Medina v. People

• Decision Date: 02 July 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06SC188.,06SC188.
• Citation: 163 P.3d 1136
• Parties: Juanita Victoria MEDINA, Petitioner v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

163 P.3d 1136

Juanita Victoria MEDINA, Petitioner v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.

No. 06SC188.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

July 2, 2007.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing August 13, 2007.^*

Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender Karen N. Taylor, Deputy State Public Defender Denver, CO, Attorneys for Petitioner.

John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Cheryl Hone Canaday, Assistant Attorney General Appellate Division, Criminal Justice Section Denver, CO, Attorneys for Respondent.

Justice BENDER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Introduction

A jury found Defendant Juanita Victoria Medina guilty of class 5 felony accessory following the trial court's instruction and both parties' argument at trial with regard to the elements of the class 5 felony accessory charge. Nonetheless, at sentencing, the trial court stated that Medina had been convicted of class 4 felony accessory, a greater offense, and sentenced her to the maximum possible sentence for this offense. Medina appealed her sentence to the court of appeals, arguing that her conviction must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing because the jury actually convicted her of a less serious offense than that to which she was sentenced.

The court of appeals upheld Medina's sentence despite recognizing that the trial court erred, reviewing the trial court's sentencing error under plain error analysis. In People v. Medina, 140 P.3d 64, 65-66 (Colo.App. 2005),¹ the court of appeals concluded that the trial court erred by instructing the jury to consider the elements of class 5 felony accessory instead of class 4 felony accessory. Although subtle, the difference between the elements of these two offenses is significant because of the greater penalties provided for the class 4 accessory crime. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A), C.R.S. (2006).² The statutory elements of the class 5 offense of accessory require that the defendant know that the person whom she assisted was suspected of committing a serious felony. § 18-8-105(4), C.R.S. (2006). In contrast, the elements of the more serious class 4 offense of accessory require that the defendant know that the person whom she assisted had in fact committed a serious felony. § 18-8-105(3). Thus in this case, to be convicted of the class 4 felony accessory crime, Medina had to know that Martinez committed first degree murder or second degree murder. To be convicted for the less serious crime of class 5 accessory, Medina only had to know that Martinez was suspected of committing first degree or second degree murder.

The court of appeals determined that the jury instruction contained a misdescription of an element of the class 4 accessory charge under Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999), and Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1 (Colo.2001). Medina, 140 P.3d at 66. The court also held that Medina's sentence violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), because the court sentenced her for a class 4 felony when the jury had only convicted her of a class 5 felony. Id. at 65-66.

Because Medina did not object to the jury instruction at trial, the court of appeals applied the plain error standard of review to address both of these errors. Id. at 66. Concluding that the error did not undermine the validity of the sentence, the court affirmed Medina's sentence. Id. We granted certiorari to determine whether the plain error standard of review applies where, as here, the jury instruction described the elements of a less serious offense than the offense that the defendant was sentenced under.

Medina argues that plain error analysis should not apply when a sentencing court enters a conviction different from that provided for by a jury's finding of guilt based upon a jury instruction that correctly and completely describes all the elements of a less serious offense rather than misdescribing or omitting an element of an offense. We agree.

Sentencing courts do not have discretion to reconsider a defendant's guilt following a jury verdict. A court violates a defendant's due process and Sixth Amendment rights to a trial by jury when it sentences a defendant on a crime different from that on which a jury's guilty verdict is based. Such rulings constitute structural error in sentencing and require that the sentence be vacated. Because this error does not affect the trial process, however, the jury's conviction of guilt may stand.

Here, the trial court committed structural error in sentencing when it sentenced Medina for a class 4 felony because the jury had convicted her of a class 5 felony. Because this error was confined to Medina's sentencing and did not affect her trial, the jury's conviction of guilt for the class 5 felony need not be disturbed. For this reason, we affirm Medina's conviction for the class 5 felony, vacate Medina's sentence for the class 4 felony, and remand this case to the court of appeals to be returned to the trial court for resentencing on the class 5 felony conviction.

Facts and Procedural History

The prosecution charged Medina by information as an accessory to the murder of Matthew Salazar. This charge arose from allegations that Medina "provided assistance" to her boyfriend Derek Martinez's crime by driving him from the crime scene where he had been engaged in a fight with two men that ended with Martinez shooting and killing Salazar.

Although the information listed Medina's charge as a class 4 felony under section 18-8-105, C.R.S. (2002), the information did not include a necessary element required for a conviction of class 4 accessory — that the defendant knew that the person she was assisting had committed a class 1 or class 2 felony.³ The information alleged only that Medina had knowingly, unlawfully, and feloniously helped her boyfriend, Derek Martinez, avoid detection and apprehension for the commission of first degree murder and second degree murder:

THE DEFENDANT, with intent to hinder, delay and prevent the discovery, detection, prosecution, conviction, punishment, and apprehension of Derek Lee Martinez for the commission of First Degree Murder and Second Degree Murder as defined by C.R.S. § 18-3-102 and § 18-3-103, did knowingly, feloniously and unlawfully render assistance to Derek Lee Martinez by harboring and concealing him and providing him with money, transportation, weapon and disguise and other thing to be used in avoiding discovery and apprehension.

Hence, it was unclear from the information itself whether Medina was charged with a class 4 felony or class 5 felony.

The prosecution cleared up this discrepancy on the first day of trial when it proffered a jury instruction for class 5 felony accessory. This instruction stated that Medina was guilty as an accessory if she assisted Martinez knowing that he was suspected of and wanted for a crime:

(1) That the defendant (2) in the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged, (3) knowingly, (4) rendered assistance to Derek Lee Martinez, who was suspected of and wanted for a crime, (5) with intent to hinder, delay, and prevent the discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, and punishment of Derek Lee Martinez, (6) and the crime that Derek Lee Martinez was suspected of and was wanted for was First Degree Murder and Second Degree Murder.

(Emphasis added.) This was the instruction that the court ultimately gave the jury. The court never instructed the jury on the elements of a class 4 felony accessory charge, and neither party objected. This instruction appears consistent with the parties' presentations and theories of their cases.

Both parties proceeded throughout the trial as if Medina was being tried on the class 5 felony accessory charge. There was no factual issue as to whether Martinez killed Salazar. However, the parties did not present evidence and did not argue to the jury the question of whether Medina knew that Martinez had actually committed the crime of first degree murder or second degree murder. Instead, the prosecution's theory of the case as stated in its closing argument was that "[t]here's no dispute . . . that [Medina] knowingly rendered assistance to him, an individual who was suspected of and wanted for a crime." (Emphasis added.) And the theory of the defense as stated in closing was that Medina did not drive Martinez from the crime scene with the intent to prevent Martinez's arrest, but instead drove away out of fear for her safety.

Neither party objected when the jury returned a guilty verdict for the class 5 felony accessory charge. The sentencing judge, who did not preside at the trial, sentenced Medina to a class 4 felony although the jury's verdict authorized only a class 5 felony sentence. The court made no comment on this discrepancy, stating only that the case was before it "on the Defendant's conviction of being an accessory to a crime which was murder, a Class 1 and Class 2 felony; and her offense is classified as a Class 4 felony." The court then sentenced Medina to the maximum sentence for class 4 felony accessory, six years in the Department of Corrections with an additional mandatory three years of parole. Medina did not object to the sentence at that time.

Medina later appealed her sentence, arguing that her conviction must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing since the jury actually convicted her of a class 5 felony, a less serious offense than that on which she was sentenced. The court of appeals affirmed her conviction. In reaching its decision, the court stated that "[t]he information charged defendant with a class four felony and alleged that she unlawfully assisted a person who `had committed' first or second degree murder." Medina, 140 P.3d at 65. The court of appeals then concluded that the court's instruction on the accessory charge, requiring the jury to determine whether Medina knew that Martinez was suspected of and wanted for first or...