Meadows v. State

• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: WEBB; BELL, C.J., and MARSHALL
• Citation: Meadows v. State, 219 S.E.2d 174, 135 Ga.App. 758 (Ga. App. 1975)
• Decision Date: 19 September 1975
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 50883,50883,1
• Parties: Melvin MEADOWS v. The STATE

Page 174

219 S.E.2d 174

135 Ga.App. 758

Melvin MEADOWS v. The STATE.

No. 50883.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1.

Sept. 19, 1975.

Robert J. Evans, Rome, for appellant.

F. Larry Salmon, Dist. Atty., Robert D. Englehart, Asst. Dist. Atty., Rome, for appellee.

WEBB, Judge.

Melvin Meadows was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault, and he contends here that the trial court erred in overruling his 'objection to the lack of a proper chain of custody being established by the State in relation to a latent fingerprint card, allegedly bearing the fingerprints of the appellant.'

At trial Officer Frazier of the Rome Police Department testified that he 'lifted' fingerprint impressions from the door handle of the automobile belonging to the victim Brown at the scene of one of the shootings. He further testified that he placed the impressions on a regulation fingerprint card and turned the card over to Detective Crabbe. Detective Crabbe testified that this latent fingerprint card, as well as a comparison card containing defendant's inked fingerprint impressions, was retained in a filing cabinet in the identification room of the police department for safekeeping and then turned over by Crabbe to Officer Barnette for delivery to the Crime Information Center. Barnette testified that he received the cards from Crabbe and delivered them to the Center, and Larry Hankerson of the Center testified that he received the cards from Barnette and performed the comparisons. Crabbe also testified that neither fingerprint card had been altered.

Defendant objected to this comparison and identification testimony on the grounds that 'testimony has been introduced that (the latent fingerprint card) was in an open file for a period of time there in the police department, that such file was available to any detective working in that department. And I do not believe that a proper chain of custody has been established by the State.' The objection was overruled, and the correctness of that ruling is before us for review. Held:

We affirm. It is obvious that there is no gap in the chain of custody. What defendant seeks is that the State, in order to render that evidence admissible, be required to negate all possibilities of tampering or error while the card was in the filing cabinet. This is not the law. In Patterson v. State, 224 Ga. 197, 199, 160 S.E.2d 815, defendant's blood sample was left over the weekend in a refrigerator to which approximately eight persons had access. In holding the result of the blood test admissible, the Supreme Court stated: 'The evidence shows that the blood sample was handled in the normal course of testing and there is nothing in the record that creates a suspicion that the blood tested was other than that taken from the defendant. The identity of such blood samples need not be proved beyond all possibility of doubt or that all possibility of tampering with them be excluded. The circumstances need only establish reasonable assurance of the identity of the sample.'

In Interstate Life, etc., Ins. Co. v. Whitlock, 112 Ga.App. 212, 224, 144 S.E.2d 532, another blood sample case, we held that no rigid rule could be applied and quoted approvingly from Eisentrager v. State, 79 Nev. 38(5, 6), 378 P.2d 26: "The burden is upon the party relying upon expert testimony to prove the identity of the object upon which such testimony is based. However, the practicalities of proof do not require such party to negative all possibility of substitution or tampering. He need only to establish...