Meadowbrook Ctr., Inc. v. Buchman

Decision Date08 April 2014
Docket NumberNo. 34234.,34234.
Citation90 A.3d 219,149 Conn.App. 177
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
PartiesMEADOWBROOK CENTER, INC. v. Robert BUCHMAN.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

J. Xavier Pryor, Hartford, for the appellant (defendant).

Edward M. Rosenthal, West Hartford, for the appellee (plaintiff).

GRUENDEL, BEAR and SCHALLER, Js.

GRUENDEL, J.

The defendant, Robert Buchman, appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Meadowbrook Center, Inc., on its claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel. The principal issue to be decided, which is dispositive of the appeal, concerns the causation aspect of damages.1 The defendant contends that the award of damages was impermissibly speculative because the record does not disclose any evidence indicating that the defendant's conduct caused the damages complained of. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. In November, 2006, the defendant entered into an admission agreement (agreement) with the plaintiff, a skilled nursing care facility, regarding residential care for the defendant's mother, Maude Buchman, who was suffering from dementia. The agreement identified the defendant's mother as “the [r]esident” and the defendant as “the [r]esponsible [p]arty.”

The agreement outlines, among other things, the responsibilities of the resident and the responsible party with respect to payment for the resident's care at the facility. Specifically, § II of the agreement, titled “Payment,” provides in relevant part that [t]he resident ... agrees to pay the [f]acility the total per diem rate, [defined in § XIV of the agreement as $323] ... except to the extent that payment is made directly to the [f]acility by a third party such as Medicare [or] Medicaid.... The obligation to pay said total per diem rate shall commence with the day the [r]esident is admitted to the [f]acility and continue until the [r]esident has been discharged and payment in full has been made for all services rendered.” Section III of the agreement, titled “Security Deposits,” states, inter alia, that upon admission to the facility, the resident “agrees to pay the [f]acility a security deposit equal to one month's total per diem rate....” Section IV (1) of the agreement, “Resident's Assets,” provides in relevant part that with respect to Medicaid assistance, the resident and responsible party agree that [a]t the time that the [r]esident's assets approach [$10,000], if the [r]esident does not have monthly income sufficient to pay for the cost of care and services, the [r]esident and [r]esponsible [p]arty agree to inform the [f]acility of the status of the [r]esident's assets and to make prompt application for Medicaid assistance to the Connecticut Department of Social Services [department].” Section IV (2) of the agreement provides that the resident and responsible party “agree to provide all information that may be requested by the [department] in connection with the application in accordance with any deadlines established by the [d]epartment,” and § IV (4) of the agreement provides in relevant part that the resident and responsible party “agree to act promptly and expeditiously to establish and maintain eligibility for Medicaid assistance....” Section IV (5) provides that if the responsible party has received a transfer of assets from the resident that results in the resident's ineligibility for Medicaid, the responsible party “agrees that these assets, or an amount of the [r]esponsible [p]arty's funds at least equal to these assets, will be used for the cost of care and services rendered to the [r]esident until the [r]esident is determined to be eligible for Medicaid assistance....” 2

The defendant's mother entered the facility on November 15, 2006. Until approximately July, 2008, her care was funded by her assets. Once those assets were exhausted, a Medicaid assistance application was filed with the department on behalf of the defendant's mother. The department sent a letter to the defendant, dated August 22, 2008, requesting certain information to complete the Medicaid application. The letter stated that the defendant must send in the requested information by September 8, 2008, and provided that if the department did not hear from the defendant or receive “at least some of the items” requested by that date, the Medicaid application would be denied. The department sent a second letter to the defendant, dated August 28, 2009, again requiring that the defendant provide the requested information in connection with his mother's Medicaid application. This letter stated: “Send in this information by 9/14/09.... If I do not get this information by the due date, this application will be denied. You have not responded in a very long time to this request for information. I am giving you this final request for the benefit of [the facility].” By notice dated September 16, 2009, the department denied the Medicaid application, stating as the basis for denial: “You failed to give us enough information or verification we need to prove you are eligible.”

