Medina v. Medina, H033006 (Cal. App. 4/17/2009)

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Duffy
• Decision Date: 17 April 2009
• Docket Number: H033006.
• Citation: Medina v. Medina, H033006 (Cal. App. 4/17/2009), H033006. (Cal. App. Apr 17, 2009)
• Parties: SUSAN R. MEDINA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSE LUIS MEDINA, Defendant and Respondent; DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES, Intervenor and Appellant.

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SUSAN R. MEDINA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSE LUIS MEDINA, Defendant and Respondent DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES, Intervenor and Appellant.

H033006.

Court of Appeals of California, Sixth Appellate District

April 17, 2009

Not to be Published in Official Reports

Appeal from the Santa Cruz County, Super. Ct. No. CV117078.

DUFFY, J.

This appeal arises out of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), codified in this state at Family Code section 4900 et seq.¹ Under section 4911, in instances in which there are multi jurisdictional child support orders, a party may seek an order determining which of the orders is the controlling order. In this case, child support orders issued by California and Colorado obligated the father, defendant and respondent Jose Luis Medina (Jose), a California resident, to pay child support for his three minor children residing in Colorado. Intervenor and appellant Santa Cruz County Department of Child Support Services (Department) filed a motion under section 4911 seeking a determination, as between prior child support orders issued by California and Colorado, as to which order was the controlling order. The court held, inter alia, that a 1995 order entered in California modified a prior support order originating from Colorado and that the California support order was the controlling order.

On appeal, the Department argues that the court erred in concluding that the California support order was the controlling order. Additionally, the Department contends that the court erred by identifying different "controlling orders" for different time periods for purposes of reconciling arrears. We conclude that the court erred and that the Colorado child support order entered in 1994 is the controlling order. Further, we decline the Department's invitation to address the reconciliation of arrearages, an issue that was not a subject of the order from which the appeal is taken. We will reverse the order of the trial court.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In December 1990, the Department received a request from the Department of Social Services of Garfield County, Colorado, that California establish a child support order for the children of Jose and plaintiff and respondent Susan R. Medina (Susan). In March 1991, the Department sought an order in the Santa Cruz County Superior Court that Jose pay child support. On June 10, 1991, the court ordered Jose to pay child support of $242.67 per month for each of his three minor children (Aaron, Elizabeth, and Sean), for a total of $728 per month, effective March 1, 1991, and that all payments were to be made to the Garfield County Department of Social Services (1991 California order).

The marriage of Susan and Jose was dissolved by order of the district court of Garfield County, Colorado, on October 20, 1993. By that order of dissolution (1993 Colorado order), Jose was required to pay monthly child support of $834.04 (an amount that was not allocated between the children), commencing November 1, 1993. That child support order was modified in July 1994 when the Colorado court entered an order (1994 Colorado order) approving the parties' marital settlement agreement. The 1994 Colorado order reduced the monthly child support obligation to the unallocated amount of $575, effective January 1994; established (pursuant to the parties' stipulation) arrearages at $8,497.79 that would be repaid at the rate of $25 per month; and thus fixed Jose's total monthly obligation at $600.

In November 1994, the Department sought an order in the Santa Cruz Superior Court modifying the 1991 California order to make the child support order consistent with the 1994 Colorado order. A minute order dated January 13, 1995, reflected that Jose was ordered to pay monthly child support of $575, effective July 1994, with arrearages determined (as of June 30, 1994) to be $8,497.79, payable at the rate of $25 per month. In the subsequent formal order, captioned "Findings and Order after Hearing," entered on January 30, 1995 (1995 California order), the court allocated the monthly child support obligation equally between the three children at $191.66 per child. (No such allocation appeared in the minute order of January 13, 1995.)

In January 2007, the Department filed a proceeding in the court below seeking an order requiring Jose to seek employment. At a hearing in March 2007—which Jose attended in pro per and at which he advised the court that he was unable to work full time because of health problems and was only working approximately half time— the court, inter alia, and without modifying the support order, ordered Jose to pay $150 a month for ongoing support and $50 per month for arrearages. The court also addressed at the hearing the fact that the oldest child, Aaron, had emancipated, and the middle child, Elizabeth, had turned 18 but it was not known whether she was still attending high school. The court ordered the Department to ascertain whether Elizabeth was still in high school. The minute order from the hearing also stated "[t]he previous order of $383.32 for two minors shall remain in effect."

