Mechanical Rubber and Supply Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.

• Decision Date: 17 January 1980
• Docket Number: No. 79-345,79-345
• Citation: 35 Ill.Dec. 656,80 Ill.App.3d 262,399 N.E.2d 722
• Parties: , 35 Ill.Dec. 656 MECHANICAL RUBBER AND SUPPLY CO., a Foreign Corporation, Counterplaintiff- Appellant, v. CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO., a Foreign Corporation, Counterdefendant-Appellee. *
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 722

399 N.E.2d 722

80 Ill.App.3d 262, 35 Ill.Dec. 656

MECHANICAL RUBBER AND SUPPLY CO., a Foreign CorporationCounterplaintiff- Appellant, v.CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO., a Foreign CorporationCounterdefendant-Appellee. ^*No. 79-345.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Jan. 17, 1980.

Charles G. Roth and Phillip B. Lenzini, Kavanagh, Scully, Sudow, White & Frederick, Peoria, for counterplaintiff-appellant.

Wayne L. Hanold and David R. Aplington, Westervelt, Johnson, Nicoll & Keller, Peoria, for counterdefendant-appellee.

STOUDER, Presiding Justice:

Plaintiff, George Harms, an iron worker, alleges he was injured while working for his employer, O. Frank Heinz Construction Co., on the premises of Caterpillar Tractor Co.(herein referred to as "Caterpillar"), defendant and counterdefendant-appellee.Also named as defendant in the original proceeding was Mechanical Rubber and Supply Co.(herein referred to as "Mechanical Rubber"), recovery being requested on the basis of strict liability in tort.That action is still pending and is not the subject of this appeal.

Mechanical Rubber filed a third party complaint against Caterpillar seeking indemnity on a strict liability theory alleging that Caterpillar, the third party defendant, defectively designed and assembled the hopper which caused the plaintiff's injury.Pursuant to defendant's motion to dismiss, the third party complaint was dismissed and this appeal follows pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a)(Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 110A, par. 304(a)).We affirm.

The plaintiff, George Harms, alleges that he was injured during the construction or assembly of a hopper.The hopper was part of a dust collector, and the hopper and dust collector ultimately constituted a major part of a building on the premises of Caterpillar, defendant and counterdefendant herein.The hopper was designed by Caterpillar and the purchase order was placed with Mechanical Rubber, defendant and counterplaintiff.Mechanical Rubber then caused the hopper to be fabricated by Miller Welding & Iron Works, Inc.The hopper was forwarded directly to Caterpillar's plant site, where it was being erected by O. Frank Heinz, the plaintiff's employer at the time of the accident.

The principal issue raised on this appeal is whether a designer of a product may be obligated under the theory of strict liability in tort to indemnify the supplier and manufacturer of the product designed.Mechanical Rubber argues that a designer is so liable and that this is especially true where, as in the instant case, the designer is also the purchaser of the product.

We have no quarrel with the general rule contended for by the appellant, namely, that the unreasonably dangerous condition which gives rise to the strict liability in tort, includes both defects in manufacture and in design.(Kerns v. Engelke(1979), 54 Ill.App.3d 323, 12 Ill.Dec. 270, 369 N.E.2d 1284, aff'd.76 Ill.2d 154, 28 Ill.Dec. 500, 390 N.E.2d 859).Describing defects in these terms is a matter of convenience and a way of analyzing aspects of a product without necessarily creating distinctions in the application of the general rule.Generally speaking, manufacturing defects result from qualities of a product not intended by the manufacturer while design defects refer to characteristics of a product intended by the manufacturer which render the product not reasonably safe.

To say that an unreasonably dangerous condition may include design defects does not mean that a party whose only connection to the product is that of the designer is liable under products liability theories.Liability is still limited to those parties in the chain of manufacturing and distributing a product.While the transactions between the parties in the distribution system may not necessarily be seller and buyer (seeCrowe v. Public Building Commission of Chicago(1978), 74 Ill.2d 10, 23 Ill.Dec. 80, 383 N.E.2d 951 where the transaction was a lease) nevertheless, the transaction and relationship of the parties should be a part of the distributive system for the product.Where a party...