Meagher v. Dugger
| Decision Date | 17 May 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-0809-CIV.,87-0809-CIV. |
| Citation | 737 F. Supp. 641 |
| Parties | William Joseph MEAGHER, Petitioner, v. Richard DUGGER, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Marcia Silvers, Miami, Fla., for petitioner.
Michael Neimand, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, Fla., for respondents.
Guy Lewis, Asst. U.S. Atty., Miami, Fla., for U.S.
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
This most unusual habeas corpus case comes before the Court on remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.1 Subsequent to the judgment of the Court of Appeals, Petitioner filed a Motion to Amend Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss. These motions were referred to United States Magistrate Charlene H. Sorrentino, who has filed a Report and Recommendation. After reviewing the mandate and opinion of the Court of Appeals, the report of the Magistrate, and Petitioner's objections to the report, and after an independent review of the record, the Court hereby ADOPTS the Recommendation of the Magistrate.
It is therefore ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Petitioner's Motion to Amend Petition is GRANTED, and the amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.
The facts of this case have previously been set out both in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, see Meagher v. Dugger, 861 F.2d 1242 (11th Cir.1988), and in the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation. The Court, however, will briefly summarize the relevant facts.
In November, 1975, Petitioner was convicted in federal court and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for unarmed robbery, a crime for which he had been arrested in 1973. In November, 1978, he was released on parole with 10 years and 1 day remaining on his sentence. In June, 1979, while on parole, he was arrested and charged with various crimes by state authorities. The day after his arrest, his parole officer informed him that he had violated his parole, and, throughout the time that Petitioner was in state custody, he was subject to a federal detainer relating to the parole violation.
In April, 1982, Petitioner was induced to plead nolo contendere to one of the state charges based on a plea arrangement in which the state agreed to a 20-year sentence which was to run currently with another state sentence already imposed and with any federal prison time he was to receive as a result of the parole violation.2 However, in July, 1984, after a parole revocation hearing was held, it was ordered that Petitioner's parole was revoked and that the unexpired 10-year portion of his federal sentence was to commence only upon release from state custody.
At this point, to effectuate the intent of the state sentencing judge and to comply with the terms of the plea agreement, Petitioner could have been transferred to federal custody so that he could begin serving his federal sentence. Instead, Petitioner remained in state custody until December 23, 1988,3 at which time he was transferred to Metropolitan Correctional Center to begin service of the remaining 10 years of his federal sentence.
Petitioner initially filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 while still in state custody. Because he has been transferred to federal custody, Petitioner now seeks to amend his petition to reflect the change in his custodial status. In brief summary, Petitioner argues that his state conviction and sentence were invalid because they were induced by a plea agreement that the state could not and did not keep. Specifically, Petitioner claims that his plea to the state charges was involuntary because he would not have pled nolo contendere had he known that his sentence would not be served concurrently with his federal parole violation sentence. Petitioner therefore requests that the time spent in state custody be credited towards completion of his federal sentence.
The government has raised three grounds in opposition to Petitioner's motion. First, the government claims that Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Second, the government questions whether this Court has jurisdiction to permit Petitioner to amend his petition. Finally, and most significantly, the government contends that the petition should be denied on the merits because the Court cannot grant the requested relief. The Court shall address each of these arguments.
The government is correct in its assertion that Petitioner must first exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of his sentence. See United States v. Lucas, 898 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Flanagan, 868 F.2d 1544, 1546 (11th Cir.1989) (); United States v. Mathis, 689 F.2d 1364, 1365 (11th Cir.1982) (). Exhaustion of these administrative remedies is a jurisdictional requirement. Lucas, supra.
During the pendency of this action, Petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies. In a document entitled "Notice of Supplementary Facts Relating To His `Objections To Magistrate's Report'," Petitioner indicates that he has fully pursued the administrative remedies provided for by 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-542.16, and that he has unsuccessfully appealed to the National Appeals Board pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 2.26.
