Mealey v. Arndt, 1 CA-CV 02-0424.
| Citation | 76 P.3d 892,206 Ariz. 218 |
| Decision Date | 30 September 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 1 CA-CV 02-0424.,1 CA-CV 02-0424. |
| Parties | Harry S. MEALEY, Jr., and Linda Mealey, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Jim Arndt and Anita ARNDT, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Arizona |
Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman & Balint, P.C., By Tara L. Jackson, Phoenix, Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Gust Rosenfeld P.L.C., By Charles W. Wirken, Scott A. Malm, Phoenix, Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants.
¶ 1 This matter involves a boundary dispute between adjacent landowners. Appellants Jim and Anita Arndt appeal from a jury verdict awarding their neighbors, appellees Harry and Linda Mealey, a strip of property to which the Arndts hold record title. The Arndts contend that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict for the Mealeys on the theory of boundary by acquiescence. Because we conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that a definite, clear, visible boundary existed as required under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 2 We view the facts and all inferences in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict. Hyatt Regency Phoenix Hotel Co. v. Winston & Strawn, 184 Ariz. 120, 123, 907 P.2d 506, 509 (App.1995). In 1971, J.B. Wilson hired Gordon McLain to survey and divide a parcel of real property in North Scottsdale into four sections. A thirty-foot-wide strip for a roadway ran along the western border of the property. McLain surveyed and divided the property into four sections of equal usable size, not including the roadway, and set survey pins at the corners. The parcels were designated parcels I, J, K, and L, with parcel J to the east of parcel I and both parcels I and J to the north of parcels K and L respectively. Parcels I and J, the subject of this appeal, were described on the survey as follows:
¶ 3 In 1972, Nenver Rietveld purchased the four parcels. In 1978, he sold Parcel J to Charles and Mary Castelletti, appellant Anita Arndt's parents. Jim Arndt chose the lot for his father-in-law. In 1979, Nenver Rietveld sold Parcel I to Edward and Josephine Hernandez. Prior to selling the property, Rietveld located the survey pins where indicated by the original survey. The realtor who showed the property to the Hernandezes, Antje Coleman, pointed out the survey markers.
¶ 4 The deed for the property sold to the Hernandezes described their property, Parcel I, as follows:
The West half of the Northwest quarter of the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section thirty-three (33), Township five (5) North, Range four (4) East of the Gila and Salt River Base and Meridian.
The deed for the property sold to the Castellettis described their property, Parcel J, as follows:
The East half of the Northwest quarter of the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section Thirty-three (33), Township Five (5) North, Range Four (4) East of the Gila and Salt River Base and Meridian.
The deeds split the combined property into east and west halves without referring to or accounting for the thirty-foot-wide strip along the western border of Parcel I.
¶ 5 Mr. Hernandez built a house on his property. For an unknown reason, the house was not built square on the property. Soon after, in 1979 or 1980, Mr. Hernandez built a barbecue pit and then sometime later a concrete patio around the pit. When constructing the patio, Hernandez strung a line from wooden stakes near the northeast and southeast survey markers to mark the eastern boundary of his property. The patio was poured within the line indicated by the string. The resulting patio, however, was not parallel to the 1971 survey line but, like the house, was built at an angle.
¶ 6 After helping the Castellettis purchase the property, Mr. Arndt visited the Castelletti property several times a year. In April 1990, the Castellettis conveyed Parcel J to the Arndts. In March 1991, the Mealeys purchased Parcel I from the Hernandezes. The Mealeys were told that the rear or eastern boundary of their property was eight to ten feet beyond the edge of the patio and that the property included the patio and barbecue pit. Mr. Mealey erected his portable horse pens on the property, aligning them with the patio in the belief that the patio was parallel to the property line. In September 1991, the Mealeys hired surveyors to determine the precise eastern boundary in preparation for installing a fence. The surveyors located the markers from the 1971 survey. For the first time, Mr. Mealey realized that the house and patio were not built square on the property and that the property line was not where he had believed it to be. Mr. Mealey then noted that his horse pens were partly on the Arndts' property. Soon after this discovery, Mr. Mealey met the Arndts and told them about the encroachment. Mr. Arndt told him that he could leave the corral in place for the time being but that he would have to move it when the Arndts started to build.
¶ 7 In 1994, the Arndts hired Pinnacle Peak Engineering to conduct a formal survey of Parcel J in preparation for building a house. Using the legal description on the recorded deed, Pinnacle Peak determined that the patio, the horse pens, and a shed were encroaching on the Arndts' property. In February 1995, the Arndts sent a letter to the Mealeys advising them that they were encroaching on the Arndts' property and requesting that they remove the encroaching items. The Mealeys engaged Desert Foothills Surveys to survey their property based on the legal description in their deed. Like the Pinnacle Peak survey, the Desert Foothills survey concluded that the Mealeys' eastern boundary based on the legal description was approximately twenty feet west of the boundary indicated by the 1971 survey markers and that the boundary ran through their patio.
