Medina v. Miami Dade Cnty.
| Decision Date | 15 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D19-1410,1D19-1410 |
| Citation | 300 So.3d 255 |
| Parties | Miguel MEDINA, Appellant, v. MIAMI DADE COUNTY and Risk Management of Dade County, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Mark L. Zientz of Law Offices of Mark L. Zientz, P.A., Miami, for Appellant.
Lynda S. Slade, Miami, for Appellees.
Claimant appeals those portions of the Judge of Compensation Claims’ (JCC) order denying his claim for temporary disability compensation benefits and directing reinstatement of personal leave benefits. Because the sick and vacation leave that was paid constitutes an employer-provided alternative benefit that cannot be used to avoid paying workers’ compensation, and the JCC lacked subject matter jurisdiction to reinstate personal leave benefits, we reverse.
In 2017, Claimant, a corrections officer, slipped and fell on the stairs of a prisoner transport bus. The Employer, who is self-insured, accepted compensability of Claimant's multiple injuries. Claimant underwent compensable, right-knee surgery on January 8, 2019. His work status as temporarily disabled from the date of his surgery to the date of the final hearing is undisputed.
After Claimant's knee surgery, the Employer made two payments of temporary disability compensation benefits to Claimant but did not issue compensation checks for two other periods. The claims adjuster testified that Claimant was not issued workers’ compensation benefit checks for the time periods of January 8 to January 27 and February 11 to February 24 because Claimant had received "full pay" through the Employer's payroll. For those periods, the adjuster issued checks directly to the Employer for reimbursement of amounts due under workers’ compensation. The adjuster confirmed that the "full pay" to Claimant from the Employer payroll was docked against Claimant's bank of personal sick or leave time. He further testified that because the payments were related to a compensable work accident, Claimant's leave-time used would eventually be reinstated. As of the final hearing, the adjuster could not confirm whether the reinstatement had occurred, as he had no authority over leave—a matter within the purview of the Employer's payroll department. No representative of the payroll department was called as a witness at the final hearing.
Claimant testified that the Employer's policy allows him to accumulate sick leave. After twenty-five years with the Employer, he had accumulated a bank of personal sick leave, which entitled him to a cash payment for up to 1,000 hours of sick time. Since his workers’ compensation accident, Claimant's leave time was substantially depleted. He could not provide any testimony as to the details of the Employer leave policy in terms of how it was negotiated, funded, or administered.
Following the merits hearing, the JCC denied Claimant's request for temporary disability benefits. In the order on appeal, the JCC determined as follows:
I accept E/C's argument that Claimant was entitled to and has been paid temporary disability benefits from 1/8/2019 through the date of the Final Hearing. As he was paid salary and used sick and vacation time for certain periods, I accept E/C's acknowledgment that he is entitled to have those periods reinstated to his sick/vacation bank in accordance with [Employer] policies. No penalties and interest are owed to Claimant as he continued to receive his benefits uninterruptedly.
Claimant argues reversal is warranted because the Employer did not pay workers’ compensation benefits as required by section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes, and the JCC lacked subject matter jurisdiction to direct reinstatement of his sick leave.1 We agree.
Because the issues on appeal involve the JCC's application of undisputed facts to the law, our review is de novo. See Gilbreth v. Genesis Eldercare , 821 So. 2d 1226, 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). The first issue we consider is whether Claimant is entitled to temporary disability compensation benefits for the time periods during which he received full pay funded by his personal sick leave. Claimant argues that this Court's decision in Nolan v. Delta Airlines , 733 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), is controlling.
