Mearida v. Murphy
| Decision Date | 15 August 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 16086,16086 |
| Citation | 42 Ill.Dec. 650,409 N.E.2d 145,87 Ill.App.3d 87 |
| Parties | , 42 Ill.Dec. 650 James L. MEARIDA and Mary K. Mearida, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Pleasant R. MURPHY and M. Bernadine Murphy, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Thomson, Weintraub & Thompson, Bloomington, for plaintiffs-appellants; Donald W. Wilcox, Jr., Bloomington, of counsel.
Herrick, Rudasill & Moss, Clinton, for defendants-appellees; A. J. Rudasill, Clinton, of counsel.
This is a suit for specific performance of an option requiring defendants to convey an easement to plaintiffs over certain land owned by defendants. The trial court entered summary judgment for the defendants. We reverse.
Both plaintiffs and defendants derive their titles from common grantors, people named Evans. On February 26, 1969, the Evanses conveyed to plaintiffs approximately 40 acres of unimproved land in rural DeWitt County. In connection with this conveyance the Evanses also conveyed to plaintiffs a 32-foot easement over property adjacent to the 40 acres and owned by the Evanses. The 32-foot easement gave access to a public highway.
On February 10, 1969 (about two weeks prior to the conveyance to plaintiffs), the Evanses entered into a contract of sale with defendants for the adjacent land over which the 32-foot easement lay. It provides for the sale to defendants of an irregular tract of about 25 acres; it then provides that the Evanses agree "to give" the 32-foot easement to defendants; it further provides that the Evanses agree to give an option to defendants to purchase an additional 28 feet adjacent to the 32-foot easement in order to make the easement 60 feet in width, such option to be exercised within 10 years. The net effect of the contract is to sell defendants 25 acres and then additionally give them easements over the land already purchased.
However, on March 1, 1969, the Evanses made and delivered a warranty deed to defendants which conveyed the 25 acres "subject to" the 32-foot easement. It also contained the following:
"Grantees agrees (sic) to give an option to James L. Mearida and Mary K. Mearida, to purchase an additional 28 foot easement West of the above described easement and adjacent thereto which would make an easement of 60 feet in width if purchased, for the sum of $750.00 if said option is exercised by giving notice in writing to grantees within ten (10) years from this date."
Plaintiffs, within the time limits set by the deed, served notice on defendants of the exercise of the option. Defendants refused to perform and plaintiffs filed the instant suit to enforce the option in the deed. As indicated above, the trial court entered summary judgment for defendants, holding in a memorandum opinion that the contract was too ambiguous to be specifically enforced. The trial court did not address the question of the deed except to say in his opinion,
The defendants' motion for summary judgment sets forth, in substance, that they had had no conversations with anyone concerning the options in either the contract or the deed and concludes that the 32-foot easement is sufficient for plaintiffs and that the 28-foot easement is unnecessary. Attached to the motion is a brief affidavit of defendants stating that each of them could competently testify as to the foregoing. Plaintiffs filed a counter affidavit of Evans, their grantor, stating that he had "advised and explained" the 28-foot easement to defendants. Since we have concluded that the trial court erred with regard to the law applicable in this case, we need not consider the sufficiency of the motion and the affidavits.
The parties, while taking differing views of them, indicate in their briefs before this court that two principles are here involved: (1) merger, and (2) enforcement of an option given to a third party. Plaintiffs maintain that the contract between Evanses and defendants merged into the deed with the consequent elimination of any ambiguity. Defendants maintain that ambiguous provisions may not merge into a deed and therefore the trial court was correct in finding for defendants by way of a summary judgment procedure.
The general rule, recognized almost universally, is that all prior conversations and understandings with regard to the property merge into the deed when delivered in the same manner that all prior parol understandings merge into the contract. Department of Transportation v. Western National Bank of Cicero (1976), 63 Ill.2d 179, 347 N.E.2d 161;...
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