Med-Trans Corp. v. Benton
| Decision Date | 26 September 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 5:07-CV-222-FL.,5:07-CV-222-FL. |
| Citation | 581 F.Supp.2d 721 |
| Parties | MED-TRANS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. Dempsey BENTON, Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, in his official capacity; Robert J. Fitzgerald, Director, Division of Health Service Regulation, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, in his official capacity; Lee B. Hoffman, Chief of the Certificate of Need Section, Division of Health Service Regulation, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, in her official capacity; Drexdal R. Pratt, Chief of the Office of Emergency Medical Services, Division of Health Service Regulation, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, in his official capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
Noah H. Huffstetler, III, Stephen D. Martin, Wallace C. Hollowell, III, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Raleigh, NC, for Plaintiff.
Angel Evon Gray, N.C. Department of Justice, Raleigh, NC, for Defendants.
Maureen D. Murray, Smith Moore Leatherwood, LLP, Greensboro, NC, Amicus.
This matter comes before the court on plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings. (DE # 53). The issues raised are ripe for ruling. For the following reasons plaintiff's motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff, a North Dakota corporation which presents itself as "one of the nation's leading providers of air ambulance services," and operates, among many others, two air ambulance services in northern South Carolina, near the North Carolina border,1 initiated this case on June 18, 2007. Its complaint asserts eight claims for relief, seven of which allege that specific portions of North Carolina's state statutory and regulatory scheme governing operations of air ambulance services are preempted by federal aviation legislation pursuant to Article VI of the United States Constitution. Defendants are four officials serving within the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS"), sued in their official capacities.2
Plaintiff, while authorized to pick up patients in North Carolina for transport to facilities in South Carolina, and to transport patients from South Carolina to facilities in North Carolina, protests North Carolina statutes and regulations which preclude it from performing purely instate transports from point to point in North Carolina. Plaintiff argues express and implied federal preemption preclude enforcement of the state laws at issue.
More particularly, plaintiff asserts that 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1), a provision of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 ("ADA"), which among other things prohibits states from enacting or enforcing laws relating to the price, route, or service of an air carrier, expressly preempts the portions of North Carolina's Certificate of Need ("CON") law that purport to regulate air ambulances. Plaintiff further asserts that 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1), together with 49 U.S.C. § 44705, a provision of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 ("FAA"), 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101 et seq., requiring the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration to issue air carrier operating certificates, and the federal regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, preempt certain provisions of the North Carolina statutes and regulations governing emergency medical services ("EMS"). Plaintiff's eighth claim, seeking recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserts that the North Carolina state laws have wrought an ongoing violation of plaintiffs right to "be free from regulation."
Under the framework herein challenged, in order to accept purely in state transports, plaintiff must first obtain a CON from DHHS. N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 131178(a), 131E-176(16)(fl)(1), 131E-176(16)(s). The rules applicable to reviews of air ambulance CON applications are set forth in 10A N.C.A.C. 14C.3301-3305. Among other things, an applicant must demonstrate that it expects to be able to obtain all of the required permits, licenses, and certifications necessary for operating an air ambulance, including those required by the state's Office of Emergency Medical Services ("OEMS"), and that "existing air ambulance services in the State are unable to accommodate the applicant's projected need for an additional air ambulance". 10A N.C.A.C. 14C.3302(b)(6),(13). The CON review process assesses the need for a new provider's services based on a variety of criteria such as the "population to be served" and whether or not the proposed project will result in "unnecessary duplication of existing or approved health service capabilities or facilities." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 131E-183(a). The burden of proving need in the process rests with the applicant. It is undisputed that prior to the instant lawsuit, plaintiff attempted to obtain a CON through the required administrative procedures, but was denied.
