Meaux v. Cooper Consol., LLC

Decision Date06 August 2020
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 19-10628
Citation477 F.Supp.3d 515
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana
Parties Jonathon R. MEAUX v. COOPER CONSOLIDATED, LLC and Savard Marine Services Inc., d/b/a Savard Labor & Marine Personnel, Inc.

Terrence Jude Lestelle, Andrea S. Lestelle, Richard Marc Morgain, Lestelle & Lestelle, Metairie, LA, for Jonathon R. Meaux.

R. Scott Jenkins, Hansford P. Wogan, Jones Walker, New Orleans, LA, for Cooper Consolidated, LLC.

John Powers Wolff, III, George Aaron Wright, Tori S. Bowling, Keogh, Cox & Wilson Ltd., Baton Rouge, LA, for Savard Marine Services, Inc.

SECTION M (5)

ORDER & REASONS

BARRY W. ASHE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is a motion by plaintiff Jonathan R. Meaux for summary judgment on seaman status, maintenance and cure, and the borrowed-employee doctrine.1 Defendants Cooper Consolidated LLC ("Cooper") and Savard Labor & Marine Personnel, Inc., d/b/a Savard Labor & Marine Personnel, Inc. ("Savard") (collectively, "Defendants") respond in opposition,2 and Meaux replies in further support of his motion.3 Also, before the Court is Cooper's cross-motion for summary judgment on seaman status and maintenance and cure,4 to which Meaux responds in opposition,5 and Cooper replies in further support of its motion.6 Having considered the parties’ memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court issues this Order & Reasons concluding that Meaux was a seaman and borrowed employee, but finding that there exist genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment on maintenance and cure.

I. BACKGROUND

This matter concerns a maritime personal injury. In January 2019, Meaux was hired by Savard, a company that supplies workers to marine companies, to work at Cooper.7 Savard vetted Meaux by having him respond to an online questionnaire and take a drug test at Savard's office, which he passed.8 Throughout the relevant period, Savard paid Meaux, but Cooper controlled his work.9

On January 3, 2019, Meaux attended an orientation conducted by a Cooper employee at Cooper's office.10 He began work the next day as a flagger and utility man in the service of crane barges owned and operated by Cooper.11 Meaux was primarily assigned to Cooper's crane barge the Bayou Special , but also worked for Cooper's other crane barges, namely, the High Tide , Bob Frane , and two others.12 The mission of Cooper's crane barge fleet was the loading and unloading of ships and barges in the Mississippi River.13

On February 19, 2019, Meaux was working as a deckhand on the Bayou Special , which was in the Mississippi River adjacent to the Weber Marine facility in Convent, Louisiana.14 Meaux was helping the Bayou Special ’s crane operator put covers on another barge when he was struck in the head with one of the barge covers that was dropped by the Bayou Special ’s crane.15 Meaux sustained injuries to his neck and head and aggravated a pre-existing lower back condition.16

After the accident, Cooper, and then Savard, sent Meaux to a medical clinic where he was examined, given a drug test, and ultimately released to work.17 Meaux's supervisor at Cooper, Ricky Adams, refused to place Meaux on light duty.18 However, Meaux could not work, and with supervisor approval, "mostly just rested."19 Meaux stopped reporting to work on March 13, 2019.20 Meaux met with Savard's safety man, Ralph Frazier, on March 18, 2019, at Savard's office, and was fired shortly thereafter.21

Post-termination, Savard authorized Meaux to seek treatment from Dr. Najeeb Thomas, a neurosurgeon at Southern Brain & Spine in Metairie, Louisiana.22 On May 10, 2019, Dr. Thomas noted that Meaux was not able to work pending treatment for complaints of neck pain, with numbness and tingling in his hands, and lower back pain, all of which Meaux attributes to the February 19, 2019 accident.23 Dr. Thomas ordered MRI scans of Meaux's cervical and lumbar spine, which revealed new herniated discs at the C4-C5 level.24 The scans also showed a herniation at L5-S1, which was also present on an MRI scan Meaux had in 2012.25

