Mecham v. Frazier

• Decision Date: 29 August 2008
• Docket Number: No. 20070730.,20070730.
• Citation: 2008 UT 60,193 P.3d 630
• Parties: Lemanda Lillian MECHAM, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Sean D. FRAZIER and David L. Johnson, Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

193 P.3d 630

2008 UT 60

Lemanda Lillian MECHAM, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Sean D. FRAZIER and David L. Johnson, Defendants and Appellants.

No. 20070730.

Supreme Court of Utah.

August 29, 2008.

Cory B. Mattson, Sandy, for plaintiff.

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., J. Clifford Petersen, Scott D. Cheney, Brent A. Burnett, Asst. Att'ys Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendants.

PARRISH, Justice:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 This case presents two certified questions from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals: (1) Does the Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("UGIA") confer to state officers immunity from suit or immunity from liability? and (2) Does the UGIA require that a notice of claim against state officials in their individual capacity expressly aver "fraud" or "malice"? We conclude (1) that the UGIA confers immunity from suit to state officers and (2) that the UGIA does not require that a notice of claim against state officials in their individual capacity expressly aver "fraud" or "malice."

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 "We accept as true the facts described by the [Tenth Circuit] in the certification order."¹ Accordingly, we recite the facts as contained therein.

¶ 3 On February 23, 2003, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Sean Frazier pulled over Lemanda Mecham for speeding and not wearing her seat belt. When Frazier asked for Mecham's license, Mecham provided it. Frazier checked the license with dispatchers and was told that it had been suspended. Mecham denied that there was any problem with her license and refused Frazier's repeated requests that she exit her car. Instead, Mecham ordered Frazier to call backup to prove his identity as a police officer. Frazier did so, and Trooper David Johnson arrived as backup. But even after Johnson arrived, Mecham still refused to exit her car. After approximately fifty minutes of argument, the troopers subdued Mecham with pepper spray and pulled her from her car.

¶ 4 In January 2004, pursuant to the UGIA,² Mecham filed a notice of claim against Frazier and Johnson, alleging violations of state law. She subsequently filed a complaint in federal district court, alleging that the troopers had used excessive force. Her complaint included both federal and state claims.

¶ 5 Frazier and Johnson moved to dismiss all claims. The federal district court denied the motion as to the federal claim but granted the motion as to the state law claims, ruling that the complaint did not aver sufficient facts upon which relief could be granted. The court did, however, grant Mecham leave to amend her complaint to cure the deficiency.

¶ 6 Mecham filed an amended complaint, alleging a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seven state law claims. The troopers moved to dismiss the state law claims, arguing that Mecham had not complied with the notice requirements of the UGIA, leaving the court without jurisdiction to entertain her state law claims. The district court denied the motion, and the troopers appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.

¶ 7 The Tenth Circuit entered a Show Cause Order on the issue of whether the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss was immediately appealable. Following briefing and oral argument, the Tenth Circuit determined that the issue required resolution by this court. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit certified to this court two questions: (1) "Does the [UGIA] confer to state officers an immunity from suit or merely an immunity from liability?" and (2) "Does the [UGIA] require that a Notice of Claim against state officials in their individual capacity expressly aver `fraud' or `malice'?"

¶ 8 We have jurisdiction over certified questions of state law pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(1) (2008).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9 When answering a certified question from a federal court, "traditional standards of review do not apply" because we are not asked to "affirm or reverse a lower court's decision."³ We do not resolve the underlying dispute; rather, "we answer the legal questions presented."⁴

ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Here, we are asked to interpret provisions of the UGIA. "When interpreting a statute, we look first to its plain language."⁵ "Only if we find some ambiguity [in the statute's plain language] need we look further, and only then need we seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy considerations."⁶

I. DOES THE UGIA CONFER TO STATE OFFICERS AN IMMUNITY FROM SUIT OR AN IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY?