Had plaintiff been successful in its CON application, and then proceeded under this framework, it would also have had to apply for and receive an EMS provider license from DHHS before operating within the state. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131E-155.1 (a). North Carolina law allows the North Carolina Medical Care Commission ("the Commission") to promulgate rules and requirements that a provider must meet in order to obtain an EMS provider license. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 131E-155.1(c). Once obtaining a provider license, plaintiff would also have had to obtain a permit for each air ambulance it would operate within the state. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 131E-156(a). North Carolina law allows DHHS to promulgate regulations and requirements that each air ambulance must meet, including standards for equipment, in order to obtain a permit from DHHS, and to inspect each ambulance for compliance with requirements set forth by the Commission. N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 131E-156(b), 131157(a), (b). Finally, in order to undertake transports from point to point in North Carolina, plaintiff would have had to comply with the myriad of requirements of the Air Medical Specialty Care Transport Program, which requires air medical programs to document, among other things, that their medical crew members have completed specific training and that the program has a CON "when applicable". 10A N.C.A.C. 13P.0302(a)(2).
Plaintiff requests primarily declarative and injunctive relief, along with damages related to its eighth claim for relief, and attorney's fees.
Under Rule 12(c) a party may move for judgment on the pleadings "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial". Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). "The test applicable for judgment on the pleadings is whether or not, when viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, genuine issues of material fact remain or whether the case can be decided as a matter of law." Smith v. McDonald, 562 F.Supp. 829, 842 (M.D.N.C.1983), aff'd, 737 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.1984), aff'd, 472 U.S. 479, 105 S.Ct. 2787, 86 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985). When there are no factual issues, judgment on the pleadings should be granted where the moving party is clearly entitled to the judgment it seeks as a matter of law. Jadoff v. Gleason, 140 F.R.D. 330, 331 (M.D.N.C.1991): see also Tollison v. B & J Machinery Co., 812 F.Supp. 618, 619 (D.S.C.1993); King v. Gemini Food Servs., Inc., 438 F.Supp. 964, 966 (E.D.Va.1976), aff'd, 562 F.2d 297 (4th Cir.1977).
A motion for judgment on the pleadings must be converted to one for summary judgment if "matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). Thus, a court considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings must base its decision solely on information obtained from the pleadings.3 A.S. Abell Co. v. Baltimore Typographical Union No. 12, 338 F.2d 190, 193 (4th Cir.1964): see also Dobson v. Cent. Carolina Bank and Trust Co., 240 F.Supp.2d 516, 519 (M.D.N.C.2003); John S. Clark Co., Inc. v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 304 F.Supp.2d 758, 763 (M.D.N.C.2004).
As a preliminary matter, defendants contend that judgment on the pleadings is not appropriate because material factual matters are in dispute.4 According to defendants the "[a]nswer is replete with denials of the allegations contained in the Complaint." (Def.'s Mem. Opp. Mot. J. Pldgs. 12-13). Defendants direct the court's attention to several specific examples, each of which the court considers in turn below.
Defendants first argue that they "expressly denied that Plaintiff currently operates an air ambulance in North Carolina." (Def.'s Mem. Opp. Mot. J. Pldgs. 13). In its complaint, plaintiff alleges it operates two "air ambulance" services out of bases in South Carolina. (Compl. ¶¶ 9, 10). It also maintains that "Med-Trans has provided air ambulance service in North Carolina since approximately 2001." (Compl. ¶ 11). Defendants deny these claims "as written" because "N.C. Gen. Stat § 131E-176(1a) defines `air ambulance' as an `aircraft used to provide air transport of sick or injured persons between destinations within the State.'" (Answer ¶¶ 10, 11) (emphasis added). Defendants do not expressly deny that plaintiff has transported patients via air ambulance between North Carolina and South Carolina. Defendants' denial is based on application of state law that limits the definition of "air ambulance" to one that provides purely intrastate transport. Whether or not plaintiffs operations fall within North Carolina's narrow statutory definition is not, as presented, a genuine issue of material fact. It is an issue of law.
Defendants also deny "as written" plaintiffs claim that OEMS will not process an application from an applicant seeking OEMS approval until the applicant obtains a CON. (Answer ¶ 27). Defendants note that the CON law only applies "when applicable." (Answer ¶ 27). Defendants nonetheless have admitted...
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