Mead v. Warner Pruyn Division, Finch Pruyn Sales, Inc.
Decision Date | 09 August 1976 |
Citation | 386 N.Y.S.2d 342,87 Misc.2d 782 |
Parties | C. Alden MEAD, Administrator of the Estate of Claude D. Mead, Deceased, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WARNER PRUYN DIVISION, FINCH PRUYN SALES INC., et al., Defendants. |
Court | New York Supreme Court |
The factual background which gives rise to this action is not in contest and from the papers before the court on the motion to dismiss it is established that on August 20, 1971 the defendant Warner Pruyn Division, Finch Pruyn Sales Inc. (hereinafter, Warner Pruyn) sold a refrigerator to Frederick D. and Margaret C. Ross of Hudson Falls, New York. On October 15, 1973 Mr. and Mrs. Ross sold their Hudson Falls residence, together with the refrigerator in question, to Clause D. and JoAnn Ross Mead. On August 29, 1975 (more than four years after the sale of the refrigerator to Mr. and Mrs. Ross) a fire consumed the Mead residence while it was being occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Mead and their three infant children, Claude D. Mead, Jr., Timothy J. Mead and Scott A. Mead. As a result of that conflagration the entire Mead family died of asphyxiation and administrators have been appointed for the estates of the decedents.
Alleging that defects in the refrigerator were responsible for the fire, a single suit consisting of 30 separate causes of action has been commenced by the administrators against the manufacturer, the distributors and the retailer of the refrigerator. The complaint sounds in negligence, breach of warranty and strict product liability.
The defendant Warner Pruyn now moves to dismiss the causes of action based on warranty and strict product liability, contending that the warranty causes of action are barred by the four year statute of limitations, and that the allegations seeking to hold the retailer in strict product liability fail to state a cause of action.
With regard to strict product liability, the moving defendant contends that in this state there is no such cause of action against the vendor of a defective product. It is conceded that since Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 298 N.E.2d 622, the State of New York permits recovery against the manufacturer of a defective product based on the theory of strict product liability. It is urged, however, that neither Codling nor its progeny has extended that theory to authorize recovery against the vendor. Codling v. Paglia, supra, was a suit against the manufacturer only. The court there was not called upon to embrace or to reject the rule imposing strict liability on any other than the manufacturer and failure there to adopt a rule holding liable the vendor does not constitute rejection of that rule. That proposition was not considered and was not decided by Codling. The court's attention has been directed to no reported case in this state which permits recovery against the retailer alone on the theory of strict product liability. (See dissent of Justice Greenblott in DeCrosta v. Reynolds Constr., 49 A.D.2d 476, 481--484, 375 N.Y.S.2d 655, 659--662.) Recovery was allowed in Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 348 N.E.2d 571 and in Velez v. Craine & Clark Lbr. Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617, 305 N.E.2d 750 wherein the defendants made the ultimate sale which put the product into use where its defect resulted in the plaintiffs' injury but in those cases the defendant was not only the seller but was also the manufacturer or the distributor. DeCrosta v. Reynolds Constr., supra, which holds that there is no strict product liability cause of action available to a purchaser against his vendor for the reason that the purchaser is able to protect himself through the terms of his contract and is in position to extract such warranties as he desires, is not dispositive of the factual situation here under consideration which deals with the rights and obligations of persons not in privity.
Pointing out the social and economic trends which compelled the adoption of the strict product liability theory, Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, supra, said at page 341, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, at page 468, 298 N.E.2d 622, at page 628:
The court's reference...
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