The Department thereafter filed a motion for determination of controlling order under section 4911. The motion identified the 1991 California order, the 1994 Colorado order, and the 1995 California order. The motion was initially heard on October 26, 2007. The court found that "the Colorado order was the controlling order from 1990 through January 1995," and that the California order providing for monthly child support of $575, allocated to $191.66 per child, controlled from January 1995 forward. The court reasoned at the time it announced its decision from the bench that the 1995 California order controlled from 1995 forward because it was based upon a Colorado request that California modify Colorado's prior support order. In subsequent proceedings, after the Department noted that Colorado had not entered a support order until October 1993, the court modified its prior ruling to provide that the 1991 California order was the controlling order from its entry until October 19, 1993 (the date of the 1993 Colorado order). A formal order was entered April 9, 2008, in which the court found that (1) the 1991 California order was the controlling order from 1991 through October 1993, (2) the 1993 Colorado order and the 1994 Colorado order were the controlling orders from November 1, 1993 through January 29, 1995, and (3) the 1995 California order was the controlling order from January 30, 1995, forward.

The Department filed a timely notice of appeal. The matter is appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(2) [order made after judgment], (a)(10) [order made expressly appealable under Family Code]; § 17407, subd. (a)(1) [Attorney General may perfect appeal challenging "support order or support-related order" claimed to be erroneous and presenting question of law].)

DISCUSSION

I. Issues On Appeal

1. Whether the court erred in determining that the 1995 California order was the controlling order.

2. Whether the court erred in identifying different "controlling orders" for different time periods for purposes of reconciling arrears.

II. Determination of Controlling Order

The Department argues that the court erred in concluding, inter alia, that the 1995 California order was the controlling order from January 30, 1995, forward. As a related issue, it contends that the court erred in finding that the 1995 California order constituted a modification of the prior 1994 Colorado order. Since these questions involve pure questions of law, we apply a de novo review. (In re Marriage of Crosby & Grooms (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 201, 205; see also Lundahl v. Telford (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 305, 312 [issue of whether California has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over support order determined de novo].) Applying that standard, we agree with the Department on both points.² Before addressing these issues, however, we digress briefly to discuss UIFSA and its predecessor statutes.

A. Reciprocal Child Support Enforcement Statutes

The 1991 California order and the 1995 California order were issued under the statute preceding UIFSA, namely, the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act of 1968 (RURESA). (See former Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1650-1699.4, repealed by Stats.1992, ch. 162, § 6, p. 464; former sections 4800 et seq., repealed by Stats.1997, ch. 194, § 1, No. 4 West's Cal. Legis. Service, p. 671].) Similarly, the 1993 Colorado order and the 1994 Colorado order were entered at the time that the state's version of RURESA was in effect. (Schumacher, The Colorado Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (1994) 23 Colo. Law. 2535.) "California adopted RURESA in 1968 [citation], and in 1994 recodified it under the Family Code without substantive change. [Citation.] In 1998, California repealed RURESA and UIFSA became effective. [Citation.]" (Lundahl v. Telford, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 313, fn. 5.) Likewise, the state of Colorado enacted UIFSA, effective January 1, 1995. (People ex rel. Orange County, Cal. ex rel. T.M.S. v. M.A.S. (Colo.1998) 962 P.2d 339, 343.)

California enacted UIFSA as a requirement for the receipt of federal child support enforcement funds. (See 42 U.S.C. § 666(f).) "Together with the Federal Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (FFCCSOA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B), the UIFSA ensures that only one state will have jurisdiction over support at any given point in time." (Hogoboom and King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2008) ¶ 18:725, p. 18-187.) Under both FFCCSOA and UIFSA, sister state support orders are required to be given recognition and enforcement across state lines. (28 U.S.C. § 1738B(a); § 4909, subd. (d).)

RURESA explicitly recognized that sister states "may issue independent support orders for differing amounts without having modified, superceded, or nullified each other's orders. [Citations.]" (Lundahl v....