Meaney v. Dodd

Decision Date15 July 1988
Docket NumberNo. 53891-3,53891-3
Citation111 Wn.2d 174,759 P.2d 455
CourtWashington Supreme Court
PartiesPaul MEANEY & Janet Meaney, husband and wife, Plaintiffs, v. Charles H. DODD & Connie, Dodd, husband and wife, Respondents, and Skagit County, Petitioner.

Keller Rohrback William Smart, Seattle, Michael Rickert, Skagit County Prosecutor, John Moffat, Deputy, Mount Vernon, for petitioner.

William Nielsen, Mount Vernon, for respondents.

Patrick Sutherland, Thurston County Prosecutor, Thomas Bjorgen, Deputy, Olympia, amicus curiae for Washington Ass'n of Counties, et al.

CALLOW, Justice.

Skagit County challenges reversal of a summary judgment order in its favor dismissing a cross-claim brought by Charles and Connie Dodd. The Dodds allege the County was negligent in issuing them a special use permit and in failing to provide accurate information during the application process. The trial court found the County breached no duty owed to the Dodds. The Court of Appeals reversed. Meaney v. Dodd, 47 Wash.App. 386, 735 P.2d 100 (1987). We reverse the Court of Appeals.

In February 1982 Charles Dodd applied to the Skagit County Permit Center and Planning Department for a special use permit to operate a semi-portable sawmill on his property. He asked Department employees to assist him in determining whether his application was complete and his proposal complied with county code requirements. He did not specifically request information concerning existing noise level regulations. The only reference to potential noise levels during the application process appeared on the environmental checklist completed by Dodd in which he stated Due to normal operation of mill proper and small machinery associated with operations, some minimum amount of increase [in noise] will be noticed.

The Skagit County Zoning Administrator checked Dodd's application against the zoning ordinance and visited the proposed site of the sawmill. He submitted staff findings to the hearing examiner which included a finding that "[w]ith operation of the sawmill there will be increased noise in the area." Neither the Zoning Administrator nor any other employee in the Department knew how much noise would be produced as the mill had not yet been built. On March 3, 1982, the hearing examiner granted the special use permit attaching certain conditions not relevant to this case. The County then issued Dodd a building permit and he began construction of the mill.

During the next year and a half Dodd's neighbors, the Meaneys, complained to the Planning Department on numerous occasions that Dodd was violating the conditions of the permit. As a result, the Zoning Administrator and other staff personnel of the Planning Department inspected Dodd's property on several occasions and two hearings were held to review the permit. Each time Dodd was found in compliance with the permit.

In the fall of 1983, the Meaneys filed a lawsuit against the Dodds and Skagit County to close the mill. 1 As a result of the Meaneys' allegations regarding noise level violations, Department officials measured the noise level of the mill and determined it exceeded the 55dBA limit of Skagit County Code 14.04.180(4) and WAC 173.60. The County ordered Dodd to cease operations until the violation was corrected, and revised his permit to include the condition that he comply with the noise limitations in the code. Dodd conducted his own tests and determined that compliance with the code was impossible or economically unfeasible considering the design of the mill and its location with respect to the Meaneys' home. The County then revoked Dodd's permit for lack of compliance with the noise limit.

The Dodds filed a cross-claim in the Meaneys' suit alleging:

VI.

That Skagit County, its agents and employees were negligent in failing to provide accurate information in response to requests by defendants Dodd concerning requirements for the installation of the saw mill.

* * *

VIII.

That Skagit County, its agents and employees were negligent in issuing a permit that was not valid and one that could not have been valid under any conditions. That Skagit County, its agents and employees had a duty to disclose to defendants Dodd facts that made it impossible for the project to comply with Skagit County codes.

IX.

That Skagit County, its agents and employees were negligent in issuing the building permit to defendants Dodd.

The County moved for an order of summary judgment dismissing the Dodds' cross-claim. The trial court granted the motion on the grounds that the County owed no duty to Dodd under the facts of this case and that Dodd had not exhausted administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a "special relationship" had been established between Dodd and the County giving rise to a duty of due care, and remanded for trial. We granted discretionary review.

This appeal arises out of an order granting summary judgment, and therefore we are to engage in the same inquiry as the trial court, which is to consider all facts submitted as contained in the record and reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party. Hontz v. State, 105 Wash.2d 302, 311, 714 P.2d 1176 (1986). A summary judgment motion should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CR 56(c). Hontz, at 311, 714 P.2d 1176.

The County contends it owed no duty of care to the Dodds under the "public duty doctrine". Although the Legislature abolished sovereign immunity for municipal corporations in 1967, 2 it did not thereby create any new causes of action or liability. J & B Dev. Co. v. King Cy., 100 Wash.2d 299, 304, 669 P.2d 468, 41 A.L.R.4th 86 (1983) (overruled on other grounds, Honcoop v. State, 111 Wash.2d 182, --- P.2d ---- (1988) and Taylor v. Stevens Cy., 111 Wash.2d 159, 759 P.2d 447 (1988)); Chambers-Castanes v. King Cy., 100 Wash.2d 275, 288, 669 P.2d 451, 39 A.L.R.4th 671 (1983). Traditionally state and municipal laws impose duties owed to the public as a whole and not to particular individuals. Chambers-Castanes, at 284, 669 P.2d 451; Baerlein v. State, 92 Wash.2d 229, 231, 595 P.2d 930 (1979). The public duty doctrine recognizes that a fundamental element of any negligence action is a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Thus "for one to recover from a municipal corporation in tort it must be shown that the duty breached was owed to the injured person as an individual and was not merely the breach of an obligation owed to the public in general (i.e., a duty to all is a duty to no one)." (Citations omitted.) Bailey v. Forks, 108 Wash.2d 262, 265, 737 P.2d 1257 (1987).

This court has established several exceptions to the public duty doctrine. See Bailey, at 268, 737 P.2d 1257. The only exception which the Dodds contend applies in this case is the "special relationship" exception. We have found the existence of a special relationship between a government agency and a plaintiff giving rise to a particular duty of care where: (1) there is some form of privity or direct contact between the governmental agency and the plaintiff which sets the latter apart from the general public, Chambers-Castanes, 100 Wash.2d at 286, 669 P.2d 451; (2) specific assurances are given by the agency, resulting in a duty being undertaken by the governmental entity, Chambers-Castanes, at 286, 669 P.2d 451; and (3) the plaintiff justifiably relies on those assurances. The government then owes the plaintiff a duty of due care to ensure that the assurances given are correct.

In Chambers-Castanes, police dispatchers, in response to numerous telephone calls, repeatedly assured assault victims that help was on the way when, in fact, no officers were dispatched until more than an hour later. We held a special relationship arose between the plaintiffs and the police department by virtue of the express...

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