Medberry v. Crosby, No. 02-11072.
| Decision Date | 25 November 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-15808.,No. 02-11072. |
| Citation | 351 F.3d 1049 |
| Parties | Daniel Clark MEDBERRY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. James CROSBY, Charlie Crist, Florida Attorney General, Respondents-Appellees. Daniel C. Medberry, Petitioner-Appellant, v. James Crosby, Secretary, Department of Corrections, Charlie Crist, Florida Attorney General, Respondents-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before BLACK, HULL and COX, Circuit Judges.
These consolidated appeals arise from Appellant Daniel Clark Medberry's habeas corpus petitions challenging two separate prison disciplinary actions against him. The district court denied both petitions. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), this Court granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on very limited issues as to each petition. We now vacate the district court's judgment in appeal number 02-15808 and remand with instructions to dismiss the petition as moot. We affirm the district court in appeal number 02-11072.
Appellant is an inmate at Union Correctional Institution in Raiford, Florida. He challenges two prison disciplinary proceedings against him.
On June 12, 2000, Appellant was found guilty at a prison disciplinary hearing of disorderly conduct and was given 30 days' disciplinary confinement. After exhausting his state court remedies, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court. The district court expressed the view that the petition was not properly brought under § 2254 because the length of Appellant's custody was not increased by the disciplinary proceeding. The court went on, however, and assumed for purposes of its opinion that the disciplinary proceeding had extended the term of Appellant's confinement and denied Appellant's petition on the merits. We granted a COA on limited issues.
On June 7, 2000, Appellant was found guilty at a prison disciplinary hearing of disobeying a correctional officer's verbal order and was given 30 days' disciplinary confinement. He also lost 39 days of gain time. After exhausting his state court remedies, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court. The district court denied Appellant's petition on the merits. We granted a COA on limited issues.
We review de novo issues of law presented in a certificate of appealability. See Ross v. United States, 289 F.3d 677, 680 (11th Cir.2002).
With respect to Appellant's petition challenging the June 12 disciplinary proceeding, we issued a COA on three issues. The first issue set out in the COA asked:
Are appellant's claims, challenging a state prison disciplinary proceeding that did not affect the duration of his confinement, cognizable in a federal habeas corpus petition?
Before we get to this issue, however, we are faced with the threshold issue of whether Appellant's petition was moot when filed.
Appellant did not file his petition challenging the disciplinary proceeding until almost a year after it occurred. It is not contested that, at the time Appellant filed his petition, he already had served his 30 days and been released from disciplinary confinement. Appellant has not shown that the disciplinary proceeding will affect the length of his confinement.1
Under our precedent, "it is proper for a district court to treat a petition for release from administrative segregation as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus" because "[s]uch release falls into the category of `fact or duration of ... physical imprisonment' delineated in Preiser v. Rodriguez." Krist v. Ricketts, 504 F.2d 887, 887-88 (5th Cir.1974) (citations omitted).2 Where, however, a prisoner has completed an imposed term of administrative segregation before he files his petition, we agree with the Seventh Circuit that the "petition[is] moot when filed and cannot be revived by collateral consequences." McCollum v. Miller, 695 F.2d 1044, 1048 (7th Cir.1982). Accordingly, we hold Appellant's petition was moot when filed.3 We therefore vacate the district court's judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the petition as moot.4
With respect to Appellant's petition challenging the June 7 disciplinary proceeding, we issued a COA on two issues:
(1) Should appellant's habeas corpus petition — challenging the loss of gain time as the result of a state prison disciplinary proceeding that allegedly violated his due process rights, and contending that he is illegally serving a longer state sentence in violation of his constitutional rights — be construed as a petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or one filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254?
(2) Regardless of the ruling on the first issue, is appellant, a state prisoner, required to have a certificate of appealability to proceed on the appeal from the denial of his habeas corpus petition challenging the loss of gain time as the result of a prison disciplinary proceeding?
We now hold that Appellant's petition was subject to both § 2241 and § 2254.5 We further hold that Appellant is required to have a COA in order to obtain review in this Court as to the merits of his challenges to the disciplinary proceeding. We previously denied Appellant a COA as to the merits of his claims because he failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Because of our holding here and our previous denial of a COA, Appellant cannot proceed on appeal as to the merits of his claims.
Unfortunately, the relatively simple issue of whether Appellant's petition should be evaluated under § 2241 or § 2254 has become complicated, if only in appearance. The volume of habeas corpus litigation in the federal courts has led us sometimes to use language casually when describing the procedures and remedies available to prisoners seeking post-conviction relief. This lack of precision has, over time, created unnecessary confusion. Today we clear up some of the confusion and hold that, although Appellant's petition is authorized by § 2241, it also is governed by § 2254 because Appellant is "in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
For the sake of completeness, we look at the history of federal habeas corpus. We focus specifically on the following discrete points in time: (i) the 1789 grant to the federal courts of the limited power to grant writs of habeas corpus; (ii) the 1867 Amendments to the federal habeas statutes (iii) the 1874 codification of the statutes; (iv) the 1948 recodification; (v) the 1966 Amendments; and (vi) the 1996 AEDPA Enactment.
The First Congress, in legislation establishing the federal judiciary, saw fit to extend to the federal courts a limited power to grant the writ of habeas corpus. According to section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
[A]ll the before-mentioned courts of the United States, shall have power to issue writs of ... habeas corpus. .... And... either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment. — Provided, That writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify.
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (). Under the final clause of section 14, the authority of the federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus was limited to federal prisoners. See id.; see also Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103, 105, 11 L.Ed. 514 (1845). Despite minor amendments, the habeas corpus statute remained mostly unchanged for nearly eight decades.
Following the Civil War, Congress amended the habeas corpus statute to expand its scope to include state prisoners:
[T]he several courts of the United States, and the several justices and judges of such courts, within their respective jurisdictions, in addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States....
Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385 (). Significantly, the 1867 amendments were the first time Congress authorized the federal courts to issue the Great Writ to any prisoner held in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, even to a prisoner held in state custody.
In 1874, Congress codified the federal statutes, locating those governing habeas corpus in §§ 751-66. See Rev. Stat. §§ 751-66 (). The basic grant of the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus was set out in § 751. See Rev. Stat. § 751 (). Consistent with the 1867 Act's expansion of the writ of habeas corpus, § 753 provided:
The writ of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to a prisoner in jail, unless where he is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States, or is committed for trial...
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