Medina v. Genovese
Decision Date | 25 August 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 2:16-cv-00019,2:16-cv-00019 |
Parties | MICHAEL G. MEDINA #332874, Petitioner, v. KEVIN GENOVESE, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Michael Medina, a state prisoner serving a sentence of life with the possibility of parole for the first degree murder of his estranged wife, has filed a pro se petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for the writ of habeas corpus. (ECF No. 1.) Respondent has filed an answer, along with a copy of portions of the state court record. (ECF Nos. 15, 19, 20.) For the reasons set forth below, the petition will be denied.
A Smith County jury convicted Petitioner on April 12, 2001, of premeditated first degree murder. (ECF No. 15-1, at 15.). The trial court imposed a life sentence. (ECF No. 15-1, at 15.) Petitioner appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence of premeditation and a ruling by the trial court that allegedly forced him to make a premature election about whether to testify at trial. (ECF No. 15-8, at 2.) The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) affirmed, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal. State v. Medina, No. M2001-02412-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31188186 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 2, 2002), app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 27, 2003).
On September 29, 2003, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was followed by the appointment of counsel and the filing of two amended petitions, the last of which was filed on October 16, 2013.1 (ECF No. 15-14, at 5, 54, 57.) The post-conviction court held a hearing on January 10, 2014, and entered an order denying relief on February 12, 2014. (ECF No. 15-14, at 97.) Petitioner limited his appeal to several claims of ineffective-assistance of trial counsel. (ECF No. 15-18, at 14-17.) The TCCA affirmed the denial of relief, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal on December 11, 2015. Medina v. State, No. M2014-00561-CCA-R3-PC, 2015 WL 5169318 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 2, 2015), app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2015).
Petitioner filed his pro se habeas corpus petition in this Court by delivering it to the prison mail room on March 9, 2016. (ECF No. 1, at 64.) Respondent does not dispute that the petition was timely. (ECF No. 20, at 2.) Respondent filed an answer to the petition on June 13, 2016, and has filed portions of the state court record. (ECF Nos. 15, 19, 20.)
Petitioner has also filed a motion to expand the record in this matter (ECF No. 23), which Respondent opposes. (ECF No. 28.) With his motion, Petitioner has submitted 220 pages of correspondence with his trial and post-conviction counsel. (ECF No. 23-1-23-6.) He also asks that dozens of additional documents be added to the record by Respondent, including investigative records, subpoenas, and court records related to appointment and withdrawal of previous counsel and his efforts to compel counsel to take certain actions during post-conviction proceedings. (ECF No. 23, at 8-10.)
Petitioner does not identify specific claims to which these documents relate, but states generally that they pertain to "issues that are allegedly waived or considered defaulted," and that they "will substantiate Petitioner['s] claim that he diligently and specifically requested each and every Post Conviction Attorney to subpoena numerous witnesses needed for the PostConviction Hearing in order to have them present to in [sic] court to have them testify regarding the issues raised." (ECF No. 23, at 3, 4.) However, evidence in a federal habeas proceeding of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is only relevant in one very limited circumstance: to establish cause to excuse the default at the post-conviction initial review stage of a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012). Petitioner has not alleged that any of his claims were defaulted at post-conviction initial review - as opposed to post-conviction appeal - and Martinez does not authorize the retrial with new evidence of claims that were rejected on the merits by the post-conviction trial court.
As fully addressed below, each of the claims Petitioner raised in the post-conviction trial court was denied on the merits and either went on to be fully exhausted or was defaulted on appeal. For the exhausted claims, consideration of any evidence beyond the state court record is prohibited. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1401 (2011). And for claims defaulted on post-conviction appeal, admission of new evidence would be futile, because Petitioner has not demonstrated cause for default at that stage. Even where a petitioner alleges that attorney error caused a claim to be denied on initial collateral review, Martinez does not apply because "[e]ven if the post-conviction trial court had ruled erroneously, and its error were traceable directly to counsel's deficient advocacy, the . . . claim would not have been procedurally defaulted at the post-conviction trial proceeding because [Petitioner] retained the right to preserve the claim by appealing." West v. Carpenter, 790 F.3d at 699 (emphasis in original). Under such circumstances, allegations that post-conviction appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise claims on appeal are also to no avail: "Ineffective assistance of counsel at this stage of the case cannot constitute cause to excuse the procedural default because it is not an initial-review collateral proceeding." Wallace v. Sexton, 570 F. App'x 443, 453 (6th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original).
Accordingly, Petitioner's motion to expand the record will be denied. To the extent therecord filed by Respondent has omitted any evidence that was properly part of the state court record and relevant to Petitioner's surviving claims, those omissions are addressed in the analysis below.
The TCCA summarized the facts of the case as follows:
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