Meagher v. State

• Decision Date: 03 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 48S00-9804-CR-247.,48S00-9804-CR-247.
• Parties: Brian MEAGHER, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

726 N.E.2d 260

Brian MEAGHER, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 48S00-9804-CR-247.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

April 3, 2000.

Robert W. Rock, Anderson, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, Chris Worden, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee. SULLIVAN, Justice.

Defendant Brian Meagher was convicted of dealing in cocaine within 1,000 feet of a public park. He was adjudicated a habitual offender and sentenced to 80 years. He appeals his convictions on the grounds that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court committed reversible error in ruling on the admissibility of certain testimony. Although we find no ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the rulings of the trial court, we find that the trial court improperly enhanced Defendant's sentence.

This Court has jurisdiction over this direct appeal because the longest single sentence exceeds 50 years. Ind. Const. art. 7, § 4; Ind. Appellate Rule 4(A)(7).

Background

Suspecting that Defendant was selling a controlled substance from his apartment, Robert Peckinpaugh contacted Jack Brooks of the Madison County Drug Task Force in June, 1997, and offered to work as a confidential informant. He informed Officer Brooks that he could arrange to purchase crack cocaine from Defendant who, at the time, lived across the street from him.

Peckinpaugh arranged for three separate controlled buys from Defendant.¹ Each transaction transpired in a similar manner. First, Peckinpaugh arranged a drug purchase from Defendant. He then contacted Officer Brooks and informed him of the arrangement. Prior to each transaction, Officer Brooks searched Peckinpaugh to ensure he had no drugs, money or weapons on his person. After being fitted with a wireless transmitter, Peckinpaugh received money from Officer Brooks to purchase the drugs from Defendant. The confidential informant then proceeded to Defendant's apartment and purchased crack cocaine from Defendant. After the transaction and upon his return, Officer Brooks conducted another search at which time Peckinpaugh relinquished the cocaine to Officer Brooks.

During the second and third transactions, after Peckinpaugh gave Defendant the money to purchase crack cocaine, Defendant left his apartment and paged someone from a nearby pay phone. Thereafter, a dark blue Cadillac pulled up in the alley. Defendant reached into his pocket and handed something to a male passenger who gave Defendant something in return.² Defendant then delivered a zip-lock baggie with several pieces of crack cocaine to Peckinpaugh.

As a result of these controlled buys, the State charged Defendant with two counts of dealing in cocaine within 1,000 feet of a public park,³ a Class A felony; aiding, inducing or causing an offense of dealing in cocaine,⁴ a Class B felony; and maintaining a common nuisance,⁵ a Class D felony. The State also charged Defendant as a habitual offender. A jury convicted Defendant on all charges and then found that Defendant was a habitual offender.

The trial court imposed the maximum sentence for each dealing in cocaine count, and enhanced one of these sentences by 30 years under the habitual offender statute resulting in an 80-year sentence. The trial court also sentenced Defendant to ten years for aiding in the offense of dealing cocaine and three years for maintaining a common nuisance and ordered those sentences to be served concurrently with the 80-year sentence.

Discussion

I

Defendant contends that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions.

We evaluate Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by applying the two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See, e.g., Canaan v. State, 683 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind.1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 906, 118 S.Ct. 2064, 141 L.Ed.2d 141 (1998); Lowery v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1031, 1041 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 992, 116 S.Ct. 525, 133 L.Ed.2d 432 (1995). The first prong requires a defendant to demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in light of prevailing professional norms. See id. To satisfy the second prong, the defendant must show that the deficient performance was so prejudicial as to deny defendant a fair trial. See Brown v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1132, 1139-40 (Ind.1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 1367, 143 L.Ed.2d 527 (1999). A defendant is denied a fair trial only when a conviction occurs as the result of a breakdown in the adversarial process rendering the trial result unreliable. See Brown, 698 N.E.2d at 1140; Cooper v. State, 687 N.E.2d 350, 353 (Ind. 1997); Marshall v. State, 621 N.E.2d 308, 321 (Ind.1993).

Defendant contends that his counsel's performance was deficient in failing to object to statements made by Officer Brooks. His allegations concerning Officer Brooks's testimony are that: (1) defense counsel failed to object to hearsay evidence when the officer recounted conversations with the confidential informant regarding the controlled buys,⁶ (2) defense counsel failed to object to hearsay evidence concerning the officer's validation of the confidential informant's photo identification of Defendant,⁷ and (3) defense counsel failed to object to the State's leading question regarding the confidential informant's motivation to participate with the Drug Task Force.⁸

The second prong of the Strickland test may be determinative of Defendant's allegations. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ("If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed."); Coleman v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1022, 1028 (Ind.1998). In each complained of instance, the confidential informant provided personal, first-hand knowledge testimony. First, the confidential informant explained when and how he contacted Officer Brooks after arranging each drug purchase with Defendant. Second, during his testimony, the confidential informant explained and confirmed his identification of Defendant in the photo array. Finally, the informant personally testified that his motivation to participate in the controlled buys stemmed from his concern that his nine-year-old daughter was living across the street from a "common crack house."

In light of the confidential informant's testimony, we do not find that Officer Brooks's testimony was so prejudicial as to deny Defendant a fair trial. The complained of evidence was at most cumulative and therefore insufficient to establish prejudice. See Timberlake v. State, 690 N.E.2d 243, 260 (Ind.1997) (holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate that he suffered prejudice due to counsel's failure to object to various witness statements finding that the evidence was cumulative and innocuous), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1073, 119 S.Ct. 808, 142 L.Ed.2d 668 (1999). Accordingly, Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.

II

Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by curtailing his cross-examination of the confidential informant when Defendant attempted to expose his motivation for participating in the controlled buys.

A defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation requires that a defendant be afforded the opportunity to conduct effective cross-examination of state witnesses in order to test their believability. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Coates v. State, 534 N.E.2d 1087, 1095 (Ind.1989); Munn v. State, 505 N.E.2d 782, 784-85 (Ind.1987). However, this right is subject to the sound discretion of the trial court, which includes limiting repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation. See id.; see also Ind. Evidence Rule 611(a) ("The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses ... so as to ... protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment."). As the Unites States Supreme Court explained in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986):

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The right of confrontation, which is secured for defendants in state as well as federal criminal proceedings, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 [85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923] (1965), means more than being allowed to confront the witness physically. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. at

315 . Indeed, `[t]he main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.' Id. at 315-316 (quoting 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence 1395, p. 123 (3d ed.1940)) (emphasis in original). Of particular relevance here, [w]e have recognized that the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. Davis, [415 U.S.] at 316-17 (citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 [79 S.Ct. 1400, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377] (1959)). It does not follow, of course, that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. On the contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.

Id. at 678-79, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (emphasis in original). Only a clear abuse of discretion warrants reversal. Coates, 534 N.E.2d at 1095.

Defendant contends he wanted to expose the confidential...