Meador v. Aramark Sports & Entm't Servs. LLC
| Decision Date | 14 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | CV-19-08345-PCT-JJT |
| Citation | 562 F.Supp.3d 221 |
| Parties | Larry MEADOR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ARAMARK SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT SERVICES LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Joseph William Watkins, Joseph W. Watkins PC, Tucson, AZ, for Plaintiffs.
Lynn Lucy Krieger, Pro Hac Vice, Terence S. Cox, Pro Hac Vice, Susan F. Shapiro, Cox Wootton Lerner Griffin & Hansen LLP, San Francisco, CA, Thomas M. Fedeli, Cox Wootton Lerner Griffin & Hansen LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant.
After holding a bench trial from November 15 through November 19, 2021 (Docs. 152, 153, 156, 160, 164), the Court now provides its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In this Order the Court also will resolve Plaintiff's post-brief seeking emotional distress damages under the "Zone of Danger" doctrine (Doc. 177), to which Defendant filed a Response (Doc. 180) and Plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. 181).
In this dispute, Plaintiffs Larry and Annette Meador ("the Meadors") sued Defendant Aramark Sports and Entertainment Services LLC ("Aramark") alleging negligence and seeking punitive damages. (Doc. 1.) Defendant filed a Counterclaim against Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Larry Meador seeking equitable indemnity and contribution. (Doc. 44.)
On September 27, 2019, Larry Meador ("Mr. Meador") was operating his 29-foot Hallett 290 powerboat on Lake Powell, in the Navajo Canyon area. Also on board the boat were Annette Meador ("Ms. Meador"), Emily Lewis, Charisse Lewis, and Maeson Lewis. Five other members of the Lewis family were on jet skis behind the boat. As Plaintiffs traveled up the channel approaching the right-hand turn into the canyon, the 76-foot M/V Desert Shadow (the "Desert Shadow"), owned by Aramark and operated by Captain Phil Anderson, rounded the left turn to exit the canyon, moving in the opposite direction of Plaintiffs’ boat, and passed Plaintiffs’ boat on its left (port) side. As the Desert Shadow passed the Meador boat, it generated a wake. Upon impact with the wake, the bow of the Hallett rose into the air before crashing back down onto the water. Ms. Meador suffered a thoracic fracture at her T-11 and T-12 vertebrae and was taken by air ambulance to a hospital in St. George, Utah.
Plaintiffs contend that their boat was to the far-right (starboard) side of the channel and allege that the Desert Shadow was not properly positioned in the channel. Plaintiffs claim that Aramark's operation of its boat was negligent and Aramark is liable for Ms. Meador's injuries. Plaintiffs also argue that Aramark was on notice that its tour boats generated dangerous wakes, and therefore punitive damages are appropriate. Defendant disputes Plaintiffs’ claims and counters that Mr. Meador's negligent operation of his boat caused the accident.
In a prior Order (Doc. 92), the Court denied Aramark's Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that there were material issues of fact as to multiple elements of Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendant's counterclaims. The Court held a bench trial on these issues from November 15 through November 19, 2021. In conjunction with the bench trial, the parties filed Trial Memoranda (Docs. 129, 132) and Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Docs. 130, 131).
This case was brought under the Court's admiralty jurisdiction, so federal maritime law applies. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc. , 476 U.S. 858, 864, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 90 L.Ed.2d 865 (1986). Federal admiralty law preempts state law, but federal courts may apply state law by express or implied reference where the federal admiralty law is incomplete. See Baggett v. Richardson , 473 F.2d 863, 864 (5th Cir. 1973). The Ninth Circuit has explained that "the general rule on preemption in admiralty cases is that states may supplement federal admiralty law as applied to matters of local concern, so long as state law does not actually conflict with federal law or interfere with the uniform working of the maritime legal system." Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n v. Aubry , 918 F.2d 1409, 1422 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original).
