Medcalfe v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co. of New York
| Decision Date | 21 June 1876 |
| Citation | 45 Md. 198 |
| Parties | FRANKLIN MEDCALFE v. THE BROOKLYN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Baltimore City.
The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
First Exception.--Omitted, being unimportant.
Second Exception.--The plaintiff offered the following prayers:
1. That unless the jury shall find from all the evidence, that the plaintiff, when he took to his own use, from time to time the sum of $1400, mentioned in the evidence, he intended thereby fraudulently to embezzle the same, and cheat the Company out of it, he was guilty of no offence under section 49 of Article 30 of the Code of Public General Laws of the State, or any other law of the State.
2. If the jury shall find from all the evidence that the Company by its agent or agents consulted the two counsel Messrs. Bryan & Merryman, who have been examined as witnesses by the plaintiff in relation to what steps the Company should take relative to the sum of $1400 and they got advice, and afterwards ceased to employ the said counsel, they cannot rely for their defence of the wrong for which this suit is brought, upon the ground that they afterward consulted and acted upon the advice of other counsel.
3. That the question whether the plaintiff acted in the use of the sum of $1400 with a fraudulent intent is a question for the jury.
4. That the question whether the defendant in having the plaintiff arrested on the criminal charge given in evidence acted with a malicious intent, is one to be decided by the jury upon all the evidence in the case.
5. That the question whether the defendant had probable cause for instituting the criminal proceedings against the plaintiff mentioned in the evidence, is one to be decided by the jury upon all the evidence in the case.
6. That if the jury find for the plaintiff, then they may find such damages as they may think to be right and proper under all the circumstances given in evidence, of his having been arrested at the instance of the defendant or its agents upon the charge of felony, and for having been held to bail, and his case sent to the Grand Jury for the same charge, if the jury shall find such charge was dismissed by the Grand Jury.
And the defendant offered the following prayers:
1. That the plaintiff has offered no evidence from which the jury can find that the prosecution complained of was instituted without probable cause, and the verdict must be for the defendant.
2. That if the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff was agent of the defendant, authorized to receive and collect money belonging to the defendant as agent of the defendant and that the plaintiff as such agent of the defendant did receive and collect money belonging to the defendant, and did convert the same to his own use secretly, and without the knowledge of the defendant, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover.
3. That there is no proof legally sufficient to connect the defendant with the arrest and prosecution of the plaintiff complained of in this case, and the plaintiff is not therefore entitled to recover.
4. That if the jury shall find that the defendant in reference to the institution and prosecution of the criminal charge complained of, acted bona fide, under the advice of counsel, after a full disclosure to the counsel of all the facts known to the defendant, and with the belief that such advice was sound, then the plaintiff cannot recover, although such advice may not have been sound, and although but for such advice the defendant would have had no probable cause for its action.
5. That this action can only be maintained by proof of actual malice, against the plaintiff in the institution of the prosecution complained of, and that such malice cannot be predicated of a corporation, and this action cannot be maintained.
The Court, (DOBBIN, J.,) rejected all the plaintiff's prayers; and granted the first, third and fifth prayers of the defendant; the defendant then withdrew its second and fourth prayers.
Whereupon the plaintiff excepted to the rejection of his prayers, and to the granting of the first, third and fifth prayers of the defendant, and to the defendant's being allowed to withdraw its second and fourth prayers.
The jury rendered a verdict for the defendant, and judgment was entered accordingly. The plaintiff appealed.
The cause was argued before BARTOL, C.J., BOWIE, STEWART, ALVEY and ROBINSON, J.
Edwin Higgins, for the appellant.
Charles Marshall, for the appellee.
The subject of the present appeal, is an action for malicious prosecution, brought by the appellant, an agent or solicitor of policies, against the appellee, a corporation, organized under the laws of the State of New York, known as "The Brooklyn Life Insurance Company of New York."
The gravamen of the suit is, that the appellee, on the first of May, 1873, at the City of Baltimore, falsely, and maliciously, and without any reasonable or probable cause whatsoever, charged the appellant, then being the agent of the appellee, with fraudulently embezzling the money of the appellee, and caused the appellant to be arrested, and held to bail for his appearance before the Criminal Court of the City of Baltimore, etc., from which arrest, he was afterwards discharged, the grand jury finding no presentment against him.
Issue was joined on the plea of "not guilty." At the trial, two exceptions were taken by the appellant; the first, to the exclusion by the Court of certain questions propounded by the appellant; the second, to the rejection of the appellant's prayers, and the granting of the first, third, and fifth of the appellee, and to the assent of the Court to the withdrawal of his second and fourth prayers.
The first exception is unimportant in the consideration of this appeal, inasmuch as the questions which arise on the prayers, go to the existence of the right of action, and are conclusive of the matters in controversy.
The plaintiff's, or appellant's prayers, present substantially the following propositions:
1st. That the appellant must have fraudulently intended to embezzle the appellee's money, and cheat the company, to constitute the offence with which he was charged, under the 49th sec. of the 30th Art. of the Code of Public General Laws, etc.
2nd. That if the company first advised with Messrs. Merryman & Bryan, in relation to their claim against appellant, in the sum of $1400, and had their advice, and afterwards ceased to employ them, they cannot defend the wrong of which the appellant complains, upon the ground that they afterwards consulted and acted upon the advice of other counsel.
3rd. That it is a question for the jury, whether the appellant acted fraudulently in the use of the sum of $1400.
4th. That whether the defendant was actuated by malice in causing the arrest, etc., was a question of fact.
5th. That whether there was probable cause for the institution of the criminal proceedings, etc., was a question to be decided by the jury.
6th....
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...the defendant acted with malice. Malice may be inferred from the want of probable cause. Straus v. Young, 36 Md. 246; Medcalfe v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 45 Md. 198; Bishop v. Frantz, 125 Md. 183, 198, 93 A. The prayer was also faulty, because it did not submit to the jury the question whet......
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