Medhin v. Hailu, 09–CV–1415.

• Citation: 26 A.3d 307
• Decision Date: 11 August 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09–CV–1415.,09–CV–1415.
• Parties: Tamrat G. MEDHIN, Appellant,v.Teshome HAILU, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Columbia District

26 A.3d 307

Tamrat G. MEDHIN, Appellant,

v.Teshome HAILU, Appellee.

No. 09–CV–1415.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted Dec. 8, 2010.Decided Aug. 11, 2011.

Tamrat Medhin, pro se.Vanessa Carpenter Lourie, Washington, DC, was on the brief, for appellee.Before WASHINGTON, Chief Judge, and GLICKMAN and BLACKBURNE–RIGSBY, Associate Judges.WASHINGTON, Chief Judge:

Appellant Tamrat Medhin challenges the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee Teshome Hailu. Hailu sued for a declaratory judgment that funds he had placed in escrow pending resolution of a dispute over a commission fee with Medhin, his real estate broker, belonged to him. Finding that the statute of limitations had run on any claim Medhin may have had to the commission, the trial court granted judgment to Hailu.

On appeal, Medhin argues that the funds held in escrow were presumptively his, and because he would have no reason to sue to obtain his own property, the statute of limitations should not have begun to run until the trial court awarded the funds to Hailu. While it is true that under certain circumstances the placement of disputed funds into an escrow account may extend the limitations period by delaying the onset of an “injury” for statute of limitations purposes, here it is undisputed that Medhin had been aware for over four years that Hailu did not intend to pay him any commission for the sale of the property. Thus, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Hailu since the three-year statute of limitations for bringing breach of contract actions had expired. Accordingly, we affirm.

I. FACTS

Beginning in 2001, Medhin, who at the time was an agent with the Remax Premiere Selections real estate firm,¹ served as Hailu's broker for the purpose of selling a piece of real estate. Medhin participated in negotiating a sales contract between the buyers and Hailu. However, a lawsuit between the buyers and Hailu ultimately resulted in a new contract being negotiated between the parties. Days after the sale closed, Medhin requested a commission ($13,500) pursuant to his original brokerage agreement with Hailu. At that time, Hailu disputed whether Medhin was entitled to a commission and refused to pay. In April 2004, Medhin's attorney ² wrote a letter to the settlement agent in the Hailu-buyer transaction, stating that Medhin would “pursue his commission claim against any and all persons who act to evade or avoid it ... as an interference with his contractual rights.” Hailu, however, continued to dispute Medhin's entitlement to the commission, although his reasons for doing so are unclear on this record.³ In any event, the settlement agent responded that “no commission would be paid” to Medhin by Hailu.

However, an escrow fund was set up by Hailu and the buyers to cover any potential claim by Medhin and Remax. The escrow agreement directed the escrow agent to hold the funds until directed to release them in writing by both the buyers and Hailu, or until the “disposition of Commission status has been determined,” at which time the escrow agent was instructed to “release [the] funds to the appropriate party—either [Hailu] or [the] listing company (Remax).” Medhin was not a party to this escrow agreement, and in his brief he asserts that he was not even aware of its existence until Hailu filed his suit for declaratory judgment.

On several occasions after the closing, Hailu contacted Medhin and Remax to ask them to relinquish their claim to the commission payment. Medhin refused, but never took any action to collect the commission. Rather, as Medhin writes in his brief, after being told that “no commission would be paid,” he “gave it to God and left it.”

Over four years later, Hailu filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the funds in the escrow account belonged to him. Hailu argued that by failing to bring any action to collect the commission, Medhin forfeited any claim he may have had to the commission because the District's three-year statute of limitations for contract-based claims had run.⁴ Medhin answered the complaint by asserting that the funds in escrow belonged to him, thus obviating the need for him to file any suit. However, he never responded to Hailu's subsequent motion for summary judgment on the statute of limitations theory. The trial court granted summary judgment to Hailu, concluding that the statute of limitations on any claim Medhin had to the commission had run prior to the filing of the instant matter. Medhin now challenges that ruling.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

We review orders granting summary judgment de novo. See Gilbert v. Miodovnik, 990 A.2d 983, 987 (D.C.2010) (citations omitted). In doing so, we independently analyze the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the non-moving party's favor. Id. (citing EastBanc, Inc. v. Georgetown Park Assocs. II, L.P., 940 A.2d 996, 1001–02 (D.C.2008)). We will uphold the grant of summary judgment where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c)).

