Medina v. Whitaker

Citation913 F.3d 152
Decision Date18 January 2019
Docket NumberNo. 17-5248,17-5248
Parties Jorge L. MEDINA, Appellant v. Matthew G. WHITAKER, Appellee
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)

Alan Gura, Washington, DC, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Jason D. Wright.

Patrick G. Nemeroff, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jessie K. Liu, U.S. Attorney, and Mark B. Stern and Michael S. Raab, Attorneys.

Before: Rogers and Pillard, Circuit Judges, and Sentelle, Senior Circuit Judge.

Sentelle, Senior Circuit Judge:

Jorge Medina was convicted of falsifying his income on mortgage applications twenty-seven years ago. Now, as a convicted felon, he is prohibited from owning firearms by federal law. He argues that the application of this law to him violates the Second Amendment because he poses no heightened risk of gun violence. Because we conclude that felons are not among the law-abiding, responsible citizens entitled to the protections of the Second Amendment, we reject his contention and affirm the district court’s dismissal order.

I. Factual Background

In 1990, Medina committed a felony. He grossly misrepresented his income on a mortgage finance application to qualify for a $30,000 loan from the First Federal Bank of California. He was referred for criminal prosecution by the bank. He cooperated with the investigation, confessed to his crime, and pled guilty in 1991 to a felony count of making a false statement to a lending institution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014. Although his crime was punishable by up to thirty years in prison, Medina was sentenced to only three years of probation, home detention for sixty days, and a fine. At the recommendation of the U.S. Attorney, the U.S. Probation Officer, and members of the community, Medina’s probation was terminated after only one year.

In the mid-1990s, Medina had another run-in with the law. In 1994 and 1995, he applied for resident hunting licenses in the state of Wyoming, while not actually residing in that state. He claims that the false statements were predicated on a misunderstanding about the residency requirements. Nevertheless, in 1996, he pled guilty to three misdemeanor counts of making a false statement on a game license application in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-3-403 (1989). The crime was classified as a misdemeanor and was punishable by a fine and six months’ imprisonment. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-6-202(a)(v) (1981). Medina was sentenced to an eight-year hunting license revocation and a fine.

Medina has no further criminal record since his 1996 conviction. He owns a successful business, supports a family, and engages in philanthropy. His rehabilitation has been recognized by several important institutions. The California real estate licensing board has continued to license him following his 1991 conviction. The government of Canada restored his right to enter the country in 2009. Even the victim of Medina’s false statement, the First Federal Bank of California, recognized his trustworthiness in 2005 by extending him a $1,000,000 line of credit.

Notwithstanding his past misdeeds, Medina wants to own a firearm for self-defense and recreation. He cannot do so, however, because his 1991 felony conviction bars him from possessing firearms under federal law.

II. Legal Background

Since 1968, anyone convicted of "a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" is prohibited from owning firearms for life under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Exempted from this prohibition are those convicted of antitrust violations, those convicted of state misdemeanors with a maximum term of imprisonment of two years or less, and those whose convictions have been pardoned or expunged. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). Although the prohibition applies for life, the statute allows the Attorney General to restore firearm rights to those deemed not "likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety." 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). This remedy has been unavailable since 1992, however, because Congress has prohibited the Attorney General from using public funds to investigate relief applications. To justify this decision, Congress cited the difficulty of the task and the fact that a wrong decision could result in "devastating consequences." S. Rep. No. 102-353 (1992).

In 2008—forty years after the enactment of this statute—the Supreme Court issued its decision in District of Columbia v. Heller , which clarified that the Second Amendment protects the right of individual Americans to keep and bear firearms for self-defense. 554 U.S. 570, 595, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008). This right, like other fundamental rights, is not unlimited in scope. In Heller , and again in McDonald v. City of Chicago , the Court explained that the recognition of an individual right to bear firearms does not "cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons." Heller , 554 U.S. at 626, 128 S.Ct. 2783 ; McDonald , 561 U.S. 742, 786, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010). The practice of barring convicted felons from possessing firearms is a "presumptively lawful regulatory measure[ ]." Heller , 554 U.S. at 627 n.26, 128 S.Ct. 2783.

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s statements concerning felon disarmament, the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) has been challenged several times. Litigation has taken the form of both facial challenges to the statute and challenges to the law’s application in particular circumstances. Facial challenges to the statute’s constitutionality have failed in every circuit to have considered the issue. United States v. Bogle , 717 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); United States v. Barton , 633 F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 2011) (overruled on other grounds by Binderup v. Attorney General , 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) ); United States v. Moore , 666 F.3d 313, 318 (4th Cir. 2012) ; United States v. Joos , 638 F.3d 581, 586 (8th Cir. 2011) ; United States v. Torres-Rosario , 658 F.3d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 2011) ; United States v. Rozier , 598 F.3d 768, 770–71 (11th Cir. 2010) ; United States v. Williams , 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010) ; United States v. Vongxay , 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010) ; United States v. McCane , 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009) ; United States v. Anderson , 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009).