In Nolan , the injured employee opted to use sick and vacation leave at full pay following a compensable work accident, but later filed a claim for payment of temporary disability benefits under workers’ compensation for the same period. Id . at 1077. At the time, Delta had in place a leave policy under which any employee injured in a workplace accident would receive full salary for thirteen weeks, and the amounts were not charged against the employee's sick leave. Id . After the initial thirteen weeks, the employee could choose either workers’ compensation or payment under one of three available alternative benefit options—each charging against personal sick or vacation leave. Id . at 1077–8. Delta's leave options were not funded through employee contributions. Id . at 1077. At a hearing, Nolan argued that the option of personal leave or workers’ compensation benefits violated section 440.21(2), Florida Statutes (1987) (). Id . at 1078. In raising her claims under workers’ compensation, she did not include a request that the JCC reinstate her leave time. In defense of the claims, Delta argued that Nolan was not "compelled" to use personal leave but did so on her own volition and continued full-pay status. Id. The JCC denied Nolan's claim concluding that to award compensation benefits for the same periods during which she had received full pay would result in Nolan receiving a windfall and, in contravention of section 440.21, more than 100% of her average weekly wage (AWW) for those weeks. Id. at 1077.
On appeal, this Court reversed the JCC's denial of compensation benefits, holding as follows: 1) Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1987), dictates that compensation "shall" be paid, except for certain situations enumerated in the section that did not apply; and 2) Delta's policy violated section 440.21(2) which exists to "redress employers’ misapplication of other employee entitlements in (legally ineffective) efforts to discharge workers’ compensation obligations." Id . at 1078 (quoting Williams v. Fort Walton Beach , 691 So. 2d 580, 581 n.2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) ). Delta's argument that Nolan was given the option of workers’ compensation or use of her leave time was rejected as an "illusory choice"—one choice gave her full pay while the other less than half due to applicable maximum compensation rate caps. Id .2
Here, the Employer argues that Nolan is distinguishable because Delta improperly allowed an employee to elect use of sick and vacation leave in lieu of payment of workers’ compensation benefits. The Employer contends that unlike Nolan , Claimant did not satisfy his burden of proof in the following two respects: 1) failing to introduce evidence detailing the Employer leave policy regarding reinstatement of sick time; and 2) failing to prove his use of sick leave or the promised reinstatement of that leave time were in place of workers’ compensation benefits. We disagree because this ignores section 440.09(1), which requires that "the employer must pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter if the employee suffers an accidental compensable injury." The record establishes that Claimant received full wages but only by paying himself through personal sick leave. No evidence was introduced that the Employer "bought back" Claimant's sick leave or that the alternate benefits were employer provided.
The Employer also raises the argument that the wages paid to Claimant were in lieu of benefits. However, payment of wages in lieu of compensation must be an act clearly understood between the employer and the employee. See City of St. Augustine v. Allen, 404 So. 2d 1115, 1118 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (); see also Davis v. Kyle, 529 So. 2d 1240, 1241 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). This "in lieu of" act is not satisfied when the employer pays wages through a right that the claimant has to receive it, which is not related to or dependent in any way upon the existence or non-existence of a workers’ compensation claim. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Rambo , 576 So. 2d 394, 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Here, the Employer was not paying wages in lieu of workers’ compensation because it was sourcing the funds from Claimant's bank of personal leave.
In Woods v. St. Anthony's Hospital , 586 So. 2d 415, 418–19 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), this Court found similar arguments as those made by the Employer here unpersuasive. After a compensable accident, Woods claimed she was entitled to full workers’ compensation benefits, but the employer instead required use of her accrued "free time" or "vacation." Id . at 418. The employer argued that because Woods may have been compelled to use her paid vacation time by the end of the year or lose it without pay, she was not prejudiced by its failure to pay her benefits. Id. This Court rejected these arguments as legally invalid, holding that "[a]n employer has no right to refuse to pay a claimant vacation benefits it was contractually obligated to pay by refusing to reimburse the claimant vacation time the claimant was required to expend in lieu of workers’ compensation benefits the claimant was entitled to receive." Id . at 418–19 (citing Marion Corr. Inst., Fla. Dep't of Corr. v. Kriegel, 522 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) ).
An important distinction between the use of personal leave in conjunction with receipt of compensation...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
N. Hannoush Jewelers, Inc. v. Bly
...that an E/C must plead entitlement to an offset for certain benefits payments as an affirmative defense, see Medina v. Miami Dade Cnty. , 300 So. 3d 255 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (discussing an E/C's offset for payment of wages in lieu of benefits), we agree with the JCC that a claimant's receipt......