Meador v. Cassady

Decision Date19 March 2014
Docket NumberNo. 4:11CV322 TIA,4:11CV322 TIA
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
PartiesBILL MEADOR, Petitioner, v. JAY CASSADY, Respondents.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This cause is before the Court on Missouri state prisoner Bill Meador's petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (filed February 22, 2011/Docket No. 1). The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

On March 16, 2005, a jury found Petitioner guilty of involuntary manslaughter in the first degree and assault in the second degree. (Legal File, Resp. Exh. B at 30). On June 3, 2005, the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Missouri sentenced Petitioner as a persistent offender to two terms of fifteen-years imprisonment to be served consecutively. (Id. at 40-41, 66-68). Petitioner filed a notice of appeal on August 3, 2005. (Id. at 69). On October 31, 2006, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentence finding that the trial court did not err in failing to grant him a new trial or in admitting the results of his blood test. (State v. Meador, 204 S.W.3d 690 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006); Resp. Exh. E). The Missouri Court of Appeals issued its mandate on November 27, 2006. (Resp. Exh. F).

On February 21, 2007, counsel filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct the Judgment pursuant to Rule 29.15. (Resp. Exh. H at 5-9). On March 23, 2009, the post-conviction motion court denied relief holding his claims to be without merit. (Id. at 33-40). On appeal, Petitioner failed to raise on appeal the issues asserted in his motion for post-conviction relief and so the Court of Appeals found he waived his right to appellate review of such issues in the April 13, 2010 Order. (State v. Meador, 308 S.W.3d 264 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010); Resp. Exh. K). The Missouri Court of Appeals issued its mandate on May 10, 2010. (Resp. Exh. L). Petitioner pursued no other action for review of his convictions and sentence in state court.

On May 26, 2010, Petitioner filed a Missouri Rule 91 habeas petition raising three grounds for relief: his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call an accident reconstruction specialist; the trial court erred by denying his motion for independent laboratory analysis of his blood sample; and his blood was withdrawn without a valid search warrant. (Meador v. Dormire, Case No. 10AC-CC00378, Missouri Case.Net at https://www.courts.mo/gov/casenet; ECF No. 1, at 4). On August 10, 2010, the Cole Circuit Court took the cause under advisement, and on August 11, 2010, the court denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Id.).

On February 22, 2011, this Court received a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent was thereafter ordered to show cause why the claims for relief as set out in Petitioner's petition should not be granted. In response, Respondent contends that the grounds for relief in the petition are either procedurally barred, not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings, or without merit. The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on February 22, 2011.

Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Jefferson City Correctional Center in Jefferson City, Missouri, pursuant to the sentence and judgment of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Missouri. In the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner raises three grounds for relief:

(1) That his trial counsel was ineffective inasmuch as he failed to call an accident reconstruction specialist as a witness;
(2) That the trial court erred by denying his motion for independent laboratory analysis of his blood sample; and
(3) That his blood was withdrawn without a valid search warrant.

Respondent contends that the unexhausted grounds are procedurally defaulted. Alternatively, Respondent argues that one claim is not cognizable and other claim lacks merit.

I. Non-Cognizable Claim

In his third ground for relief, Petitioner claims that his blood was withdrawn without a valid search warrant.

Federal habeas relief is available to a state prisoner only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of a constitutional or federal statutory right. Williams-Bey v. Trickey, 894 F.2d 314, 317 (8th Cir. 1990); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Claims that do not reach the level of "constitutional magnitude" cannot be addressed in a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Carter v. Armontrout, 929 F.2d 1294, 1296 (8th Cir. 1991). "Section 2254 only authorizes federal courts to review the constitutionality of a state criminal conviction, not infirmities in a state post-conviction relief proceeding." Williams-Bey, 894 F.2d at 317. There is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings. Coleman v. Thompson, 502 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). A petitioner cannot, therefore, claim that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings. Coleman, 501 U.S.at 750; citing Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982) (where there is no constitutional right to counsel, there can be no claim of deprivation of effective assistance).

