Mead v. Stirling

• Decision Date: 30 November 1892
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: MEAD v. STIRLING.

27 A. 591

62 Conn. 586

MEAD

v. STIRLING.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Nov. Term, 1892.

Application for injunction by Frederick Mead against Hugh Stirling. Writ denied.

L. Warner and, T. B. Hurlbutt, for plaintiff.

M. W. Seymour and G. W. Wheeler, for defendant.

PERRY, J. The complaint herein alleges, in substance, that the plaintiff is worshipful master and presiding officer of a local lodge of Ancient Free and Accepted Masons, to which office he was elected on an undesignated day in December, 1891, for the term of one year thereafter, and until his successor should be chosen. That said office is one "of honor and position in the lodge and in the order generally outside of the lodge." That the defendant is grand master of the Grand Lodge of Masons of Connecticut, within the jurisdiction of which said local lodge is. That the plaintiff, at a communication of his lodge, truthfully and fairly stated to its members the substance of a certain important conversation relative to their order which he had theretofore held with the defendant, and received and submitted for their consideration, as he believed he was bound to do, certain resolutions, with preambles, which were thereupon offered. That on the day of the date of the complaint, between the hours of 11 and 12 o'clock in the forenoon, the plaintiff received a summons from the defendant, acting as grand master, to appear before him on the next day at 10 o'clock in the forenoon, to show cause why he should not be suspended from his said office "for having made the statement and receiving said resolutions, charging said statement to be a willful misrepresentation of said conversation." That the defendant proposes to himself determine the question of veracity between them, and "to judge the plaintiff upon such finding, and suspend him from his said office; in other words, to act as judge in his own cause, and further the carrying out" of an ulterior point which he had in view. That, in making the statement complained of, the plaintiff violated no Masonic obligation or pledge or any rule of gentlemanly and proper conduct or intercourse. That the defendant has no authority by any Masonic law, constitution, or by-law of the Grand Lodge to try and depose the plaintiff from his said office of honor and trust. That by Masonic rules and law the plaintiff is entitled to a trial before an unbiased tribunal of his peers, upon testimony of competent witnesses, and upon charges properly preferred. That no charges have been preferred against the plaintiff or served upon him, as Masonic law and rules require. That until charges have been preferred, the defendant, neither as grand master nor in any other capacity, has jurisdiction or authority to suspend the plaintiff as he threatens to do. That the plaintiff has no remedy except by injunction from a court of equity. That the only redress which the plaintiff would have from a decision of the defendant, acting in his capacity of grand master, would be by an appeal, through him, to the Grand Lodge of Connecticut, over which he presides, which "would not, by reason of the bias and determined disposition of the defendant to accomplish his purpose, have before it, to give the plaintiff that fair position before his fellows in his order that he is entitled to, the full question and attendant circumstances which the grand master and himself propose to try, but simply the decision of the grand master." That the Grand Lodge does not meet until January, 1893, after the plaintiff's term of office has expired; "so that no order of reinstatement upon an overruling of the decision of the grand master can be made, or adequate relief to the plaintiff be granted." And the apprehended damage is then stated as follows: "That an order of suspension of the plaintiff by the defendant would disgrace the plaintiff in the opinion of all regular masons, work him an irreparable Injury to his reputation, character, and business, and be published in Masonic circles, and otherwise most extensively circulated, injuring his financial credit, and be an impeachment of veracity." An injunction is claimed restraining the defendant from hearing and determining as to the guilt of the plaintiff, and from suspending him from his said office. It will be observed that no specific allegation is made that a grand master has jurisdiction to suspend a worshipful master. On the contrary, the opposite would seem to be really claimed in the complaint. But the case was argued by both parties upon the assumption that such jurisdiction in fact existed, and as if it had been so alleged. The questions herein will therefore be considered as if it affirmatively appeared that the defendant had jurisdiction over the subject-matter in dispute, or, in other words, that he had authority to suspend the plaintiff for a sufficient cause properly proved. If the defendant had no jurisdiction in the premises in any event, then, of course, an injunction would be plainly unnecessary, and should not be granted. To this complaint the defendant demurs, virtually, on three grounds: (1) Because the plaintiff and defendant are bound to conform to the constitution, laws, and regulations of the order to which they both belong; and the remedies thereby afforded, as indicated in the complaint, must first be exhausted before recourse can be had to this tribunal. (2) Because no property rights of the plaintiff are alleged to be threatened by the defendant, and, this being so, the first ground of demurrer is certainly valid, even if invalid otherwise. (3) Because no facts showing such irreparable damage as would warrant an injunction are set forth in the complaint.

