Medellin v. Texas

• Decision Date: 05 August 2008
• Docket Number: 08–5574.,08–5573,Nos. 06–984,s. 06–984
• Parties: Jose Ernesto MEDELLIN, v. TEXAS.In re Jose Ernesto Medellin.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

129 S.Ct. 360

171 L.Ed.2d 833

554 U.S. 759

77 USLW 3073

Jose Ernesto MEDELLIN,

v.TEXAS.In re Jose Ernesto Medellin.

Nos. 06–984

08–5573

08–5574.

Supreme Court of the United States

Aug. 5, 2008.

Donald Francis Donovan, Counsel of Record, Catherine M. Amirfar, Jill Van Berg, William C. Weeks, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, Sandra L. Babcock, Northwestern University School of Law, Attorneys for Petitioner.

James C. Ho, Counsel of Record, Greg Abbott, Kent C. Sullivan, Eric J.R. Nichols, Edward L. Marshall, Kristopher S. Monson, Tina J. Miranda, Attorneys for Respondent.

Donald Francis Donovan, Counsel of Record, Carl Micarelli, Catherine M. Amirfar, Bruce W. Klaw, Jill Van Berg, Emma C. Prete, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, New York, for Petitioner.Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, Kent C. Sullivan, First Assistant Attorney General, Eric J.R. Nichols, Deputy Attorney General for Criminal Justice, R. Ted Cruz, Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Sean D. Jordan, Deputy Solicitor General, Kristofer S. Monson, Daniel L. Geyser, Adam W. Aston, Assistant Solicitors General, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, Texas, for Respondent.PER CURIAM.

Petitioner seeks a stay of execution on the theory that either Congress or the Legislature of the State of Texas might determine that actions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) should be given controlling weight in determining that a violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is grounds for vacating the sentence imposed in this suit. Under settled principles, these possibilities are too remote to justify an order from this Court staying the sentence imposed by the Texas courts. And neither the President nor the Governor of the State of Texas has represented to us that there is any likelihood of congressional or state legislative action.

It is up to Congress whether to implement obligations undertaken under a treaty which (like this one) does not itself have the force and effect of domestic law sufficient to set aside the judgment or the ensuing sentence, and Congress has not progressed beyond the bare introduction of a bill in the four years since the ICJ ruling and the four months since our ruling in Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 170 L.Ed.2d 190 (2008). This inaction is consistent with the President's decision in 2005 to withdraw the United States' accession to jurisdiction of the ICJ with regard to matters arising under the Convention.

The beginning premise for any stay, and indeed for the assumption that Congress or the legislature might seek to intervene in this suit, must be that petitioner's confession was obtained unlawfully. This is highly unlikely as a matter of domestic or international law. Other arguments seeking to establish that a violation of the Convention constitutes grounds for showing the invalidity of the state court judgment, for instance because counsel was inadequate, are also insubstantial, for the reasons noted in our previous opinion. Id., at ––––, 128 S.Ct. at 1354-1355.

The Department of Justice of the United States is well aware of these proceedings and has not chosen to seek our intervention. Its silence is no surprise: The United States has not wavered in its position that petitioner was not prejudiced by his lack of consular access.

The application to recall and stay the mandate and for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice SCALIA, and by him referred to the Court, is denied. The application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice SCALIA, and by him referred to the Court, is denied. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.

It is so ordered.

Justice STEVENS, dissenting.

Earlier this Term, in Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008), we concluded that neither the President nor the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has the authority to require Texas to determine whether its violation of the Vienna Convention prejudiced petitioner. Although I agreed with the Court's judgment, I wrote separately to make clear my view that Texas retained the authority—and, indeed, the duty as a matter of international law—to remedy the potentially significant breach of the United States' treaty obligations identified in the President's Memorandum to the Attorney General. Because it appears that Texas has not taken action to address the serious national security and foreign policy implications of this suit, I believe we should request the views of the Solicitor General, who argued on behalf of the Executive Branch in earlier proceedings in the suit, before allowing Texas to proceed with the execution.

As I explained in my separate opinion in March, the cost to Texas of complying with the ICJ judgment “would be minimal, particularly given the remote likelihood that the violation of the Vienna Convention actually prejudiced” this petitioner. 552 U.S., at ––––, 128 S.Ct. at 1375 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). “On the other hand, the costs of refusing to respect the ICJ's judgment are significant. The entire Court and the President agree that breach will jeopardize the United States' ‘plainly compelling’ interests in ‘ensuring the reciprocal observance of the Vienna Convention, protecting relations with foreign governments, and demonstrating commitment to the role of international law.’ ” Ibid. Given these stakes, and given that petitioner has been under a death sentence for 14 years, waiting a short time to guarantee that the views of the Executive have been given respectful consideration is only prudent. Balancing the honor of the Nation against the modest burden of a short delay to ensure that the breach is unavoidable convinces me that the application for a stay should be granted.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Justice SOUTER, dissenting.

I joined the dissent in Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting), and invoke the rule that it is reasonable to adhere to a dissenting position throughout the Term of Court in which it was announced. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 744, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The only chance to apply the treaty provisions the dissent would have held presently enforceable is now through action by the other branches of the Government. A bill on the subject has been introduced in the Congress, Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008, H.R. 6481, 110th Cong., 2d Sess. (2008), and the Government has represented to the International Court of Justice it will take further steps to give effect to that court's judgment pertinent to Medellín's conviction, among others, Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2008 I.C.J. No. 139, ¶ 37 (Order of July 16). I would therefore enter the requested stay of execution for as long as the remainder of the 2007 Term, to allow for a current statement of the views of the Solicitor General and for any congressional action that could affect the disposition of petitioner's filings. I would defer action on the petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, the petition for an original writ of habeas corpus, and the motion to recall and stay the mandate in Medellin v. Texas, supra.

Justice GINSBURG, dissenting.

I would grant the application for a stay of execution. Before the International Court of Justice, in response to Mexico's request for provisional measures, the United States represented : “[C]ontrary to Mexico's suggestion, the United States [does] not believe that it need make no further effort to implement this Court's Avena Judgment, and ... would ‘continue to work to give that Judgment full effect, including in the case of Mr. Medellín.’ ” Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2008 I.C.J. No. 139, ¶ 37 (Order of July 16). I would invite the Solicitor General's clarification of that representation very recently made to the international tribunal. Pending receipt and consideration of the Solicitor General's response, I would defer action on Medellín's submissions.

Justice BREYER, dissenting.

The International Court of...