Medina v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 09-CV-4018 (NGG) (LB)
| Decision Date | 16 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | 09-CV-4018 (NGG) (LB) |
| Parties | SANTA MEDINA, as executor of the estate of Yendy Medina, deceased, Plaintiff, v. DELTA AIR LINES, INC., Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff/ Counter Third-Party Defendant, v. ARAMARK AVIATION SERVICES LP, Defendant/Third-Party Defendant/ Counter Plaintiff. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
BROOKLYN OFFICE MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Plaintiff Santa Medina brings this Complaint as the executor of the estate of her late daughter, Yendy Medina ("Medina"), against Delta Air Lines, Inc. ("Delta"), arising from a 2009 traffic accident at LaGuardia Airport ("LaGuardia") in Queens, New York that killed Medina. Delta, in turn, brings a Third-Party Complaint against Medina's former employer, Aramark Aviation Services LP ("Aramark"), which asserts claims against Aramark for indemnification and contribution. 1 The following motions are now before the court: Medina's motion for summary judgment against Delta (Pl.'s Mot. (Docket Entry # 87)); Delta's cross-motion for summary judgment with respect to Medina's claims for punitive damages ; and Aramark's motion for summary judgment (3d Party Def.'s Mot. (Docket Entry # 150)). For thereasons set forth below, the court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment; grants Delta's motion for summary judgment with respect to punitive damages; and grants in part and denies in part Aramark's motion for summary judgment.
On a motion for summary judgment, the court may consider "depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. 56(a). A fact is material if its existence or non-existence "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and an issue of fact is genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the [non-moving] party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,248 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, "the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.. Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149 (2000).
To service its fleet at LaGuardia, Delta contracted with Aramark to provide cleaning services for its planes. (Katt Aff. Ex. K.)2 The cleaning of the Delta fleet would take place at various, remote locations at LaGuardia, including an area known as "Echo-Pad." (Id. Ex. B.) Echo-Pad "is a [secure] area at LaGuardia used for aircraft parking that is roughly the size of a football field," approximately 2.9 miles from the Delta terminal. (Def.'s Opp'n (Docket Entry# 89) at 1.) Typically, a plane requiring custodial service would be parked at Echo-Pad, or another aircraft parking location, and Delta would notify Aramark that the plane required cleaning. (Katt Aff. Ex. C.) Aramark would then notify Delta that it needed access to the plane: specifically, stairs to allow its employees on and off the plane. (Id. Aramark would then drive its employees to Echo-Pad and drop them off at the plane site with any necessary equipment. (Id.) The employees would then wait for a Delta employee to bring a set of movable stairs to enable them to board the plane. (Id.)
Prior to her death, Medina was employed by Aramark to clean Delta planes. (Id. Ex. A.) At around 3:00 a.m. on July 29, 2009, Delta notified Aramark that three of its planes parked at Echo-Pad needed servicing. (Pl.'s Mem. (Docket Entry # 87) at 14-15.) At approximately 3:30 a.m., Aramark notified Delta that it needed movable stairs to access the planes. (Id. at 15.) Shortly thereafter, Aramark employees Ivan Cruz ("Cruz") and Jackson Abreu drove a crew of cleaners out to Echo-Pad to service the three planes that required service. (Id.) Medina was part of one crew that also included Ramon Villavicencio, Wladimiro Chavez-Veliz ("Chavez-Veliz"), and Alicia Maurath, who were responsible for cleaning a Delta 757. (Def.'s Opp'n at 1.) The 757 crew arrived at their plane around 3:40 a.m. and were dropped off with their equipment. (Pl.'s Mem. at 15.) Because no stairs were on site, the 757 crew were not able to board the plane to begin working. (Id. Instead, they waited on the tarmac for a Delta employee to bring stairs. (Def.'s Opp'n at 2.)
Echo-Pad had no benches or chairs for the 757 crew to sit down on while waiting for the stair-truck. (Pl.'s Mem. at 16.) Tired of waiting on Echo-Pad's asphalt, some of the 757 crew members began to sit down next to the plane. (Id.) Chavez-Veliz leaned against the front wheelof the plane as if it were a chair. (Id. at 17.) Medina lay down on the ground about seven feet away from the front wheel of the plane. (Id.)
