Medina v. City of New York

• Decision Date: 25 October 2012
• Citation: 953 N.Y.S.2d 43,2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 07218,102 A.D.3d 101
• Parties: Stephan Villanueva MEDINA, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants–Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

102 A.D.3d 101

953 N.Y.S.2d 43

2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 07218

Stephan Villanueva MEDINA, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants–Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

Oct. 25, 2012.

Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Suzanne K. Colt and Pamela Seider Dolgow of counsel), for appellants.

Law Office of Jay H. Tanenbaum, New York (Laurence S. Warshaw of counsel), for respondents.

LUIS A. GONZALEZ, P.J., DAVID B. SAXE, JOHN W. SWEENY, JR., ROLANDO T. ACOSTA, DIANNE T. RENWICK, JJ.

SAXE, J.

Plaintiff Stephan Villanueva Medina commenced this action against the City of New York, the New York City Police Department, and arresting officer Sgt. Matthew Reilly, claiming false arrest, false imprisonment, and related causes of action, following his acquittal on charges of sexual abuse in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child. Plaintiff was arrested based on his 11–year–old niece's assertions to the police that on the night of September 21, 2002, while she was sleeping next to her cousin, plaintiff's daughter, in plaintiff's home, she awoke to find plaintiff lifting up her shirt and touching her breast.

The 11–year–old complainant was taken to the 45th precinct of the NYPD by her mother, plaintiff's sister-in-law, on September 22, 2002, and gave an officer on duty her description of what had happened. Because plaintiff was employed by the Police Department as an auto mechanic, the Internal Affairs Bureau was called into the investigation. Lieutenant Thomas Maldon, Sergeant Matthew Reilly and Sergeant Carmen Martinez, all from IAB, reported to the precinct and took over the questioning of the complainant. Based on the information they obtained from her, with the authorization of IAB executive officer Raymond King, they arrested plaintiff at his home that night. He was suspended from his job without pay, and his name was placed on a watch list.

Plaintiff was acquitted of the criminal charges after a nonjury trial. The judge explained that while he could see no reason that the child, who seemed to be normal and well adjusted, would make up this story, he could see no reason for a married uncle with two children of his own to want to touch the breast of an 11–year old who was his god-daughter and who had slept over hundreds of times before. He concluded that the charges were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Plaintiff then commenced this action, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, as well as negligence, violation of his civil rights, and defamation.

Defendants' motion for summary judgment was based on the contention that the undisputed submitted evidence established as a matter of law that the police had probable cause to arrest plaintiff, and that therefore his false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and related claims must be dismissed. In opposition, plaintiff offered an expert's assertion that the manner in which the police handled the investigation was improper, and argued that therefore an issue of fact was presented as to whether probable cause was established. The motion court denied summary judgment, finding an issue of fact as to whether the police had probable cause for plaintiff's arrest.

Where, as here, an arrest is made without a warrant, “a presumption arises that it was unlawful, and [defendants have] the burden of proving that ... the arrest was based on probable cause” ( Williams v. Moore, 197 A.D.2d 511, 513–514, 602 N.Y.S.2d 199 [2d Dept.1993] ). To establish as a matter of law that the police in the present matter had probable cause, the People rely on the general rule that “an eyewitness-victim of a crime can provide probable cause for the arrest of his assailant despite the fact that his reliability has not been previously established or his information corroborated [citation omitted]. In fact, an accusation against a specific individual from an identified citizen is presumed reliable” ( People v. Nichols, 156 A.D.2d 129, 130, 548 N.Y.S.2d 175 [1st Dept.1989] [internal quotation marks omitted], lv. denied76 N.Y.2d 740, 558 N.Y.S.2d 902, 557 N.E.2d 1198 [1990];see also Shapiro v. County of Nassau, 202 A.D.2d 358, 609 N.Y.S.2d 234 [1st Dept.1994],lv. denied83 N.Y.2d 760, 616 N.Y.S.2d 15, 639 N.E.2d 755 [1994];Kramer v. City of New York, 173 A.D.2d 155, 569 N.Y.S.2d 67 [1st Dept.1991],lv. denied78 N.Y.2d 857, 574 N.Y.S.2d 938, 580 N.E.2d 410 [1991] ).

However, the fact that an identified citizen accused an individual who was known to her of a specific crime, while generally sufficient to establish probable cause, does not necessarily establish it. The rule is actually somewhat less absolute: “Probable cause is established absent materially impeaching circumstances, where, as here, the victim of an offense communicates to the arresting officer information affording a credible ground for believing the offense was committed and identifies the accused as the perpetrator” ( People v. Gonzalez, 138 A.D.2d 622, 623, 526 N.Y.S.2d 208 [2d Dept.1988] [emphasis added], lv. denied71 N.Y.2d 1027, 530 N.Y.S.2d 562, 526 N.E.2d 54 [1988] ). The question is whether the police are aware of “materially impeaching circumstances” or grounds for questioning the complainant's credibility.

In Sital v. City of New York, 60 A.D.3d 465, 875 N.Y.S.2d 22 [1st Dept.2009],lv. dismissed13 N.Y.3d 903, 895 N.Y.S.2d 293, 922 N.E.2d 879 [2009], the arresting officer had doubts about the credibility of the identified citizen complainant who had accused the plaintiff of a fatal shooting, and moreover, the identification by the complainant was arguably contradicted by physical evidence at the crime scene that was consistent with the conflicting statement of an independent eyewitness. This Court held that “a rational jury could have determined that the officer's failure to make further inquiry of potential eyewitnesses was unreasonable under the circumstances, and evidenced a lack of probable cause” ( id. at 466, 875 N.Y.S.2d 22).

In Stile v. City of New York, 172 A.D.2d 743, 569 N.Y.S.2d 129 [2d Dept.1991], the false arrest claim was upheld where the plaintiff was arrested without a warrant by a New York City police detective, based on a claim by friends of the detective that the plaintiff had stolen a ring while visiting their home. The Court observed that the detective had ignored not only the plaintiff's protestations of innocence, but also his attorney's insistence that the detective should investigate an earlier incident in which his friends had similarly accused another man of stealing a ring and later dropped the charges.

Issues of fact were also found in Carlton v. Nassau County Police Dept., 306 A.D.2d 365, 365–366, 761 N.Y.S.2d 98 [2d Dept.2003] regarding whether the police had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff at his home without a warrant for theft of services. Although the restaurant owner had provided an affidavit stating that the plaintiff left the restaurant without paying the bill, the arresting officers knew that the bill was disputed and that the plaintiff had provided his business card to the restaurant owner, facts that the court said would have prompted a reasonable person to make further inquiry.

But mere denial by the accused of the complainant's claims will not constitute “materially impeaching circumstances” or grounds for questioning the complainant's credibility so as to raise a question of fact as to probable cause. In Kramer v. City of New York, 173 A.D.2d 155, 569 N.Y.S.2d 67 [1st Dept.1991],lv. denied78 N.Y.2d 857, 574 N.Y.S.2d 938, 580 N.E.2d 410 [1991], the complainant, who appeared to the police officer to have fallen to the sidewalk as if she had been thrown from a car, told the officer that the occupants of the car (the plaintiffs) had stolen her purse. The officer stopped the vehicle and, upon finding the complainant's purse therein, arrested the plaintiffs. Although the charges were eventually dismissed when the complainant refused to proceed, and although the plaintiffs explained that they asked her to leave the car because she was unruly and said that they had no idea she had left her purse behind, the order setting aside the jury verdict in the plaintiffs' favor on the false arrest claim was affirmed. This Court reasoned that “[t]he information given to the officer by the identified citizen, accusing plaintiffs of a specific crime, was legally sufficient to provide the officer with probable cause to arrest” ( id. at 156, 569 N.Y.S.2d 67).

Here, the police had no information about the complainant, no knowledge of facts relating to her or to her accusations that would justify doubt as to her reliability. Neither her age nor the sexual nature of the charges presents grounds to call her credibility into question.

“[T]he requirement for corroboration in sex crimes was largely abandoned when Penal Law § 130.15 was repealed in 1974 (L. 1974, ch. 14, § 1) and the remaining requirement for corroboration of sex offenses with respect to child victims was eliminated in 1984 (L. 1984, ch. 89). These changes were made in the belief that defendants are sufficiently protected from false charges by other safeguards and that in child abuse cases the difficulty of obtaining corroborative evidence, the need to protect child victims and the unfairness of treating those victims differently from victims of crime in general, warranted repeal of the statute (see, Governor's Mem. approving L. 1984, ch. 89, 1984 N.Y. Legis. Ann., at 73; see also, Governor's Mem. approving L. 1974, ch. 14, 1974 N.Y. Legis. Ann., at 371–372)” ( People v. Groff, 71 N.Y.2d 101, 109, 524 N.Y.S.2d 13, 518 N.E.2d 908 [1987] ).

Of course, for non-sex offenses, too, the sole testimony of a minor is sufficient to establish...