Meant v. Standard Oil Co.

• Decision Date: 21 July 1903
• Citation: 55 A. 653
• Parties: MEANT v. STANDARD OIL CO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

55 A. 653

MEANT

v. STANDARD OIL CO.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

July 21, 1903.

Action by Michael Meany against the Standard Oil Company. On rule to show cause why a new trial should not be granted after verdict in favor of plaintiff. Rule discharged.

Argued February term, 1903, before GUMMERE. C. J., and FORT, HENDRICKSON, and PITNEY, JJ.

Thomas F. Noonan, for plaintiff.

Charles W. Fuller, for defendant.

PER CURIAM. This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff in consequence of inhaling noxious gases in a stillhouse of the defendant while the plaintiff, as its employ**, was attending to his duties there. The case has been twice tried, both verdicts being in favor of the plaintiff. The first verdict was set aside (Meany v. Standard Oil Co. [N. J. Sup.] 47 Atl. 803) on the ground that the evidence disclosed that the presence of gases in the stillhouse was apparent, and the danger from them was obvious, and on the ground that the defendant had used due care to keep the stillhouse as free as possible from the gases. The evidence at the second trial renders the case somewhat more clear upon both points. It now appears that in the process of distillation two different kinds of gas were evolved, one known as "acid gas," which was produced from sulphuric acid that was mixed with the oil. This gas was produced in the earlier stages of the distillalion. The other kind was known as "oil gas." and was produced from the oil itself by the heat of distillation. The acid gas was dangerous to the workmen; the oil gas was comparatively harmless. The evidence upon the second trial was such as to justify the jury in finding, first, that the defendant bad not exercised reasonable care to so dispose of the acid gas as to render the stillhouse reasonably safe for the workmen; and, secondly, that, while the presence of oil gas in the stillhouse was persistent and obvious, the dangerous gas known as acid gas was only occasionally present, and that the risk arising from it was not obvious to the plaintiff, lie having had no previous experience therewith.

A second verdict having been rendered in favor of the plaintiff upon evidence that supports his case more clearly than that given at the first trial, the rule to show cause should be discharged.