Mecca v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., Case No. 12-60828-CIV-COHN/ROSENBAUM
| Decision Date | 09 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 12-60828-CIV-COHN/ROSENBAUM |
| Parties | ALFRED MECCA, Plaintiff, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant School Board of Broward County's Motion to Dismiss [DE 3]. The Court has considered the Motion, Plaintiff Alfred Mecca's Response [DE 17], Defendant's Reply [DE 18], the record in this case, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.
According to the Complaint [DE 1-2 at 2-15], Plaintiff Alfred Mecca was a teacher employed by Defendant School Board of Broward County for thirty years. Compl. ¶ 7. On or about February 5, 2010, while in his classroom, Plaintiff was injured when he was knocked to the ground by a male special education student. Id. ¶ 9. At the time, Plaintiff was attempting to break up a physical altercation between the male student and a female student. Id. Defendant allegedly assured Plaintiff that the male student would be removed from his classroom, but the male student was not removed. Id. ¶¶ 11, 12. Plaintiff says he felt continuously threatened, stalked, and intimidated by the male student's frequent verbal intimidation and stares. Id. ¶ 12.
After the February 5th incident, Plaintiff was diagnosed with post-traumatic stressdisorder ("PTSD"). Id. ¶ 13. Before the diagnosis, Plaintiff "had no apprehension or anxiety interacting with challenging students," id. ¶ 18, but after the diagnosis, "he experienced severe insomnia, fatigue, nervousness/anxiety/shaking, withdrawal from student conflict situations and other symptoms . . . associated with PTSD," id. ¶ 19.
Because of his condition, Plaintiff missed five days of work. Id. ¶ 13, 17. He requested to use sick leave for his absence, but Defendant denied the request and deducted five days of pay from Plaintiff's salary for the days he missed. Id. ¶¶ 14-15, 17. Defendant advised that Plaintiff did not qualify for sick leave under Defendant's Illness in Line of Duty Policy ("ILOD Policy") because he did not suffer physical illness or injury as required under the policy. Id. ¶¶ 15-16; see also ILOD Policy [DE 1-2 at 17].
Later, Plaintiff was absent an additional five days because of his condition. Compl. ¶ 21. Again, he requested to use sick leave, but Defendant reprimanded him for his absence. Id. Defendant later reprimanded Plaintiff a second time when he fell asleep during his lunch break. Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff claims he fell asleep because he was exhausted and lethargic due to his insomnia. Id.
Ultimately, Plaintiff resigned his employment with Defendant. Id. ¶ 23. He says he resigned "to preserve his health and sanity," because he "felt so demeaned demoralized, and embarrassed," as a result of "Defendant's failure to remove the student from Plaintiff's class, its . . .reprimands and harassing verbal statements . . . , and [its] repeated expressions of dissatisfaction with him in the work place, such that his poor treatment by Defendant was commonly known among Plaintiff's colleagues." Id.
On December 28, 2011, Plaintiff filed this action in the Circuit Court of theSeventeenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Broward County, Florida. See Compl. The Complaint brings the following claims against Defendant: handicap discrimination under Titles I and II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., ("ADA") (Count I); handicap discrimination under the Florida Constitution and Statutes (Count II); "denial of equal protection; retaliation/constructive discharge" (Count III); and handicap discrimination under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Fla. Stat. § 760.10 et seq., ("FCRA") (Count IV). See id.
Defendant was served on April 18, 2012. See Summons [DE 1-2 at 1]. Thereafter, on May 3, 2012, Defendant removed the action to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction. See Notice of Removal [DE 1]; 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The next day, Defendant filed the instant Motion, seeking to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss lies for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In order to state a claim, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (citations omitted). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
At this stage in the litigation, the Court must consider the factual allegations in the Complaint as true, and accept all reasonable inferences therefrom. Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty., Fla., 21 F.3d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, the Court may grant a motion to dismiss when, "on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual allegations will support the cause of action." Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993).
Defendant seeks to dismiss each Count of the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff opposes Defendant's Motion, but also seeks leave to amend his Complaint to bring claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court evaluates the parties' arguments as to each Count of the Complaint below.
(Count I)
Count I brings a claim for handicap discrimination under the ADA. "[T]o establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, [Plaintiff] must demonstrate that [he] (1) is disabled, (2) is a qualified individual, and (3) was subjected to unlawful discrimination because of [his] disability." Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000). Additionally, "an ADA plaintiff (1) as part of [his] burden of production, must identify an accommodation that would allow [him] to perform [his] job duties and (2) as a part of [his] burden of proving [his] case, must establish that such an accommodation is reasonable." Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 283 (11th Cir. 1997). Defendant contends that Plaintiff fails to plead the first element of his ADA discrimination claim (that he is disabled), and fails to plead a reasonable accommodation.
First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to plead factual allegations establishing that he is disabled. Under the ADA, an individual is disabled if he has "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) [is] regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1). The Complaint pleads that Plaintiff was diagnosed with PTSD, and that the PTSD affected his everyday life because after his diagnosis, "he experienced severe insomnia, fatigue, nervousness/anxiety/shaking, withdrawal from student conflict situations and other symptoms . . . associated with PTSD." Compl. ¶¶ 18, 19. The Federal Regulations explain that, for an impairment like PTSD, "it should easily be concluded that the [impairment] will, at a minimum, substantially limit the major life activities indicated." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(3)(iii); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1)(vii) (). Therefore, the Complaint pleads that Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to identify a reasonable accommodation that would allow him to perform his job duties. In response, Plaintiff points to his allegations that he requested to use sick leave for his absence and asked that the male student be removed from his classroom. See Resp. at 4; Compl. ¶¶ 11-12, 14. Plaintiff also suggests in his Response that Defendant could have permitted him to sleep during his lunch break. Resp. at 4.
In its Reply, Defendant suggests that the ADA claim cannot survive based on Plaintiff's request to use sick leave for his absence, because Defendant properly rejected the claim under its ILOD Policy, and the ILOD Policy does not conflict with theADA. See Reply at 2-3. The Complaint acknowledges that Defendant denied Plaintiff's request to use sick leave under the ILOD Policy because the policy only applies to employees who suffer physical illness or injuries, and Plaintiff suffered a psychological injury. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 16; see also ILOD Policy (". . . employee shall be entitled to illness-in-line-of-duty leave with pay when the employee has to be absent from [his] duties because of personal injury received in the discharge of duty or because of illness from any contagious or infectious disease contracted at work."). Similar to Hensley v. Punta Gorda, 686 So. 2d 724, 727 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997), where the court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to recover benefits for a psychiatric illness under Florida's workers' compensation statute because the statute only covers physical injuries, Plaintiff's claim cannot succeed to the extent that he seeks to recover benefits under the ILOD Policy for his psychological illness, because the ILOD Policy only covers physical illnesses. See Hensley, 686 So. 2d at 727 (...
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