Dr. Thomas treated Meaux's neck injury with a cervical epidural and physical therapy.26 On July 18, 2019, with four sessions remaining, Meaux quit going to physical therapy, claiming that it was causing him too much pain.27

Meaux saw Dr. Thomas again on September 3, 2019, and after an examination, the doctor noted that Meaux's herniated discs at C4-C5 and L5-S1 were symptomatic.28 Dr. Thomas told Meaux he could live with the pain or have a discectomy and arthroplasty.29 Meaux opted for surgery, which was performed on November 27, 2019.30 Thereafter, Meaux was supposed to participate in physical therapy.31 Savard paid for Meaux's medical care until December 2019.32

On February 10, 2020, Dr. Thomas requested that Savard authorize three months of post-surgical office visits and cervical x-rays.33 Savard refused, claiming that Meaux had not complied with his prescribed medical treatment by failing to attend physical therapy sessions both before and after his surgery.34 Savard also denied Dr. Thomas's request for reconsideration.35

Meaux filed this case against Savard and Cooper seeking redress for his injuries.36 Meaux alleges that he is a Jones Act seaman and Cooper's borrowed employee.37 Meaux seeks damages for negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, maintenance and cure, as well as punitive damages and attorney's fees for Cooper and Savard's failure to pay such benefits.38 Alternatively, in the event that the Court finds Meaux is not a Jones Act seaman, he seeks benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act ("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901, et seq.39

II. PENDING MOTIONS

Meaux and Cooper filed cross-motions for summary judgment on seaman status,40 as to which the material facts are not in dispute. Instead, the parties view these facts from quite different perspectives. Meaux contends that he is a Jones Act seaman because in his capacity as flagger and utility man, his duties contributed to the function and mission of Cooper's vessels, especially the Bayou Special.41 Further, Meaux argues that his connection to Cooper's vessels was substantial in duration and nature as he worked exclusively in the service of Cooper's vessels while exposed to the perils of the sea: thus, as a Jones Act seaman, his employer must provide him with maintenance and cure.42 Meaux contends that Cooper and Savard arbitrarily and capriciously ceased maintenance-and-cure payments, which makes them liable for his attorney's fees and punitive damages.43 Further, Meaux argues that he is Cooper's borrowed servant because Cooper had control over his work.44

Cooper and Savard, on the other hand, argue that Meaux is a longshoreman, not a seaman, because he did not have a connection to a vessel, or identifiable fleet of vessels, controlled by Cooper that was substantial in both nature and duration.45 Thus, Cooper contends that Meaux's remedy is workers’ compensation under the LHWCA, not a negligence claim under the Jones Act.46 Cooper and Savard argue that Meaux is not entitled to maintenance and cure because he is not a seaman, and, in any event, he is not entitled to attorney's fees or punitive damages with respect to the employers’ failure to pay maintenance and cure because he voluntarily stopped treatment and failed to disclose a prior medical condition in his employment application.47 Further, Cooper argues that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment on the borrowed servant issue.48

III. LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ). " Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. A party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the basis for summary judgment and identifying those portions of the record, discovery, and any affidavits supporting the conclusion that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the moving party meets that burden, then the nonmoving party must use evidence cognizable under Rule 56 to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

A genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. Material facts are not genuinely disputed when a rational trier of fact could not find for the nonmoving party upon a review of the record taken as a whole. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Simbaki, Ltd. , 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014). "[U]nsubstantiated assertions," "conclusory allegations," and merely colorable factual bases are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Hopper v. Frank , 16 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1994). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court may not resolve credibility issues or weigh evidence. See Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co. , 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, a court must assess the evidence, review the facts, and draw any appropriate inferences based on the evidence in the light most...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 cases
  • Nelson v. Warner
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
    • 10 Agosto 2020
  • Cole v. Oceaneering Int'l
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana
    • 26 Abril 2023
    ...Act employer. District courts in this Circuit have reached the same conclusion, including several Sections of this Court. In Meaux v. Cooper Consolidated, LLC, for another Section of this Court reaffirmed its prior holding that the plaintiff satisfied the substantial duration prong of the J......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT