Medical Business Associates, Inc. v. Steiner

• Decision Date: 19 October 1992
• Citation: 183 A.D.2d 86,588 N.Y.S.2d 890
• Parties: MEDICAL BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, INC., Respondent, v. Jane STEINER, et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 890

588 N.Y.S.2d 890

183 A.D.2d 86

MEDICAL BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, INC., Respondent, v. Jane STEINER, et al., Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

Oct. 19, 1992.

Eric N. Aglow, Elmsford, for appellants.

Mead, Dore & Voute, White Plains (Elizabeth M. Hecht, of counsel), for respondent.

Before MANGANO, P.J., and HARWOOD, EIBER and O'BRIEN, JJ.

EIBER, Justice.

The common law of this State has long required a husband to support his wife in conformity with his means, and to provide her with such "necessaries" as food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. Under the common-law doctrine of necessaries, a husband is thus liable to third parties who furnish his wife with goods or services which fall within the scope of the rule. On this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the common-law doctrine of necessaries violates the Equal Protection Clause because, while it makes a husband responsible for certain goods and services provided to his wife, it does not impose a similar obligation upon her. For the reasons which follow, we find that as traditionally formulated, the necessaries doctrine violates the Equal Protection Clause, and that its unconstitutionality should be remedied by extending the common-law rule to both spouses. We further hold that it is the spouse who received the necessary goods or services who should be primarily liable for payment. A creditor seeking to recover a debt against the nondebtor spouse retains the burden of demonstrating that necessaries were furnished on the nondebtor spouse's credit, and that the nondebtor spouse has the ability to satisfy the debt.

I

The record in the instant case is sparse, and the relevant facts can be briefly stated. The plaintiff, Medical Business Associates, Inc., is a domestic corporation which, through its agents and employees, allegedly provided medical treatment to Paul Steiner and his wife Jane over a six year period. In March 1988 the plaintiff commenced the instant action against Paul Steiner seeking to recover the sum of $1007.93 for medical services rendered to his wife from November 4, 1981, to September 25, 1987. Shortly after the commencement of the action, the plaintiff moved to amend its complaint to add Jane Steiner as a defendant, and to include a second cause of action demanding judgment against both defendants in the sum of $5,343.38 for additional medical services allegedly provided directly to Paul Steiner. The proposed amended complaint essentially alleged that the plaintiff's employees had rendered medical services to Jane and Paul Steiner "[a]t the express or implied request of the defendants", and that, although an account had been stated between the parties, no portion of the balance due had been paid. By decision and order dated September 16, 1988, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion, concluding that the proposed amended complaint stated a cause of action against Paul Steiner for medical services rendered to his wife Jane because "[u]nder New York law, a husband is liable for reasonable medical services rendered to his wife". ¹

One year later, by notice of motion dated September 28, 1989, the plaintiff corporation moved for summary judgment against both defendants. In a supporting affirmation, the plaintiff's attorney summarized the procedural history of the litigation, and urged the court to hold Paul and Jane Steiner both jointly and individually liable for all medical services provided to them. Although the attorney acknowledged that at common law, a wife ordinarily would not be liable for medical services provided to her husband, he contended that, in view of recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court and statutory amendments equalizing support responsibilities between men and women in New York, the common-law obligation to furnish necessaries should be enforced against a wife in the same manner as it is enforced against a husband. The plaintiff's attorney urged that Jane Steiner was therefore under a duty to provide reasonable necessaries, including medical care, to her husband, and could raise no viable defense to this action. In support of summary judgment, the plaintiff also submitted the affidavits of two employees which indicated that a balance of $932.93 remained due for unspecified medical services rendered to Jane Steiner, and that a balance of $5,093.38 remained due for unspecified medical services rendered to Paul Steiner.

The defendants countered by requesting that summary judgment dismissing the complaint be granted in their favor. In opposition to the plaintiff's motion and in support of their cross application, the defendants relied primarily upon a memorandum of law prepared by their attorney, who contended that any constitutional inconsistency between the common-law doctrine of necessaries and New York's recently-enacted gender-neutral support laws should be resolved by abolishing rather than expanding the necessaries doctrine. The defendants' attorney additionally pointed out that the plaintiff had failed to submit any proof with regard to the nature and extent of the services allegedly rendered, or documentary proof to establish the balance remaining for these services.