Although the circumstances in which the civil courts can be called upon to afford relief where property rights are not threatened must be rare indeed, still it seems to be well settled that, if any such in fact exist, the remedies within the order must first have been exhausted before other relief can be obtained. Accordingly, inasmuch as the plaintiff expects to be deprived merely of "an office of honor and position" in his order, with which no pecuniary emoluments or property benefits are alleged to be connected, the first ground of demurrer might well be disregarded, and the second considered in its place. But a few cases decided by tribunals in high repute hold that the same is true even where property rights are involved, and that, therefore, the first ground of demurrer is well taken also. If the first be sound, the second certainly must be, and therefore those cases will be briefly considered.

Bacon, in his work on Benefit Societies & Life Insurance, (section 104, top of page 127,) says."There is a great array of judicial authority in favor of the proposition that, where members are expelled from religious societies, social clubs, benevolent societies, and other voluntary organizations incorporated or unincorporated, the judicial courts will not interfere to reinstate them, or to revise the judgment of expulsion, until the expelled member has exhausted all the remedies available to him within the organization itself, by appealing to a higher judicatory provided by the rules of the society, or otherwise." The same rule would of course apply with far greater force to a case of threatened suspension from a mere office in the order, and therefore authorities sustaining the proposition just quoted will control the case at bar. In the case of Lafond v. Deems, (1880,) 81 N. Y. 507, it was sought to dissolve a voluntary charitable association, and divide its assets, on the ground that the misconduct of its members and their mutual bitterness of feeling and irreconcilable hostility made a winding-up of its affairs and division of its assets necessary. The rules of the order provided for the trial of its members for misconduct, and in that connection for appeals from one tribunal to another within the order. These remedies have not been tried. The court denied the application, and said: "As the members who are claimed by the plaintiffs to have been chargeable with a violation of the rules of the association were not called upon to answer so as to correct the evils complained of, and as the power to remedy the same was ample and complete, the plaintiffs are not in a position to seek the interposition of a court of equity. * * * Courts should not, as a general rule, interfere with the contentions and quarrels of voluntary associations so long as the government is fairly and honestly administered, and those who have grievances should be required, in the first instance, to resort to the remedies for redress provided by their rules and regulations. This had not been done in the case considered, and under such circumstances no action lies. None of the authorities cited by the plaintiffs' counsel sustain the position that the remedy is at law or in equity, unless there is well-grounded cause for complaint; and even then an opportunity should be given to correct the cause of complaint within the organization where it can be properly done." I understand this to mean that, even if there is "well-grounded cause for complaint" on account of the methods adopted or the result reached by the first tribunal, still the means provided by the rules of the organization for the correction of such errors must first be pursued, before recourse can be had to the courts of the state. And if it be answered that the complaint shows that an appeal from the threatened action of the defendant to the Grand Lodge could not avail the plaintiff, because of the defendant's "bias and determined disposition" to be unfair to the end, still it surely must be an adequate and proper reply to say that the demurrer cannot be taken to admit that such a court of appeals is unable to and will not rectify any unfairness of the defendant at any stage of the case. Its disposition and ability to do so will be presumed, and, according to this authority,...