Meade v. Williamson

• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BENHAM
• Citation: Meade v. Williamson, 293 Ga. 142, 745 S.E.2d 279 (Ga. 2013)
• Decision Date: 03 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. S13A0517.,S13A0517.
• Parties: MEADE v. WILLIAMSON.

293 Ga. 142

745 S.E.2d 279

MEADE

v.WILLIAMSON.

No. S13A0517.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

June 3, 2013.

Ronald B. Warren, Christopher Kenneth Rodd, Malia Phillips–Lee, Whitehurst, Blackburn, Warren & Kelley, Thomasville, for appellant.

James M. Skipper Jr., County Attorney, Gatewood, Skipper & Rambo, P.C., Americus, for appellee.

Franklin Thompson Coleman, IV, Perry & Walters, LLP, Albany, for other party.

BENHAM, Justice.

Appellant Dana Meade and Appellee Tim Williamson were the candidates on the ballot in a run-off election in the Democratic primary for Sheriff of Baker County.¹ Meade is the incumbent in the race and was, at the time of the election, serving as Sheriff. The election was held on August 21, 2012. A total of 1,353 votes were cast in the race and Meade was declared the winner by a margin of 39 votes. Williamson timely filed a petition in the Superior Court of Baker County contesting the results of the election. After a bench trial, the trial court issued an order setting forth findings of fact and reaching the conclusion that sufficient irregularities in voting and in the election process were shown to cast doubt upon the election result. The election was declared invalid and a new election was ordered. ²

“It is presumed that election returns are valid, and the party contesting the election has the burden of showing an irregularity or illegality sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election.” Banker v. Cole, 278 Ga. 532, 535(4), 604 S.E.2d 165 (2004) (citations and punctuation omitted). On the other hand, “a trial court's findings in an election contest will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.” Id. at 533(1), 604 S.E.2d 165 (citations and punctuation omitted). Based upon this Court's review of the evidence presented at the bench trial, we find the contestant in this case did not meet the evidentiary burden and that the trial court committed factual and legal errors in its ruling. This Court has set aside elections under two different circumstances. In the majority of cases in which this Court has affirmed an order setting aside an election, we have required the evidence to “show that a sufficient number of electors voted illegally or were irregularly recorded in the contest being challenged to change or cast doubt upon the election.” McCranie v. Mullis, 267 Ga. 416, 478 S.E.2d 377 (1996). ³ This Court has also recognized that the result of an election may be voided where systemic irregularities in the process of the election are sufficiently egregious to cast doubt on the result. See Stiles v. Earnest, 252 Ga. 260(3), 312 S.E.2d 337 (1984). The evidence presented at trial meets neither of these standards. The evidence failed to establish a sufficient number of specific irregular or illegal ballots that would change or place in doubt the results of the election. Further, this Court rejects the trial court's finding that sufficient irregularities in the election process were shown to cast doubt upon the results. Accordingly, we reverse the order invalidating the August 21, 2012 run-off election in the Democratic primary for Sheriff of Baker County.

The trial court based its order upon the following findings: (1) there had been vote buying; (2) a Meade supporter was seen in possession of 20 or so absentee ballot applications that she delivered to Van Irvin, a county commissioner; (3) eight voters had been assisted by a single individual who was not shown to be qualified to assist these voters pursuant to OCGA § 21–2–409(b)(2) and another voter was assisted by a person who likewise was not qualified to assist; (4) four absentee ballot applications reflected addresses different from the address at which the applicant was registered to vote; (5) four absentee ballot envelopes that reflected the voter received assistance in voting contained incomplete oaths in that they failed to designate the disability that would authorize a person to assist the voter; and (6) 14 absentee ballots appeared to have been altered. First, we address the issue of whether the evidence supported the invalidation of a sufficientnumber of ballots to cast doubt upon or change the results of the election.

Analysis of the evidence regarding specific challenged votes

1. With respect to the finding of vote buying, only one witness testified he had been given money in exchange for his vote.⁴ With respect to the finding that a Meade supporter delivered absentee ballot applications to another supporter who is a county commissioner, there is no evidence that this contributed to any illegal voting and any conclusions reached based upon this finding would be unsupported speculation.⁵

With respect to the finding that eight voters had been assisted by one who was unqualified to assist them, the evidence reflects each of these voters was assisted by Andrea Stubbs, a convicted felon who was not qualified to vote. The trial court based its finding that Stubbs was unqualified to assist any of these electors on the ground that she was thus not a qualified elector of the precinct, as required by OCGA § 21–2–409(b)(2)(A), and that she was not otherwise qualified to serve as an assistant pursuant to OCGA § 21–2–409(b)(2)(B) because “she was not identified as a qualified family member” of each of the eight voters.⁶ In fact, no evidence at all was presented regarding Stubbs's relation to these eight voters although the election supervisor testified that, in order to permit a voter to utilize an assistant, the assistant was required by a poll worker to sign an oath on the voting certificate as to his or her qualification to assist the voter. The trial court also found that Jeannette Jackson wrongly assisted voter Johnny Jackson because they were registered to vote in different precincts and no evidence was presented of any familial relationship. Likewise, no evidence was presented regarding the relation between Jeannette Jackson and Johnny Jackson. Assuming, without deciding, that the disqualification of these two assistants would invalidate these votes, Williamson, as the contestant, had the burden of proving they were not qualified and he failed to carry it.⁷ Instead, the trial court's order demonstrates the burden was improperly placed upon Meade to prove Stubbs and Jeanette Jackson were qualified to assist the identified voters. Thus, these nine ballots were not shown to be illegally cast.⁸

With respect to the finding that, contrary to the prohibition of OCGA § 21–2–381(a)(1)(D)⁹, four absentee ballot applications reflected addresses different from the address at which the applicant was registered to vote, this discrepancy does not establish that each of these ballots should be invalidated. First, the undisputed evidence shows one of these four ballots was mailed, at the written request of the registered voter (Mary B. Singletary), to an out-of-county address that was written in the space provided on the application to request that the ballot be mailed to a temporary out-of-county address or alternate address for a physically disabled person. The election supervisor testified she believed the address to be the out-of-county nursing home where the voter lived. Thus, the evidence supports the conclusion that the Singletary ballot was mailed in compliance with the OCGA § 21–2–381(a)(1)(D) either because the voter was disabled or because it was otherwise properly mailed to a temporary out-of-county address. The application of Rubye Nell Hall shows on its face that it was an application for advance in-person voting.¹⁰ Because it is reasonable to assume that Hall was properly identified, as required by OCGA § 21–2–417, when she cast her absentee ballot in person at the polling place, the fact that her absentee ballot was mailed to an in-county address other than the one reflected on her voter registration record provides no ground for invalidating her ballot.

That the two remaining absentee ballot requests at issue in the case (filed by Willie Bodiford and Manerva Crumbley) were each mailed to an in-county address other than the one reflected on the applicant's voter registration record is also insufficient to invalidate these voters' ballots. The election supervisor testified to the steps taken to verify the authenticity of the signature of an applicant for an absentee ballot against the signature on the voter registration card, as well as the steps taken to verify the authenticity of the signature of the voter on the space provided for the oath of the elector that is pre-printed on the return envelop in which the absentee ballot is mailed back to the Board of Registrars. “Where the statute simply provides that certain acts or things shall be done within a particular time or in a particular manner, and does not declare that the performance is essential to the validity of the election, they will be regarded as merely directory unless they affect the actual merits of the election.” Hastings v. Wilson, 181 Ga. 305, 307, 182 S.E. 375 (1935) (citation omitted) (holding the statute requiring election returns to be made within three days did not require the Secretary of State to invalidate the results of a statewide referendum because they included returns from counties that reported late). We construe the language in OCGA § 21–2–381(a)(1)(D) stating that, with noted exceptions, no absentee ballots shall be mailed to an address other than the permanent mailing address reflected on the applicant's voter registration record, to be directory and not to require, under the circumstances in this case, the ballots in question to be invalidated.

With respect to the finding that four absentee ballot envelopes reflecting the voter received assistance in voting contained incomplete oaths, this also does not require invalidation of these ballots. The trial court noted that these four ballot envelopes failed to designate the disability that would authorize a person to assist the voter. Pursuant to OCGA § 21–2–409(a), the only...