The defendant's mother remained a resident at the facility until her death on May 11, 2009. At the time of her death, the defendant's mother had an unpaid balance of $99,820.78 due to the facility. The parties stipulated to the trial court that if the department had granted Medicaid benefits to the defendant's mother, the department would have paid the facility $47,561.18.

In its complaint, dated January 22, 2010, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendant breached the agreement by failing to provide the department with the requested information for his mother's Medicaid application in a timely fashion. The plaintiff also alleged a promissory estoppel claim, asserting, inter alia, that the defendant promised to utilize his mother's income and assets toward the cost of care at the facility, and to apply for Medicaid benefits and respond promptly to the department's requests for information in conjunction with the Medicaid application, and that the plaintiff relied upon the defendant's representations to its detriment in providing care to the defendant's mother.

A court trial commenced on October 13, 2011. At the close of the plaintiff's case-in-chief, the defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting, inter alia, that the plaintiff had failed to name the defendant as a party to the action in his capacity as conservator of his mother's estate, and that any evidence of the defendant's actions or omissions in his role as conservator bore no relevance to the issues before the court.3 The defendant also argued that the agreement did not impose any personal liability on the responsible partyexcept in the circumstance contemplated by § IV (5) of the agreement, i.e., where the responsible party has received a transfer of assets from the resident that results in the resident's ineligibility for Medicaid, and he further contended that the plaintiff had not proven that his mother would have qualified for Medicaid even if the requested information had been given to the department. The court denied that motion, and the defendant then rested.

Following a luncheon recess, the court issued an oral decision in favor of the plaintiff. With respect to the plaintiff's breach of contract claim, the court found that: (1) the plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant; (2) the contract provided that the defendant would timely supply all information requested by the department in connection with an application for Medicaid; (3) the consideration for the contract was the agreement of the plaintiff to supply care to the defendant's mother; (4) the defendant signed the contract as the responsible party; (5) the defendant failed to fulfill the terms of the contract by not supplying the requested information to the department; and (6) as a result, “the defendant caused the plaintiff to lose the Medicaid money.” The court found that the defendant's appointment as conservator did not relieve him of his duty to the plaintiff as the responsible party who signed the agreement, and that there was no need for the defendant, in his role as conservator, to be named as a separate party to the action. Additionally, the court found that the doctrine of promissory estoppel applied because (1) the defendant entered into a promise with the plaintiff to provide information to the department in connection with his mother's Medicaid application; (2) the plaintiff relied on this promise and provided care to the defendant's mother; and (3) the plaintiff lost the benefit of Medicaid as a result of the defendant's failure to fulfill the promise.

In accordance with its oral ruling, the court rendered judgment in the plaintiff's favor on October 18, 2011, and awarded damages in the amount of $47,561.15 plus attorney's fees to be determined postjudgment.4 The defendant thereafter filed motions for reargument, for articulation, and to open the judgment, which the court denied on January 3, 2012. This appeal followed.

I

We first address the defendant's claim that the award of damages stemming from his breach of the agreement was impermissibly speculative.5 Specifically, the defendant claims that the plaintiff failed to adduce any evidence to support the court's finding that his breach of the aforementioned contractual obligations “caused the plaintiff to lose the Medicaid money.” 6On our review of the record before us, we are compelled to agree.

“The general rule in breach of contract cases is that the award of damages is designed to place the injured party, so far as can be done by money, in the same position as that which he would have been in had the contract been performed.... It has traditionally been held that a party may recover general contract damages for any loss that may fairly and reasonably be considered [as] arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual...

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    ...and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to render judgment in favor of the defendant. Meadowbrook Center, Inc. v. Buchman , 149 Conn. App. 177, 212, 90 A.3d 219 (2014). The order from [the Appellate Court] was dated April 8, 2014. Thereafter, on April 30, 2014, the court, Ro......
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    ...in this opinion, Vancrest is without the remedy it wants to have and now seeks. See Meadowbrook Ctr., Inc. v. Buchman , 149 Conn.App. 177, 222, 90 A.3d 219 (2014) (Schaller, J., concurring) (noting that the nursing facility "was not without a remedy for the defendant's breach but, instead, ......
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    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 90, 2017
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