At approximately 4:45 a.m.—an hour after the 757 crew had been dropped off at their plane—a Delta employee, Scott McEntee ("McEntee"), drove a pickup truck to the 757 site to monitor the situation regarding stairs. (Def.'s Opp'n at 2.) McEntee pulled up to the 757, facing it, approximately ten to fifteen feet from the front wheel. (Id.) Cruz then arrived at the 757 site and pulled up his car on the left side of McEntee's truck, facing the same direction. (Id.) It is unclear whether McEntee and Cruz conversed at this point. (Pl.'s Mem. at 19.) After about five minutes, McEntee began driving away from Cruz's van, toward the plane. (Id at 20.) McEntee initially banked left, and then swung right. (Id.) As McEntee was turning right, he ran over Medina, who was lying on the tarmac. (Id.)
McEntee exited his vehicle and realized that he had just run over Medina. (Def.'s Opp'n at 3.) McEntee did not call 911, nor did he tell anyone else to call 911. (Pl.'s Mem. at 21.) Nor did McEntee have in his possession a radio to call anyone else to inform them that an accident occurred. (Id. at 22.) As a consequence, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (the "Port Authority") was not notified of the accident until eight minutes after it occurred; emergency medical services was not notified until two minutes later; and paramedics did not arrive at the scene until four minutes thereafter, at 5:14 a.m. (Id. at 23.) For fourteen minutes, Medina lay on the tarmac, dying, without any medical assistance whatsoever. (See id.) Medina was taken to a hospital where she subsequently died. (Def.'s Opp'n at 3.) On September 17, 2009, Medina's mother, now the executor of her estate, filed this Complaint against Delta. (See Compl.)
A. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment Against Delta
Plaintiff moves for summary judgment against Delta under two common-law theories of negligence: (1) that McEntee was negligent in failing to observe Medina lying on the tarmac while driving his vehicle; and (2) that McEntee was negligent in failing to operate his vehicle within the speed limit while on Echo-Pad.3 (Pl.'s Mem. at 27, 37.) Plaintiff argues that McEntee's negligence under either of these theories was the proximate cause of Medina's death. (Id. at 27, 37.) Plaintiff also asserts that if McEntee is found to be negligent, Delta is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. (Id. at 27.) Delta argues that Plaintiff's motion should be denied due to the lack of a statement of undisputed facts as required by Rule 56.1 of the Local Civil Rules of the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York (the "Local Civil Rules"), (Def.'s Opp'n at 7-8), and, in any event, that McEntee was not negligent in his operation of the truck and that Medina was comparatively negligent because she was lying down on the tarmac at the time of the accident (id. at 8-17).
Local Civil Rule 56.1 requires a party moving for summary judgment to "annex[] to the notice of motion a separate, short and concise statement, in numbered paragraphs, of the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried," i.e., a Rule 56.1 statement. Loc. Civ. R. 56.1. "Failure to submit such a statement may constitute grounds for denial of the motion." Id. Nonetheless, a court "may in its discretion opt to review the record independently even where one of the parties has failed to file such a statement." Pugni v.Reader's Digest Ass'n. Inc., No. 05-cv-8026 (CM), 2007 WL 1087183, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2007) (citing Monahan v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 292 (2d Cir. 2000)). Plaintiff argues that the court should not deny her motion for failing to provide a Rule 56.1 statement because she has included a "statement of facts" section in her brief with citations to the record. (Pl.'s Reply (Docket Entry # 88) at 4.) But Plaintiff's statement of facts are not a statement of undisputed facts—the point of a Rule 56.1 statement. The purpose of this court's long-standing practice in requiring Rule 56.1 statements is to help the court separate those facts ripe for summary judgment from the fruit intended for a jury. This is especially important in a factually complicated and vigorously litigated case such as this. Plaintiff's counsel's failure to file a Rule 56.1 statement is inexcusable; he has been admitted to practice in this court for nine years (see Docket Entry # 164) and should be well aware of court practice. Nonetheless, the court does not consider this defect to be fatal; it will "conduct an assiduous review of the record," Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co.. 258 F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir. 2001), despite Plaintiff counsel's neglect.
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