As-applied challenges have fared only marginally better, and no circuit has held the law unconstitutional as applied to a convicted felon. The Ninth Circuit takes the view that "felons are categorically different from the individuals who have a fundamental right to bear arms." Vongxay , 594 F.3d at 1115. Four other circuits have, in a similar vein, also rejected as-applied challenges by convicted felons. See Hamilton v. Pallozzi , 848 F.3d 614, 626–27 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 500, 199 L.Ed.2d 384 (2017) ; United States v. Rozier , 598 F.3d 768, 770–71 (11th Cir. 2010) ; United States v. Scroggins , 599 F.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2010) ; In re United States , 578 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009). The Seventh and Eighth Circuits, while leaving open the possibility of a successful felon as-applied challenge, have yet to uphold one. See United States v. Woolsey , 759 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2014) ; United States v. Williams , 616 F.3d 685, 693–94 (7th Cir. 2010).

Only one court has held § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional in any of its applications. In Binderup v. Attorney General , the Third Circuit, en banc, considered the application of the law to two misdemeanants and issued a well-reasoned opinion, concurrence, and dissent that illustrates the various viewpoints in this debate. 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 2323, 198 L.Ed.2d 746 (2017). The court ultimately concluded that the law was unconstitutional as applied, but split sharply on the reasoning. The narrowest ground supporting the judgment held that those who commit serious crimes forfeit their Second Amendment right to arms. Id. at 349. It further held that the "passage of time or evidence of rehabilitation" could not restore the lost right; only the seriousness of the crime was relevant to determine if a convicted criminal fell outside the scope of the Second Amendment. Id. at 349–50. Applying this reasoning, the misdemeanor crimes at issue in that case were not sufficiently serious to warrant disarmament. Id. at 353. In a concurrence to the judgment, five judges disagreed with the seriousness test and took the view "that non-dangerous persons convicted of offenses unassociated with violence may rebut the presumed constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) on an as-applied basis." Id. at 357–58. (Hardiman, J., concurring in the judgment). Finally, seven judges dissented from the judgment and would have rejected the as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1). Although they agreed that the proper focus was on the seriousness of the crime, they were satisfied that crimes encompassed by the statute were sufficiently serious to warrant disarmament. Id. at 381 (Fuentes, J., dissenting from the judgment).

In our 2013 Schrader v. Holder decision, we joined our sister circuits in rejecting a categorical Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1). 704 F.3d 980, 989 (D.C. Cir. 2013). In that case, Schrader was barred from possessing firearms because of a forty-year-old, common-law misdemeanor charge arising from a fistfight. Id. at 983. Although he was only sentenced to a $100 fine, the misdemeanor carried no maximum possible term of incarceration—triggering the lifetime firearm prohibition under § 922(g)(1). Id. Schrader argued that the statute violated the Second Amendment when applied to misdemeanants such as himself because it deprived law-abiding citizens of their right to bear arms. Id. at 984. To resolve this claim, we applied the familiar two-step Second Amendment analysis used by circuits throughout the country and adopted by this Court in Heller v. District of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
54 cases
  • Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. v. Hogan
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • 12 Agosto 2021
    ..."generally engage in the ... two-pronged [ Chester ] analysis for facial Second Amendment challenges"); see, e.g., Medina v. Whitaker , 913 F.3d 152, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ; Gould v. Morgan , 907 F.3d 659, 669 (1st Cir. 2018) ; Jackson v. City and Cty. of San Francisco , 746 F.3d 953, 967 (9......
  • Harley v. Wilkinson
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • 22 Febrero 2021
    ..., 837 F.3d 678, 685-86 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc); United States v. Jimenez , 895 F.3d 228, 232 (2d Cir. 2018) ; Medina v. Whitaker , 913 F.3d 152, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ; Kanter v. Barr , 919 F.3d 437, 441-42 (7th Cir. 2019). Under the first prong of this approach, we address whether the cha......
  • Holloway v. Attorney Gen. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • 17 Enero 2020
    ...for a crime to be deemed serious, see, e.g., Binderup, 836 F.3d at 348 (Ambro, J.); id. at 390-91 (Fuentes, J.); Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 152, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (holding that fraud, by lying on mortgage documents, is "a serious crime"). Thus, the fact that an offense does not include......
  • Moran v. Wis. Dep't of Justice
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • 11 Junio 2019
    ...then, various federal courts have upheld the federal felon-in-possession statutes in Heller ’s wake. See, e.g. , Medina v. Whitaker , 913 F.3d 152, 157-60 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (holding that felons generally, as opposed to only violent offenders, fall outside the scope of Second Amendment protec......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT