Meade Elec. Co. v. Hagberg

• Decision Date: 19 June 1959
• Docket Number: No. 19236,No. 2,19236,2
• Citation: 159 N.E.2d 408,129 Ind.App. 631
• Parties: MEADE ELECTRIC COMPANY, Incorporated, of Indiana, an Indiana Corporation, Appellant, v. Harold P. HAGBERG, as Business Manager and Representative Member of Local 697, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Appellee
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 408

159 N.E.2d 408

129 Ind.App. 631

MEADE ELECTRIC COMPANY, Incorporated, of Indiana, an Indiana

Corporation, Appellant, v. Harold P. HAGBERG, as Business Manager and Representative

Member of Local 697, International Brotherhood of

Electrical Workers, Appellee.

No. 19236.

Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 2.

June 19, 1959.

Frank A. J. Stodola, Hammond, for appellant.

Joseph P. Sullivan, Whiting, Bernard M. Mamet, Chicago, Ill., for appellee.

KELLEY, Judge.

Appellant, by its complaint, sets forth that it is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Indiana, engaged in the electrical contracting business and in addition, maintains a motor shop which engages in the business of repairing, rebuilding and servicing electrical motors and other devices. The defendant is Harold P. Hagberg, who is sued in his representative capacity as Business Manager and a member of Local 697, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, which is an unincorporated labor organization. The complaint alleges that the defendant, Local 697, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, had been certified by the National Labor Relations Board as exclusive bargaining representative for all of the electricians of the motor division of plaintiff company, under the provisions of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq.; and that the complaint further alleges that plaintiff and defendant had mutually arrived at and agreed to the terms of a certain collective bargaining agreement with the exception of Article VI, which Article reads as follows:

'No Discrimination--Equal Benefits--Equal Obligation.

'Section 1. Agency Shop. (a) Membership in the Union is not compulsory.

Employees have the right to join, not join, maintain or drop their membership in the Union, as they see fit. Neither party shall exert any pressure on or discriminate against an employee as regards such matters.

'(b) Membership in the Union is separate, apart and distinct from the assumption by one of his equal obligation to the extent that he receives equal benefits. The Union is required under this agreement to represent all of the employees in the bargaining unit fairly and equally without regard as to whether or not an employee is a member of the Union. The terms of this Agreement have been made for all employees in the bargaining unit and not only for members in the Union, and this Agreement has been executed by the Employer after it has satisfied itself as the result of a secret ballot that the Union is the choice of a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit and the Union has been certified by the National Labor Relations Board. Accordingly, it is fair that each employee in the bargaining unit, pay his own way and assume his fair share of the obligation along with the grant of equal benefit contained in this Agreement.

'(c) In accordance with the policy set forth under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Article, all employees shall, as a condition of continued employment, pay to the Union, the employee's exclusive collective bargaining representative, an amount of money equal to that paid by other employees in the bargaining unit who are members of the Union, which shall be limited to an amount of money equal to the Union's regular and usual initiation fees, and its regular and usual dues and its general and uniform assessments. For existing employees, such payments shall commence forty-five (45) days following the date of execution of this Agreement and for new employees, the payment shall start forty-five (45) days following the date of employment.'

The plaintiff claimed that the aforementioned clause was in violation of the Indiana Right to Work Law, Acts of 1957, Chap. 19, Burns' § 40-2701-s 40-2705, and that the insistence of the defendant to include such clause constituted an unlawful act which would result in substantial and irreparable injury to plaintiff. Further, the complaint asked for a temporary and permanent injunction restraining and enjoining the defendant from commission of any act calculated directly or indirectly to coerce or force the plaintiff to execute a collective bargaining agreement which contained said clause and from the solicitation or insistence of the incorporation of said clause in a collective bargaining agreement.