In a decision and order dated December 29, 1989, the Supreme Court (Miller, J.) denied both the plaintiff's motion and the defendants' cross application for summary judgment, but held that the necessaries doctrine should be expanded to impose liability upon wives for necessaries furnished to their husbands. In reaching its determination, the Supreme Court relied primarily upon the reasoning of the Appellate Division Third Department, in Our Lady of Lourdes Mem. Hosp. v. Frey, 152 A.D.2d 73, 548 N.Y.S.2d 109, which held that imposing a reciprocal duty upon each spouse to furnish the other with necessaries comported with the modern view that marriage is an economic partnership and was consistent with the policy underlying this State's gender-neutral support laws. The Supreme Court concluded that "so long as the necessaries doctrine exists, it must be extended to require reciprocal obligations of wives. It is only logical that the partnership be called upon to reimburse those third parties who have provided necessary services to one of the spouses". The court noted, however, that a trial was still required because the plaintiff had failed to submit proof concerning the nature and value of the services claimed, and because application of the necessaries doctrine requires proof that the services rendered to each spouse were furnished in reliance on the credit of the other spouse, as well as proof as to each spouse's financial status and ability to pay the bill for the other, if required.

On appeal from the denial of their cross application for summary judgment, Paul and Jane Steiner continue to maintain that the common-law doctrine of necessaries should be abolished because it is unconstitutional, and that neither the husband nor the wife should be held liable for medical expenses incurred by the other spouse. The plaintiff corporation agrees that the necessaries doctrine in its historical form is unconstitutional, but contends that the unconstitutionality of the common-law rule should be remedied by expanding it to impose liability upon wives for necessaries provided to their husbands.

II

At early common law, a husband and wife were regarded as one legal entity, and a married woman had no right to own property or to control her financial affairs (see, Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584, 591, 23 N.E. 17; North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, Inc. v. Harris, 319 N.C. 347, 354 S.E.2d 471; Condore v. Prince George's County, 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011, 1013; Hulse v. Warren, 777 S.W.2d 319, 321 [Mo.App.]. Since the married woman was considered legally incapable of owning property and incurring debts independent of her husband, the common law recognized that the husband had a duty to support his wife and to provide for her necessary expenses (see, Cromwell v. Benjamin, 41 Barb 558; Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N.Y. 337, 18 N.E.2d 521; North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, Inc. v. Harris, supra ). In return for her husband's support, the wife had a corresponding duty to provide domestic services for the comfort, care, and well being of her family, and consortium to her husband (see, North Carolina Baptist Hospitals v. Harris, supra; Hulse v. Warren, supra; Schilling v. Bedford Mem. Hosp., 225 Va. 539, 303 S.E.2d 905). A corollary of the husband's obligation of support was the common-law doctrine of necessaries, which imposed liability on the husband to third parties who provided essential goods and services, including medical care and treatment, to his wife and children (see, Cromwell v. Benjamin, supra; Matter of Burt, 254 App.Div. 584, 3 N.Y.S.2d 70; Our Lady of Lourdes Mem. Hosp. v. Frey, supra; see generally, 47 NY Jur 2d Domestic Relations, § 662). Because the basis of liability for expenses incurred by the wife was the husband's presumed failure to provide adequate support (see, Jersey Shore Med. Center-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003, 1005), the necessaries doctrine served, in the words of one commentator, as a "protective remedy for the hapless wife and children facing economic abandonment by the husband" (see, Williams, The Doctrine of Necessaries: Contemporary Application As A Support Remedy, 19 Stetson L Rev 661 [1990].

Although this allocation of marital rights and responsibilities developed during a period in history when married women were under legal disabilities which prevented them from managing their own financial affairs, the enactment across the nation of "Married Women's Acts" which empowered women to make contracts and transact business, did not relieve husbands from liability for necessaries purchased by their wives (see, General Obligations Law § 3-301; Frank v. Carter, 219 N.Y. 35, 113 N.E. 549; Hulse v. Warren, supra; Condore v. Prince...