In general, a “claim ... accrues for statute of limitations purposes when injury occurs.” Doe v. Medlantic Health Care Grp., Inc., 814 A.2d 939, 945 (D.C.2003). We have stated that “[w]hat constitutes the accrual of a cause of action is a question of law; the actual date of accrual, however, is a question of fact.” Brin v. S.E.W. Investors, 902 A.2d 784, 800–01 (D.C.2006) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Courts determine the accrual of a claim from the moment a party has either “actual notice of her cause of action,” or is deemed to be on “inquiry notice” by failing to “act reasonably under the circumstances in investigating matters affecting her affairs,” where “such an investigation, if conducted, would have led to actual notice.” Harris v. Ladner, 828 A.2d 203, 205–06 (D.C.2003) (citation omitted). When the relationship between the fact of injury and the conduct is obscure, the so-called “discovery rule” will apply, such that the claim does not accrue until the claimant knows or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know of (1) the injury, (2) its cause in fact, and (3) some evidence of wrongdoing. See Bussineau v. President & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll., 518 A.2d 423, 435 (D.C.1986). “[T]he quantum of knowledge sufficient to put one on notice of [his] claims against another” will vary depending on the facts of a case. Brin, supra, 902 A.2d at 793; Fred Ezra Co. v. Psychiatric Inst. of Washington, D.C., 687 A.2d 587, 592 (D.C.1996). The limitations period does not run until the claimant has notice of “some evidence of wrongdoing,” and its running is not delayed simply because the claimant does not know (or cannot be charged with knowledge of) the full “breadth or nature” of the defendant's wrongdoing. Brin, supra, 902 A.2d at 792; see also Morton v. National Med. Enters., Inc., 725 A.2d 462, 468 (D.C.1999) (noting that the “fact that appellants lacked full knowledge of the extent of appellees' alleged wrongdoing” did not preclude accrual of claim). The question turns on when the claimant had “inquiry notice that she might have suffered an actionable injury.” Bussineau, supra, 518 A.2d at 428 (citation omitted).

With regard to contract actions, “[a] cause of action for breach of contract accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, at the time of the breach.” EastBanc, supra, 940 A.2d at 1004 (internal citation omitted). See also Bembery v. District of Columbia, 758 A.2d 518, 520 (D.C.2000). “A contract is breached if a party fails to perform when performance is due,” EastBanc, supra, 940 A.2d at 1004, i.e., upon a party's “unjustified failure to perform all or any part of what is promised in a contract entitling the injured party to damages.” Fowler v. A & A Co., 262 A.2d 344, 347 (D.C.1970) (internal quotations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Notice of Hailu's Refusal to Pay

Medhin's entitlement to a commission was based on the parties' brokerage contract. The statute of limitations for a contract-based action is three years. See D.C.Code § 12–301(7) (2001). It is undisputed that more than three years elapsed between Hailu's refusal to pay Medhin a commission and Hailu's declaratory judgment lawsuit. When Hailu represented to Medhin that he would not pay any commission, Medhin could have sued to enforce his rights under the parties' brokerage agreement. See News World Communications, Inc. v. Thompsen, 878 A.2d 1218, 1224–25 (D.C.2005) (“[T]he statute of limitations began to run no later than [the date] Ms. Thompsen had performed her last service to the Times, [and] the Times had declined to compensate her ..., for by that date she had been definitively told that she would not be paid.”); Pardue v. Center City Consortium Sch. of Archdiocese of Wash., Inc., 875 A.2d 669, 679 (D.C.2005) (holding that notice of appellee's “failure to pay ... gave rise to [appellant's] claim and marked the accrual of her cause of action”); Bembery, supra, 758 A.2d at 520 (finding that appellant's making “successive demands and receiv[ing] no payment from the [appellee]” was sufficient for claim to accrue; explicit refusal to pay by appellee was not necessary) (citations omitted). “As a general rule, an actionable claim accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when a suit thereon could first be maintained to a successful conclusion.” Bembery, supra, 758 A.2d at 520 (citations omitted). Indeed, Medhin's attorney threatened to do just that in April 2004. See Harris, supra, 828 A.2d at 206 (finding that “Harris knew of her injury” where she “threatened to sue [appellee] ... more than three years before she...