Mead v. Town Of Greenwich.

• Decision Date: 26 July 1944
• Citation: 131 Conn. 273,38 A.2d 795
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: MEAD et al. v. TOWN OF GREENWICH.

131 Conn. 273

38 A.2d 795

MEAD et al.

v.TOWN OF GREENWICH.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 26, 1944.

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Fairfield County; Wall, Judge.

Action by Augustus I. Mead and others, executors of the estate of Anna H. Mead, deceased, against Town of Greenwith for reduction in the amount of an assessment of land and buildings, brought to the court of common pleas and tried by the court. From a judgment reducing the assessment, defendant appeals.

No error.

H. Allen Barton, of Greenwich, for appellant (defendant).

C. Driscoll Grimes, of Greenwich, for appellees (plaintiffs).

Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS, and DICKENSON, JJ.

ELLS, Judge.

The plaintiffs alleged that the amounts of the assessments made by the assessors of the town of Greenwich on their lands and buildings on the list of June 1, 1943, were manifestly excessive and could not have been arrived at except by disregarding the provisions of the statute for determining the valuation of the property. The defendant town denied that this was so, but the court found the issues for the plaintiffs, and made reductions in the assessments amounting to about 33 per cent on one parcel and 25 per cent on the other. The defendant has appealed.

The applicable portion of General Statutes, Cumulative Supplement 1941, § 165f, under which the action was brought, reads as follows: ‘Sec. 165f. Remedy when property wrongfully assessed. When it shall be claimed that * * * a tax laid on property was computed on an assessment which, under all the circumstances, was manifestly excessive and could not have been arrived at except by disregarding the provisions of the statutes for determining the valuation of such property, the owner thereof, prior to the payment of such tax, may, in addition to the other remedies provided by law, make application for relief to the court of common pleas of the county in which such town or city is situated. * * * In all such actions, the court of common pleas shall have power to grant such relief upon such terms and in such manner and form as shall to justice and equity appertain. * * * If such assessment shall be reduced by said court, the applicant shall be reimbursed by the town or city for any over-payment of taxes in accordance with the judgment of said court.’

The essence of the defendant's claims in the court below and in its assignments of error is that this is an appeal from an administrative board and that the function of the trial court is only to determine whether the board acted illegally, unreasonably, arbitrarily or in abuse of its discretion, that the evidence shows that its action was based upon substantial evidence and taken according to the methods designated by the law, and that the valuation it placed on the property cannot be disturbed by the court upon appeal. There is nothing in the language of the statute to support such a contention. That this is not an action in the nature of an appeal is recognized in Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Oxford, 101 Conn. 383, 391, 126 A. 1, and in State ex rel. Waterbury Corrugated Container Co. v. Kilduff, 128 Conn. 647, 649, 25 A.2d 62. We discussed the nature and purpose of the statute in the recent case of Cohn v. Hortford, 130 Conn. 699, 702, 37 A.2d 237. Section 375c of the Cumulative Supplement of 1935 was there involved, but the 1941 act contains no amendments material to this discussion. We pointed out that our statutes provide a method by which an owner of property may directly call in question the valuation placed by assessors upon his property by an appeal to the board of tax review, and from it to the courts; General Statutes, §§ 1193-1195; Cum.Sup.1935, § 374c; that the statute now under consideration was not an alternative remedy but was designed to meet situations of a different character, giving a taxpayer a remedy where there was misfeasance...