The purposes of the exhaustion requirement would not be served by dismissing this petition. Petitioner has afforded the attorney general the initial opportunity to determine credit for the time served on the state sentence, a full factual record has been developed, and the parties have fully briefed the issues raised by Petitioner's claim. Nevertheless, the exhaustion requirement is in this case jurisdictional, and it provides that administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to seeking judicial review, not merely prior to a district court's decision on the merits. Cf. White v. Frank, 718 F.Supp. 592, 596 (W.D.Tex. 1989) (), aff'd, 895 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.1990).
Petitioner's "Notice of Supplementary Facts" can fairly be read as an attempt to amend the factual allegations of the petition. The Court will therefore construe Petitioner's "Notice of Supplementary Facts" as a motion to amend his petition to allege that administrative remedies have been exhausted. The Court will grant this motion and address the merits of the motion to substitute parties and to proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
In his motion to amend petition, Petitioner seeks to proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and to substitute various parties in place of the state officials who are now named as Respondents in this action. Because Petitioner does not attack the legality of his federal sentence, § 2255 is an inappropriate mechanism by which to seek credit for time spent in state custody. See Cox v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 643 F.2d 534, 536 (8th Cir.1981); Youngworth v. United States Parole Commission, 728 F.Supp. 384, 388 (W.D.N.C.1990) (). However, Petitioner's subsequent pleadings indicate the intent to seek relief pursuant to § 2241, and the parties have briefed the merits of the issue as if the petition were brought pursuant to § 2241. Accordingly, the Court will construe Petitioner's motion as an attempt to amend the initial motion so that it is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
The government contends that the Court cannot permit the amendment because the federal government was not a party to the plea agreement in question. However, it is clear that Petitioner may assert his claim in a § 2241 petition. See Pinaud v. James, 851 F.2d 27 (2nd Cir.1988) (); Cox v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 643 F.2d 534, 536 n. 3 (8th Cir.1981) (); Youngworth v. United States Parole Commission, 728 F.Supp. at 389. Further, the government will not be prejudiced by substituting these federal officials as parties. See id. at 388 ().
Accordingly, Petitioner's Motion to Amend Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED.4 Because the parties have fully briefed the issues raised by the amended petition, and because the Magistrate reached the merits in her Report and Recommendation, the Court will address the issues raised by the amended petition.
The Court of Appeals found that Petitioner did in fact have a plea bargain, and that the plea bargain required that the state sentence be served concurrently with the federal parole violation sentence. See Meagher v. Dugger, 861 F.2d 1242, 1246 (11th Cir.1988). Citing Justice v. Texas, 522 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir.1975), the Court also noted that "an allegation that the defendant would not have pleaded nolo contendere if he had known that the sentence would not run concurrent to the parole violation sentence will support federal habeas relief." Meagher v. Dugger, 861 F.2d at 1247.5 The Court of Appeals remanded the case to this Court to determine the relief to be afforded Petitioner. Id. at 1247 n. 7.
Two remedies are available for a government's breach of its plea agreement: specific performance and withdrawal of the guilty plea. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971); United States v. Tobon-Hernandez, 845 F.2d 277, 280 (11th Cir.1988). The choice between the two is within the sound discretion of the court. Id.
During the pendency of this litigation, Petitioner has been transferred to the custody of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Dorman v. Simpson
... ... 1981); Landrum v. Warden, 623 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. Unit A 1980); Lundy v. Osborn, 555 F.2d 534 (5th Cir.1977); Meagher v. Dugger, 737 F.Supp. 641 (S.D.Fla.1990) ... Treating this as a case seeking habeas relief, there has been no showing that ... ...
-
State v. Parker
... ... See, e.g., Meagher v. Dugger, 737 F.Supp. 641, 647 (S.D.Fla.1990), aff'd, Meagher v. Clark, 943 F.2d 1277 (11th Cir.1991); Pinaud v. James, 851 F.2d 27, 30 (2d ... ...
-
Meagher v. Clark
... ... The habeas proceeding on this issue was denied at various points for technical difficulties, until it came before this court ... In Meagher v. Dugger, 861 F.2d 1242 (11th Cir.1988), this court disposed of the technical challenges to Meagher's instant habeas petition and, while not ruling on the merits, noted: ... The terms of the plea agreement were that his twenty-year sentence was to run concurrently with both his [prior state sentence] and ... ...