¶ 8 On December 14, 1995, the Mealeys filed an action to quiet title of the disputed strip of property based on adverse possession.1 On December 22, 1995, the Arndts filed a quiet title and trespass action against the Mealeys. The cases were consolidated and went to trial in March 2001.
¶ 9 At trial, the Mealeys argued not only adverse possession but also boundary by acquiescence in support of their quiet title action. With regard to boundary by acquiescence, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
The Mealey Plaintiffs and the Arndt Defendants may have established the boundary line between their lands by acquiescence. Failure of the Arndt Defendants to object to an encroachment with the knowledge that the Mealey Plaintiffs have used and developed an area for ten years may amount to acquiescence establishing the boundary between their lands. The fact that one or both parties were mistaken as to the true boundary between their lands does not preclude the establishment of a boundary by acquiescence.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Mealeys on the theory of boundary by acquiescence, but the jury did not return a verdict on the theory of adverse possession. The jury awarded the Mealeys the entire twenty-foot strip from the northern to southern boundaries of the property.
¶ 10 The Arndts moved for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial. They argued that the 1971 survey markers, on which the jury based its verdict, were insufficient to establish a boundary and that no evidence had been presented that the Arndts were aware of those markers, much less acquiesced to using them as a boundary. The Arndts also argued that boundary by acquiescence requires uncertainty as to the true boundary, that no uncertainty existed, and that evidence was insufficient to show use of the entire strip for the requisite period of time.
¶ 11 The trial court denied the Arndts' motion for judgment as a matter of law and the motion for new trial and entered judgment in favor of the Mealeys. The Arndts timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (1992) and 12-2101(B) (1994).
¶ 12 The Arndts argue that the Mealeys presented insufficient evidence to support the finding that the parties acquiesced to a recognizable boundary. In reviewing a jury's verdict, we view the evidence and the inferences in the light most favorable to upholding the judgment. Hyatt Regency Phoenix Hotel Co., 184 Ariz. at 123, 907 P.2d at 509. We affirm the judgment if substantial evidence was presented to permit reasonable persons to reach the decision reached by the jury. Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 192 Ariz. 51, 53, ¶ 14, 961 P.2d 449, 451 (1998). "Substantial evidence" is "`any relevant evidence from which a reasonable mind might draw a conclusion.'" Troutman v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Arizona, 170 Ariz. 513, 518, 826 P.2d 810, 815 (App.1992) (quoting Matter of Estate of Mustonen, 130 Ariz. 283, 285, 635 P.2d 876, 878 (App.1981)). We must set aside a verdict, however, if there is not substantial evidence in the record to justify it. Styles v. Ceranski, 185 Ariz. 448, 450, 916 P.2d 1164, 1166 (App.1996) (citing Spain v. Griffith, 42 Ariz. 304, 305, 25 P.2d 551, 551 (1933)).
¶ 13 Although Arizona has acknowledged the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, it has not clearly defined the elements. Hein v. Nutt, 66 Ariz. 107, 114, 184 P.2d 656, 661 (1947). We therefore look to other jurisdictions. Generally, to establish the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, the party asserting the doctrine must prove (1) occupation or possession of property up to a clearly defined line, (2) mutual...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Higgins v. Assmann Electronics, Inc.
...52 P.3d 184, 185 (2002). "Substantial evidence is any relevant evidence from which a reasonable mind might draw a conclusion." Mealey v. Arndt, 206 Ariz. 218, 221, ¶ 12, 76 P.3d 892, 895 (App.2003) (internal quotations and citations ¶ 27 Assmann notes that the trial court granted partial su......
-
Booth v. State
...it was entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law.1 ¶ 3 Viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict, Mealey v. Arndt, 206 Ariz. 218, ¶ 12, 76 P.3d 892, ¶ 12 (App.2003), the following facts were presented below and are not challenged by the state. Elk are indigenous......
-
Rayburn v. Rayburn
...of the trier of fact. Id. Substantial evidence is any relevant evidence from which a reasonable mind might draw a conclusion, Mealey v. Arndt, 206 Ariz. 218, ¶ 12, 76 P.3d 892, 895 (App. 2003), but does not include purely speculative inferences or conclusions, Dodd v. Boies, 88 Ariz. 401, 4......
-
Senior Advisory Grp. of America, Inc. v. McDowell
...P.3d 184, 185 (2002). "Substantial evidence is any relevant evidence from which a reasonable person might draw a conclusion." Mealey v. Arndt, 206 Ariz. 218, 221, ¶ 12, 76 P.3d 892, 895 (App. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). ¶10 McDowell's defamation counterclaim alleg......