To this complaint the appellee filed a demurrer based upon the grounds:

1. The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and in the demurrer and the memorandum thereto alleged that the tendered and questioned provision of such collective bargaining agreement was not in violation of the Indiana Right to Work Law; and

2. That the court was without jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's complaint because the determination of the matters raised therein lies solely within the province of the National Labor Relations Board under the doctrine of federal preemption. The court sustained the demurrer to appellant's complaint for a temporary and permanent injunction and rendered judgment for the appellee, and that the plaintiff take nothing by its complaint herein and the defendant do have and recover its costs laid out and expended. The plaintiff failed to plead over and elected to stand on the demurrer, and the court rendered judgment for the defendant.

Thereafter, the appellant filed its transcript and assignment of errors in this court based upon the grounds that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to appellant's complaint and that the court erred in its conclusions of law.

Both parties have argued the question of federal preemption, but quite clearly no such question is raised by the complaint and demurrer in this case which would call for our consideration of the doctrine of federal preemption. Appellant's complaint alleges that the aforequoted agency shop clause, allegedly urged upon it by appellee, constitutes a violation of Indiana's Right to Work Law. Appellee's demurrer poses the sole legal proposition of whether said agency clause, as alleged upon, does, in fact, violate said Right to Work Law. It must be apparent that the Lake Superior Court, being a court of general jurisdiction, possesses the requisite jurisdiction to determine said question. Any suggestion of want of jurisdiction in said court to hear and determine a matter preempted by Federal agencies falls without the pale of the instant inquiry. The Labor-Management Relations Act, commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Law, by section 14(b) thereof, specifically authorizes and recognizes the validity of Right to Work Laws of the several states. Now, whether or not such authorization and recognition would extend to or authorize a state legislature to validly 'outlaw' such 'agency shop' clauses would, perhaps, require and necessitate an extensive exploration of this doctrine of federal preemption, a question and task with which we are not here confronted.

The issue tendered in this appeal is whether the defendant seeks to coerce or force the plaintiff to do an illegal act by executing a collective bargaining agreement containing the clauses providing for an 'agency shop'. The Indiana Right to Work Law, which is a relatively short act, provides as follows:

'Public policy. It is hereby declared to be the public policy of the state of Indiana that membership or nonmembership in a labor organization should not be made a condition to the right to work or to become an employee of or to continue in the employment of any employer; that employees should have the right of self-organization; and the right to form, join, continue membership in, or assist labor organizations; and that employees should equally have the right to refrain from forming, joining, continuing membership in, or assisting labor organizations. The aforesaid rights of employees and each and all of them are fundamental and essential rights and any agreement between employers and labor organizations which makes membership or the maintenance thereof, or nonmembership, in a labor organization a condition of employment or continued employment, and any denial, severance or interruption of employment because of such membership or nonmembership are violations of said rights and are against the public policy of the state of Indiana.' (Acts of 1957, Chap. 19, Sec. 1; Burns' § 40-2701, C.P.S.)

'Definitions. When used in this act, the term 'labor organization' shall mean any organization of any kind, or any agency, or employee representation committee or plan, which exists for the purpose in whole or in part of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.' (Acts of 1957, Chap. 19, Sec. 2; Burns' § 40-2702, C.P.S.)

'Prohibited Agreements. No corporation or individual or association or labor organization shall solicit, enter into or extend any contract, agreement or understanding, written or oral, to exclude from employment any person by reason of membership or nonmembership in a labor organization, or to discharge or suspend from employment or lay off any person by reason of his refusal to join a labor organization or by reason of his failure to maintain his membership in a labor organization or by reason of his resignation or expulsion or suspension from a labor organization. Any such contract, agreement or understanding, written or real, entered into or extended after the effective date of this act, shall be null and void and of no force or effect.' (Acts of 1957, Chap. 19, Sec. 3; Burns' § 40-2703, C.P.S.)

'Prohibited Conduct. No corporation or individual or association or labor organization shall encourage the exclusion, discharge, suspension, or layoff from employment of any person pursuant to any contract, agreement or understanding, written or oral, which contract, agreement or understanding violates section 3 of this act. No corporation or individual or association or labor organization shall...