Medellin v. Dretke
| Decision Date | 20 May 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-20687.,03-20687. |
| Citation | 371 F.3d 270 |
| Parties | Jose Ernesto MEDELLIN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Doug DRETKE, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Gary Allen Taylor, Austin, TX, Michael B. Charlton, Law Office of Michael B. Charlton, Alvin, TX, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Tina J. Dettmer, Austin, TX, for Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before JONES, BENAVIDES and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Jose Ernesto Medellin, a citizen of Mexico, was convicted of capital murder in Texas state court and sentenced to death. Medellin filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied the petition. The district court also, sua sponte, denied Petitioner a certificate of appealability ("COA"). Petitioner now requests a COA from this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). For the following reasons, Petitioner's Application for a Certificate of Appealability from Denial of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied.
On June 24, 1993, Petitioner, along with fellow gang members, raped and killed two teenage girls whom the gang happened across after a gang initiation. Petitioner raped both girls and helped to murder at least one of the girls by holding one end of the shoelace used to strangle her.
After Petitioner was convicted of this crime and his sentence was imposed, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Petitioner did not seek certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States.
Petitioner subsequently filed a state application for a writ of habeas corpus. Without holding an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's claims, the state trial-level habeas court recommended to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that Petitioner's application be denied. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agreed and denied Petitioner's application.
Petitioner filed a preliminary federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus in November 2001. Petitioner amended his petition in July 2002. As previously noted, the district court denied relief and also denied Petitioner a COA. Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. Petitioner now seeks a COA raising six claims, all of which were properly raised in the district court.
Petitioner alleges four grounds for relief based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective at the sentencing stage of his trial for failing to present evidence that Petitioner complied with his probation officer while on probation as a juvenile. Relatedly, Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective at the sentencing phase of his trial for declining to inform the jury that Petitioner would have been eligible for parole after serving thirty-five years if he had been sentenced to life imprisonment. Petitioner also avers that his counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to seek the enforcement of the state trial court's order purporting to preclude the state from seeking the death penalty. Finally, Petitioner claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not properly raising a Batson claim on direct appeal.
The remaining two grounds that Petitioner urges in support of his petition are that the state violated his rights as a foreign national to consular access under the Vienna Convention and that the state failed to disclose exculpatory information to defense counsel.
Medellin filed his Section 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). The petition, therefore, is subject to the procedures imposed by the AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997).
Under the AEDPA, a petitioner must obtain a COA before an appeal can be taken to this Court. See 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2) (West 2003); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (). "[W]hen a habeas applicant seeks permission to initiate appellate review of the dismissal of his petition, the court of appeals should limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of his claims." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327, 123 S.Ct. 1029. Id. at 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029.
A COA will be granted if the petitioner makes "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c)(2) (West 2003). "A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327, 123 S.Ct. 1029. "The question is the debatability of the underlying constitutional claim, not the resolution of that debate." Id. at 342, 123 S.Ct. 1029. "Indeed, a claim can be debatable even though every jurist of reason might agree, after the COA has been granted and the case has received full consideration, that petitioner will not prevail." Id. at 338, 123 S.Ct. 1029. Finally, "[b]ecause the present case involves the death penalty, any doubts as to whether a COA should issue must be resolved in [Petitioner's] favor." Hernandez v. Johnson, 213 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir.2000).
We note that under the AEDPA, federal courts are to give a level of deference to state court findings per §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1). At the COA stage, however, "we only ask whether the District Court's application of AEDPA deference, as stated in §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1), to [a] claim was debatable amongst jurists of reason." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 341, 123 S.Ct. 1029.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must show (1) that his counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-94, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). "To establish deficient performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's representation `fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.'" Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052). " Id. at 2542 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052).
With the Strickland framework in mind, we turn to Petitioner's specific ineffective assistance claims.
The jury found that Petitioner posed a future danger, one of the special findings required for imposition of a death sentence in Texas. Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective at the punishment stage of his trial for failing to investigate and present evidence of Petitioner's compliance with his probation officer while he was on probation as a juvenile. Petitioner necessarily alleges that this purported failure prejudiced him at the sentencing phase of his trial because the evidence would have shown that he did not pose a future danger.
The district court noted that Petitioner presented only hearsay evidence, in the form of an affidavit, that Petitioner's probation officer would testify that Petitioner satisfied his juvenile probation. Nonetheless, the district court addressed the merits of Petitioners claim and agreed with the state habeas court that Petitioner was not prejudiced even if his counsel was deficient. Because we find the district court's holding in this respect not debatable, even upon a threshold review, we may not issue a COA as to this claim.
Assuming that Petitioner's juvenile probation officer would have testified that Petitioner was a model probationer, Petitioner's own acts after he completed his juvenile probation belie a conclusion that he would not pose a threat of future dangerousness when in a supervised, structured environment. Putting aside the fact that Petitioner fell back into gang activity after completing his juvenile probation, ultimately leading to the horrific crime for which he was sentenced to death, Petitioner clearly indicated his continuing dangerousness while in prison awaiting trial. On two separate occasions while Petitioner was in the Harris County jail awaiting trial, Petitioner was found to have hidden shanks in his cell. One cannot reasonably fathom how the fact that Petitioner once complied with probation as a juvenile rebuts the overwhelming evidence that Petitioner posed a future danger. Nothing that his probation officer may have said could have conceivably caused the jury to decide the question of Petitioner's future dangerousness in Petitioner's favor. Accordingly, it is not debatable that Petitioner was not prejudiced by his probation officer not testifying. Absent prejudice, Petitioner's claim fails the second Strickland prong. A COA may not issue as to this claim.
Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel...
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