The elements of negligence at admiralty are generally the same as in a common law negligence action—(1) the defendant had a duty of reasonable care; (2) that duty was breached; (3) causation; and (4) damages. Samuels v. Holland Am. Line-USA, Inc. , 656 F.3d 948, 953 (9th Cir. 2011).
In admiralty, a party's duty of care can be derived from "(1) duly enacted laws, regulations, and rules; (2) custom; or (3) the dictates of reasonableness and prudence." Galentine v. Estate of Stekervetz , 273 F. Supp. 2d 538, 544 (D. Del. 2003) (citing Pennsylvania R. Co. v. The Marie Leonhardt , 202 F. Supp. 368, 375 (E.D. Pa. 1962) ). The Inland Rules of Navigation, 33 C.F.R. § 83.01 et seq. , provide "rules of the road" that apply "to all vessels upon the inland waters of the United States[.]" 33 U.S.C. § 2071 ; 33 C.F.R. § 83.01(a).
For determining causation, the Pennsylvania Rule offers guidance. See The Pennsylvania , 86 U.S. 19 Wall. 125, 22 L.Ed. 148 (1873). The Pennsylvania Rule provides that "when a statutory rule intended to prevent an admiralty accident exists and a party violates that statute injuring a party whom the statute was created to protect, the violating party, to avoid liability, must show that its violation could not have been the cause of the accident." Pearce v. U.S. , 261 F.3d 643, 648 (6th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original) (citing The Pennsylvania , 86 U.S. at 136 ). In the Ninth Circuit, "clear and convincing evidence suffices for a showing in satisfaction of the Pennsylvania rule." Trinidad Corp. v. S.S. Keiyoh Maru , 845 F.2d 818, 825 (9th Cir. 1988).
Proportional division of liability applies to all admiralty cases. See, e.g. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stokes Oil Co., Inc. , 863 F.2d 1250, 1255 (6th Cir. 1988) (). Thus, a court must first determine whether the defendant's negligence was a substantial cause of the injury at issue, and if that is the case, the court must then allocate damages to the plaintiff in the amount of the total loss, minus the damages attributable to the plaintiff's own proportionate fault, if any.
At a general level, the parties appear to agree Defendant owed Plaintiffs a duty of care. See In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC , 624 F.3d 201, 211 (5th Cir. 2010) (). However, the parties dispute whether certain rules and regulations also imposed a duty upon Aramark. The parties agree that the Inland Rules of Navigation ("Inland Rules"), 33 C.F.R. § 83.01 et seq. apply, but they disagree as to which rules are pertinent.
Plaintiffs’ expert, Captain J.R. Sutton, testified that Inland Rules 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 34(e) applied to the Desert Shadow. (Transcript ("Tr.")1 11/15/21, 10:22:38, 10:25:07, 10:28:09, 10: 20:45.)
Captain Sutton referred to Rule 2 as the "prudent seaman rule," which requires mariners to follow the other Inland Rules. (Tr. 11/15/21, 10:22:38.) Rule 2 states:
33 C.F.R. § 83.02. Parties do not dispute the application of this rule. Rule 5, the look-out rule, states:
Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision.
33 C.F.R. § 83.05. Likewise, parties do not dispute whether this rule applies. Rule 6, the safe speed rule, requires that:
Every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed so that she can take proper and effective action to avoid collision and be stopped within a distance appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions.
33 C.F.R. § 83.06. The rule sets out factors that should be taken into account in determining safe speed, which include visibility, traffic density, the vessel's maneuverability, wind, current, and navigational hazards. 33 C.F.R. § 83.05(a)(i)-(vi). Again, parties do not dispute that Rule 6 applies here. Rule 7, which covers the risk of collision, requires:
33 C.F.R. § 83.07. Parties do not dispute that Rule 7 applies. Finally, Rule 9, which discusses narrow channels, states in relevant part:
33 C.F.R. § 83.09(a), (f). Rule 34(e) states:
A vessel nearing a bend or an area of a channel or fairway where other vessels may be obscured by an...
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