Petitioner's instant claim that his blood was drawn without a valid search warrant implicates the Fourth Amendment. A claim that a conviction was based upon evidence obtained pursuant to an illegal search and seizure is not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding where the petitioner had an opportunity to litigate the matter in a pre-trial suppression hearing. See Palmer v. Clarke, 408 F.3d 423, 437 (8th Cir. 2005) ("A Fourth Amendment claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review unless the state fails to provide "an opportunity for full and fair litigation of [the] claim." (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). "[A] 'mere disagreement with the outcome of a state court ruling is not the equivalent of an unconscionable breakdown in the state's corrective process.'" Chavez v. Weber, 497 F.3d 796, 802 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Capellan v. Riley, 975 F.2d 67, 71 (2nd Cir. 1992)). "The federal courts on habeas review of [Fourth Amendment] claims are not to consider whether full and fair litigation of the claims in fact occurred in the state courts, but only whether the state provided an opportunity for such litigation." Willett v. Lockhart, 37 F.3d 1265, 1273 (8th Cir. 1994).

Petitioner filed a motion to quash search warrant and to suppress evidence at the state court level. (Resp. Exh. B at 61-63). Petitioner sought to suppress the blood sample taken from him inasmuch as the search warrant was illegally and improperly issued. (Id.). After a hearing on the motion, the Circuit Court denied the motion to suppress. (Resp. Exh. A, Vol. I at 10-13). Therefore, the record establishes that Petitioner had an opportunity to full and fair litigation of his claim, and his Fourth Amendment ground for relief is not cognizable in this § 2254 proceeding. Palmer, 408F.3d at 437. As such, the claim raised in Ground three of the instant petition is not cognizable in these proceedings, and should be denied.

II. Exhaustion of Remedies and Procedural Bar

As to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Ground one, Respondent argues that the claim may not be considered in this federal habeas proceeding because Petitioner did not present it in his post-conviction relief motion.

A state prisoner must fairly present each of his claims in each appropriate state court before seeking federal habeas review of the claim. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004). In Missouri, a post-conviction proceeding is the exclusive procedure for pursing ineffective assistance of counsel claims in state court, and successive post-conviction motions are not permitted. Mo. S. Ct. Rule 29.15(a) and (1); Moore-El v. Luebbers, 446 F.3d 890, 896 (8th Cir. 2006). Moreover, the Missouri Supreme Court Rules expressly provide for an appeal from a post-conviction motion court's ruling. Mo. S. Ct. Rule 29.15(k). A federal habeas court may be precluded from considering the merits of a claim procedurally defaulted due to a failure to include the claim in a post-conviction appeal. Turnage v. Fabian, 606 F.3d 933, 936, 940-42 (8th Cir. 2010) (not addressing the merits of a federal claim that had not been fairly presented in a brief to the state supreme court after the denial of post-conviction relief); Storey v. Roper, 603 F.3d 507, 523-24 (8th Cir. 2010) (not addressing the merits of a claim that the petitioner had not pursued on appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1574 (2011); Smith v. Jones, 923 F.2d 588, 589 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that claims not presented to the Missouri courts, as well as those presented in post-conviction motions "and not appealed are procedurally barred"); Stokes v. Armontrout, 851 F.2d 1085, 1092 (8th Cir. 1988) (agreeing that a failure to pursue an "ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim on post-conviction appeal ... created a procedural bar to federal habeas review of that issue."). The ineffective assistance of counsel claim presented as Petitioner's Ground one was not pursued by Petitioner in his post-conviction relief motion. Because Petitioner may not present this ground for relief in a successive post-conviction motion or appeal therefrom, the claim is procedurally defaulted. Skillicorn v. Luebbers, 475 F.3d 965, 976 (8th Cir. 2007) ("Claims that have not been presented to the state courts, and for which there are no remaining state remedies, are procedurally defaulted.").

A review of the record shows that Claimant failed to raise the claim in Ground two, the trial court erred by denying his motion for independent laboratory analysis of his blood sample on direct appeal or in his post-conviction relief motion. (Resp. C at 4, 8-14, Exh. E, Exh. H at 5-9). Therefore, his claim raised in Ground two is also procedurally defaulted.

In an effort to avoid the procedural default...

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