A. The Importance of the Distinction Between Immunity from Suit and Immunity from Liability

¶ 11 The distinction between immunity from suit and immunity from liability is important to the federal courts because it defines their jurisdiction. Under the collateral order doctrine, federal appellate courts "have subject matter jurisdiction to hear appeals of orders denying motions to dismiss where the motions are based on immunity from suit."⁷ They do not, however, have jurisdiction to hear appeals of orders denying claims of immunity from liability.⁸ Thus, a federal appellate court's jurisdiction to hear an appeal turns on the scope of the immunity.⁹

¶ 12 When the claimed immunity derives from state law, the scope of the immunity—i.e., whether the immunity in question is immunity from suit or immunity from liability—is governed by state law.¹⁰ Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has asked us to interpret the scope of the immunity conferred to state officials under the UGIA so that it can determine whether it has jurisdiction to hear the troopers' appeal. This is a question of first impression because, in Utah, there is no collateral order doctrine.¹¹ As a result, we have not had occasion to focus on the distinction between immunity from suit and immunity from liability under the UGIA.

B. Government Employees and Immunity Under the UGIA

¶ 13 The UGIA clearly grants immunity from suit to governmental entities. Section 63-30-3, the first substantive provision in the UGIA, begins with the following statement: "Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a governmental function...."¹² We have often referred to the immunity provided to governmental entities by the UGIA as a "blanket immunity" that protects the entities from suit unless a provision in the UGIA specifically waives that immunity.¹³

¶ 14 The UGIA does not contain a similarly explicit grant of immunity from suit to government employees. Nevertheless, section 63-30-4(3)(a) clearly provides that an action under the UGIA is a "plaintiff's exclusive remedy" for bringing suit against a government employee for an act occurring "during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under the color of authority."¹⁴ By making suit under the UGIA a plaintiff's sole remedy against a government employee, the legislature extended to government employees the blanket immunity from suit that was explicitly granted to government entities.

¶ 15 A government employee's immunity from suit, however, is subject to three exceptions,¹⁵ one of which is relevant here: a government employee can be sued individually if the employee acts or fails to act due to fraud or malice.¹⁶ In order to successfully sue a government employee individually, a plaintiff must file a notice of claim with the proper government entity¹⁷ that—as discussed in Part II of this opinion—contains an allegation of fraud or malice. When fraud or malice is properly alleged, the employee is not immune from suit and may be held personally liable if "it is established that... the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice."¹⁸ Accordingly, whether a notice of claim properly alleges fraud or malice raises questions regarding the employee's immunity from suit and not the employee's immunity from liability.

II. DOES THE UGIA REQUIRE THAT A NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST STATE OFFICIALS IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES EXPRESSLY AVER "FRAUD" OR "MALICE"?

¶ 16 The second question certified by the Tenth Circuit asks what degree of compliance is required to satisfy the notice of claim requirement of the UGIA. The troopers argue that, in order to assert a claim against a government employee, a claimant must "specifically allege" fraud or malice. In other words, the troopers' argument is that a proper notice of claim must contain the words "fraud" or "malice." Mecham, on the other hand, contends that the UGIA does not require a claimant to specifically state "fraud" or "malice" in the notice of claim. We agree with Mecham.

¶ 17 The notice of claim requirement is contained in section 63-30-11, which provides in part:

Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.¹⁹

A notice of claim must contain (1) "a brief statement of the facts," (2) "the nature of the claim asserted," and (3) "the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known."²⁰ The purpose of the notice of claim requirement is to "provide[] the governmental entity an opportunity to correct the condition that caused the injury, evaluate the claim, and perhaps settle the matter without the expense of litigation."²¹

¶ 18 Utah courts require strict compliance with the notice of claim requirement of the UGIA.²² Strict compliance mandates "adherence to all of the relevant provisions outlined in the [UGIA]."²³ Nevertheless, the courts will not "require more of a claimant than is required by the pertinent statutory language."²⁴ For example, in Xiao Yang Li v. University of Utah, we held that a notice of claim met the requirements of the UGIA, even though the notice did not list the claimants' names.²...