petitioner is serving the correct indeterminate sentence of twenty-five years to life imprisonment.

Following a hearing on March 9, 2004, on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, the habeas court issued a memorandum of decision on May 20, 2004. The court, relying in part on Williams v. Bronson, 24 Conn.App. 612, 622, 590 A.2d 984, cert. denied, 219 Conn. 913, 593 A.2d 138 (1991), concluded that the enactment of P.A. 80-442 was part of a comprehensive revision of this state's sentencing structure that altered substantive, rather than procedural rights. The court noted that statutes that affect substantive rights are presumed to apply prospectively only. Finding no clear and unequivocal expression by the legislature rebutting the presumption of prospective application, either in the text of § 53a-35b or in its relationship to other statutes, the habeas court concluded that § 53a-35b did not apply to the petitioner's current controlling sentence. The habeas court granted the commissioner's motion for summary judgment, denied the petitioner's motion for summary judgment, and, accordingly, rendered judgment denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

The petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court challenging the habeas court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the habeas court improperly concluded that § 53a-35b does not apply retroactively to persons sentenced prior to that statute's enactment. The Appellate Court heard oral argument on the appeal on February 7, 2006. Thereafter, the Appellate Court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing what effect, if any, this court's decision in State v. Skakel, 276 Conn. 633, 888 A.2d 985, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 578, 166 L.Ed.2d 428 (2006), had on the application of §§ 53a-35 and 53a-35b. After the filing of the supplemental briefs, the Appellate Court panel moved, pursuant to Practice Book § 65-2,¹⁰ that this appeal be transferred to the Supreme Court. We granted the motion on March 17, 2006, and thereafter heard oral argument on the appeal.

We conclude that § 53a-35b affects substantive rights and, in the absence of any clear and unequivocal expression by the legislature rebutting the presumption of prospective application, that the statute does not apply retroactively to persons sentenced prior to its enactment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

As a preliminary matter, we set forth the appropriate standard of review. "Although a habeas court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of review, questions of law are subject to plenary review." Tyson v. Commissioner of Correction, 261 Conn. 806, 816, 808 A.2d 653 (2002), cert. denied sub nom. Tyson v. Armstrong, 538 U.S. 1005, 123 S.Ct. 1914, 155 L.Ed.2d 836 (2003). Whether a legislative act applies retroactively is a question of law over which this court has plenary review. State v. Nowell, 262 Conn. 686, 701, 817 A.2d 76 (2003).

When considering the retroactivity of a penal statute, "[i]t is axiomatic that, [w]hether to apply a statute retroactively or prospectively depends upon the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute.... In seeking to discern that intent, [o]ur point of departure is ... [General Statutes] § 55-3,¹¹ which ... we have uniformly interpreted ... as a rule of presumed legislative intent that statutes affecting substantive rights shall apply prospectively only.... The [l]egislature only rebuts this presumption when it clearly and unequivocally expresses its intent that the legislation shall apply retrospectively.... As a corollary to this principle, we also have presumed that procedural or remedial statutes are intended to apply retroactively absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary.... While there is no precise definition of either [substantive or procedural law], it is generally agreed that a substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights while a procedural law prescribes the methods of enforcing such rights or obtaining redress." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Skakel, supra, 276 Conn. at 679-81, 888 A.2d 985.

In State v. Quinet, 253 Conn. 392, 411-12, 752 A.2d 490 (2000), we considered the retroactivity of Public Acts 1995, No. 95-142, § 2, which amended General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53-29(e), to require the imposition of a probationary term of not less than ten years and not more than thirty-five years for certain serious sexual offenses. The amendment increased the maximum probationary period of five years previously allowed under § 53-29. Expressing concern that applying the new statute retroactively would violate the ex post facto clause of the United States constitution by exposing the defendant to a longer probationary period, we refused to give retroactive effect to a change in the state's probationary structure. Id., at 414-16, 752 A.2d 490. Thus, we concluded that changes in the structure of probation, an alternative form of sentencing, affect substantive rights.

In Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 804, 805-807, 786 A.2d 1091 (2002), we considered the retroactivity of Public Acts 1995, No. 95-255, § 1 (P.A. 95-255), now codified at General Statutes § 54-125a. Prior to P.A. 95-255, certain violent offenders were eligible for parole upon completion of 50 percent of their sentence, whereas after the amendment, persons convicted of offenses involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person were not parole eligible until they...