Meditz v. City of Newark

• Decision Date: 28 September 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10–2442.,10–2442.
• Citation: 94 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44285,658 F.3d 364,113 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 727
• Parties: Gregory MEDITZ, Appellantv.CITY OF NEWARK; Does 1–10.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

658 F.3d 364

113 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 727

94 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,285

Gregory MEDITZ, Appellant

v.CITY OF NEWARK; Does 1–10.

No. 10–2442.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued April 27, 2011.Filed: Sept. 28, 2011.

Gregory Meditz, (argued), East Rutherford, NJ, Appellant, pro se.Gary S. Lipshutz, Esquire, Emelia Perez, Esquire, (argued), City of Newark, Department of Law, Newark, NJ, for Appellee City of Newark.Before: SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., and ROTH, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

Gregory Meditz (“Meditz”), an attorney proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Newark (“Newark”) on his claim of disparate impact and his motion to strike ¹ an exhibit attached to Newark's reply brief. Meditz alleges that the residency requirement adopted by Newark for its non-uniformed work force has a disparate impact on white, non-Hispanics because Newark's population does not reflect the racial make-up of the relevant labor market in the surrounding area. As a result, white, non-Hispanics are under-represented in Newark's non-uniformed work force. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the grant of summary judgment on the disparate impact claim was not appropriate based on this record. We will therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Facts/background

In April 2007, Meditz, a white male, applied for the position of Housing Development Analyst in Newark. He was rejected in July 2007 because, at the time, he lived in Rutherford, New Jersey.² Newark has a residency requirement for non-uniformed employees.³ In light of the waiver provisions in the ordinance, 185 non-uniformed employees ⁴ reside outside of Newark, in 82 ⁵ different municipalities, including some in other states. Uniformed employees must reside in Newark during their preliminary training, but then can move out of the city.

In support of his prima facie case, Meditz provided detailed statistical information in opposition to Newark's motion for summary judgment. Meditz obtained the statistical information from publicly available reports. Newark does not dispute the validity of any of the statistics Meditz presented. These statistics compared the ethnic distribution of non-uniformed employees to the ethnic makeup of Newark.⁶ Meditz argued that the difference between the percentages of white, non-Hispanic non-uniformed and uniformed employees was based on the residency requirement for non-uniformed employees. That is, Meditz posited that the residency requirement for non-uniformed employees was negatively impacting the hiring of white, non-Hispanics.

Newark argues that the statistics presented by Meditz do not support his prima facie case, since “the statistical disparities are not sufficiently substantial as to show that the residency ordinance has caused whites of non-Hispanic origin to be excluded from jobs with [Newark] because of their race.” (Br. of Def.–Appellee City of Newark 10.)

Alleging that the relevant labor market was the six county area surrounding Newark, Meditz also provided the ethnic breakdown of the general population in the surrounding counties, all of which included higher percentages of white, non-Hispanics than were employed as non-uniformed employees in Newark. ⁷ He included more specific data addressing the ethnic composition of government employees ⁸ and the private labor force ⁹ in each of the surrounding counties. The percentage of white, non-Hispanics in these positions greatly exceeded the number of white, non-Hispanics in Newark's non-uniformed work force. Meditz also provided employment statistics for Essex County governmental employees. Essex County has its county seat in Newark, and the composition of the Essex County and Newark non-uniformed workforces are comparable with regard to skill level and job function. Of the non-uniformed county workforce, 42.96% is white, non-Hispanic, according to the 2008 EEO–4 report. Meditz argued that the lower percentage of white, non-Hispanic non-uniformed employees in Newark was caused by the residency requirement, and that absent a residency requirement, significantly more white, non-Hispanics would be employed by Newark. As a result, Meditz concluded that Newark's residency requirement disparately impacted him as a white, non-Hispanic who was denied a job with Newark.

The District Court granted Newark's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Meditz failed to prove his prima facie case. That is, based on the statistical evidence Meditz presented, the District Court concluded that “these statistics, standing alone, do not constitute sufficient evidence of a significantly discriminatory hiring pattern.” In re Meditz v. City of Newark, No. 08–2912, 2010 WL 1529612, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2010). The District Court further concluded that there was no need to look beyond Newark's borders to define the relevant labor market, since “Newark is New Jersey's largest city with over 270,000 residents, 38,950 of whom are White. Given its diversity and large population, there is no need to redefine the relevant labor market past city limits for purposes of Title VII analysis.” Id. at *4. We disagree with both conclusions of the District Court.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.¹⁰

We review the District Court's order granting summary judgment de novo. Azur v. Chase Bank, USA, Nat'l Ass'n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir.2010). “To that end, we are required to apply the same test the district court should have utilized initially.” Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Summary judgment is appropriate “where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805–06 (3d Cir.2000) (en banc) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).¹¹ “Once the moving party points to evidence demonstrating no issue of material fact exists, the non-moving party has the duty to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists and that a reasonable factfinder could rule in its favor.” Azur, 601 F.3d at 216. In determining whether summary judgment is warranted “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Chambers ex rel. Chambers, 587 F.3d at 181. “Further, ‘[w]e may affirm the District Court's order granting summary judgment on any grounds supported by the record.’ ” Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir.2009) (quoting Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d at 805).

III. Analysis

Meditz claims that Newark's residency requirement for non-uniformed employees has a disparate impact on white, non-Hispanics in violation of Title VII. In support of his claim, he cites evidence of the relatively low percentage of white, non-Hispanics in Newark's non-uniformed work force. The statistics he provides demonstrate that the percentage of white, non-Hispanics in Newark's non-uniformed work force is lower than the percentage that would be anticipated based on the percentage of white, non-Hispanics in the population of the relevant labor market.

Title VII makes it unlawful “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). The Supreme Court has long recognized that Title VII plaintiffs can make out a viable employment discrimination claim without alleging or proving discriminatory intent. See Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). Under Title VII, “practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.” Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430, 91 S.Ct. 849.

“The [Supreme] Court announced that these ‘disparate impact’ cases should proceed in two steps: (1) the plaintiff must prove that the challenged policy discriminates against members of a protected class, and then (2) the defendant can overcome the showing of disparate impact by proving a ‘manifest relationship’ between the policy and job performance. This second step came to be known as the ‘business necessity’ defense, and it serves as an employer's only means of defeating a Title VII claim when its employment policy has a discriminatory effect.” El v. SEPTA, 479 F.3d 232, 239–40 (3d Cir.2007) (footnotes omitted.) “[T]he successful assertion of the business necessity defense is not an ironclad shield; rather, the plaintiff can overcome it by showing that an alternative policy exists that would serve the employer's legitimate goals as well as the challenged policy with less of a discriminatory effect.” Id. at 240 n. 9.

Thus, “[i]n order to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, a plaintiff is required to demonstrate that application of a facially neutral standard has resulted in a significantly discriminatory hiring pattern.” N.A.A.C.P. v. Harrison, 940 F.2d 792, 798 (3d Cir.1991) (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977)). “The evidence in these ‘disparate impact’ cases usually focuses on statistical disparities.” Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 101 L.Ed.2d 827 (1988). “A comparison between the racial composition of those qualified persons in the relevant labor market and that of those in the jobs at issue typically ‘forms the...