Medina v. Public Utility Dist. No. 1

• Decision Date: 12 September 2002
• Docket Number: No. 70978-5.,70978-5.
• Citation: 147 Wn.2d 303,53 P.3d 993,147 Wash.2d 303
• Parties: Alirio MEDINA and Ernestina Fuentes, Petitioners, v. PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT NO. 1 OF BENTON COUNTY, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

53 P.3d 993

147 Wn.2d 303

147 Wash.2d 303

Alirio MEDINA and Ernestina Fuentes, Petitioners, v. PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT NO. 1 OF BENTON COUNTY, Respondent.

No. 70978-5.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued January 17, 2002.

Decided September 12, 2002.

Charles Barr, Richland, Wiggins Law Office, Kenneth Masters, Bainbridge Is., Darrell Smart, Yakima, for Petitioners.

Karr, Tutle, Campbell, Craig Campbell, Mark Johnson, Seattle, for Respondent.

Bryan Harnetiaux, Debra Stephens, Spokane, amicus curiae on behalf of Wash. State Trial Lawyers Ass'n.

Michael Nicefaro, Seattle, amicus curiae on behalf of State of Wash.

MADSEN, J.

In March, 1998, Alirio Medina and Ernestina Fuentes (Medina) filed a complaint seeking damages for Medina's personal injury claim against Public Utility District No. 1 of Benton County (County) and Fuentes' derivative claim for loss of consortium. The County moved for summary judgment, arguing that Medina failed to comply with the provisions of RCW 4.96.020(4) by filing four days before the statutory waiting period expired. Initially the Benton County Superior Court denied the motion but upon reconsideration issued an order granting the County summary judgment and dismissing the case. In an unpublished decision the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of petitioners' suit. Medina v. Pub. Util. Dist., No. 1 of Benton County, noted at 105 Wash.App. 1019, 2001 WL 254425 (2001). Medina petitioned this court for its review. We hold that Medina's failure to wait 60 days before filing a claim against the County in superior court violates the provisions of RCW 4.96.020(4), and affirm the Court of Appeals.

FACTS

On January 9, 1995, Alirio Medina was injured when a car owned and operated by the County and driven by a county employee rear-ended the vehicle Medina was driving. In October 1995, Medina filed a claim with the County for property damage. On the claim form, settlement documents, and correspondence relating to the property damage claim, Medina stressed that the claim involved property damage only and should not be construed as encompassing any possible future personal injury claims. That claim was settled on October 30, 1995. On January 7, 1998, two days before the statute of limitations was to expire, Medina filed a second claim with the County for personal injury damages and loss of consortium.¹

Under RCW 4.96.020(4), "[n]o action shall be commenced against any local governmental entity for damages arising out of tortious conduct until sixty days have elapsed after the claim has first been presented to and filed with the governing body thereof." The applicable limitations period is tolled during this period. Id. Medina's filing of the claim with the County thus commenced the 60-day period and tolled the statute of limitations for filing suit in superior court. The County denied the claim on January 13, 1998, and the County made no subsequent attempts to negotiate, to investigate, or to contact petitioners following the denial.

On March 5, 1998, four days before the 60-day waiting period was to expire, Medina filed the instant complaint in Benton County Superior Court.² The County was served with the summons and complaint on June 3, 1998. The County answered on July 13, 1998, and amended its answer on July 22, 1998, to include the affirmative defense of failure to comply with the waiting period specified in RCW 4.96.020(4). On December 28, 1998, the County filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court initially denied the motion, but upon the County's motion for reconsideration granted summary judgment and dismissed the case. Medina appealed directly to this court, and this court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals.

In the Court of Appeals, Medina argued that (1) filing suit on March 5, 1998, complied with RCW 4.96.020(4); (2) the County waived noncompliance as an affirmative defense by raising it in an amended answer and by rejecting the claim prior to the end of the waiting period; (3) the County should be precluded from asserting a violation of the waiting period based on the theories of laches and equitable estoppel; and (4) RCW 4.96.020(4) is unconstitutional because it violates equal protection and due process. The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed summary judgment in favor of the County. Only the issues of compliance with RCW 4.96.020(4) and the statute's constitutionality are raised in the petition for review.

ANALYSIS

A. Medina's 1995 claim

As a preliminary matter, we first consider whether, in light of RCW 4.96.010, Medina's 1995 claim for property damage satisfies the provisions of RCW 4.96.020(4) as to the 1998 claim for personal injury and loss of consortium. Medina argues that the property damage claim filed and settled in October, 1995, satisfied the requirements of RCW 4.96.020(4) for the personal injury claim filed on January 7, 1998. The County responds that the first and second claims cannot be consolidated for the purposes of satisfying the statute because, not only was the first claim settled, precluding a lawsuit, but the first was also explicitly designated as a claim for property damage only. The County cites as an example the fact that Medina hand wrote in capital letters "PROPERTY DAMAGE" on his claim form and wrote "property damage" above the signature line before signing. The County also points to Medina's settlement letter, which said, "I enclose Mr. Medina's claim for the property damage to his vehicle only, for the agreed amount of $1,896.86." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 61. Medina did not mention personal injury other than to specify that the claim he was filing was not for personal injury.

Medina argues that the personal injury claim is only redundant or an amendment to the first claim and that the first claim for property damage should be given a liberal reading so as to include personal injury claims. He contends that the settlement release for the 1995 claim expressly reserved a cause of action for personal injuries:

The [Petitioner] clarifies that by using this property damage release he does not intend to release [the PUD] ... from any claim he may have for personal injuries and special and general damages, of any kind and that this instrument is intended to be a release only as to the physical damages to his vehicle.

CP at 68.

Relying on RCW 4.96.010 Medina urges that, applying a liberal construction to his claim, the court should find that his 1995 claim includes personal injury damages. RCW 4.96.010 provides:

(1).... The laws specifying the content for such claims shall be liberally construed so that substantial compliance therewith will be deemed satisfactory.

While we recognize that the statute sets forth a substantial compliance standard for the content of a claim, we must apply the Legislature's liberal construction directive in a manner that promotes the purpose of the claim filing statutes. It is generally accepted that one of the purposes of the claim filing provisions is to allow government entities time to investigate, evaluate, and settle claims. See, e.g., Daggs v. City of Seattle, 110 Wash.2d 49, 57, 750 P.2d 626 (1988)

; Williams v. State, 76 Wash.App. 237, 248, 885 P.2d 845 (1994). In this case Medina repeatedly specified that the 1995 claim was only for property damage to a vehicle. Thus, Medina's 1995 claim did not give the County the benefit of the waiting period to investigate the 1998 claim because no personal injury claims were made. The Legislature did not intend that RCW 4.96.010 be applied to mean that the content of a claim should be read so broadly as to negate the purpose of RCW 4.96.020(4), and we decline to do so.

We also agree with the County that treating the 1995 claim for property damage as encompassing the 1998 personal injury claims does not assist Medina because the 1995 claim was settled. Although Medina did preserve the right to file later claims, he did not preserve the original claim. That claim was disposed of and no longer exists. If Medina is correct that the 1995 claim did include the personal injury claim, then that claim has already been settled as well.

On this record, we hold that Medina's first and second claims are separate and each is subject to the provisions of RCW 4.96.020(4).

B. Medina's constitutional challenges

Next we consider Medina's argument that the 60-day waiting requirement of RCW 4.96.020(4) is unconstitutional. Medina says that this court has already held that once a claim has been denied there is no reason to require a tort claimant to wait to file suit. Hanford v. King County, 112 Wash. 659, 662-63, 192 P. 1013 (1920) (once the county denied the claim, the plaintiff did not need to wait the remainder of the sixty day period to file suit because the purpose of waiting period was satisfied). Relying on Hanford, Medina argues that there is no legitimate reason to prevent a plaintiff from filing suit if the County is not using the time to investigate or evaluate the claim. It is this lack of purpose, once a claim has already been denied, that Medina claims makes the statute unconstitutional as applied in this case.

The plaintiff in Hanford filed suit for injuries sustained when he was struck by an automobile owned by King County and driven "on its behalf." Id. at 660, 192 P. 1013. The statute at issue in Hanford provided, in part, that "[n]o action shall be maintained for any claim for damages until the same has been presented to the Board of County Commissioners and sixty days have elapsed after such presentation." Id. at 661, 192 P. 1013 (citing Laws of 1919, ch. 149 at 414).³ The court presumed that the purpose of the statute was to allow the county time to investigate the accident and the extent of its liability. Id. The court then found that, because the county had already rejected Hanford's claim, there was no longer any purpose served by requiring Hanford to wait to file suit. Hanford does not advance Medina's...