Medley v. Lemmon

• Decision Date: 12 September 2013
• Docket Number: No. 61A01–1209–PL–420.,61A01–1209–PL–420.
• Citation: 994 N.E.2d 1177
• Parties: Natalie MEDLEY, Appellant–Plaintiff, v. Bruce LEMMON, Julie Stout, Pam Ferguson, Stacey Milner, Sherry White, L.A. VanNatta, Mike Pavese, Virginia McCullough, Appellees–Defendants.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

994 N.E.2d 1177

Natalie MEDLEY, Appellant–Plaintiff,

v.Bruce LEMMON, Julie Stout, Pam Ferguson, Stacey Milner, Sherry White, L.A. VanNatta, Mike Pavese, Virginia McCullough, Appellees–Defendants.

No. 61A01–1209–PL–420.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

July 17, 2013.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 12, 2013.

Natalie Medley, Rockville, IN, Appellant Pro Se.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Kathy Bradley, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

BARNES, Judge.

Case Summary

Natalie Medley appeals the dismissal of her complaint against Bruce Lemmon, Michael Pavese, Julie Stout, Stacey Milner, Pam Ferguson, Virginia McCullough, Sherry White, and L.A. VanNatta (collectively “the Defendants”). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Issues

We restate the issues before us as:

I. whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to address Medley's claims that the Defendants violated provisions of the Indiana Code;

II. whether Medley adequately stated any claims against the Defendants under the Indiana Constitution; and

III. whether Medley adequately stated any claims against the Defendants under the United States Constitution.

Facts

Medley is a prisoner at the Rockville Correctional Facility (“Rockville”). On October 4, 2010, Rockville staff member McCullough recommended that Medley's visitation privileges be modified to non-contact or video-only visitation for a period of six months after Medley was found to have violated prison rules by fleeing or resisting prison staff.¹ This recommendation was agreed to by Milner, the Rockville assistant superintendent, and approved by Stout, the superintendent. On December 16, 2010, the non-contact visitation restriction was extended for an additional year, after Medley was found to have violated a prison rule by hugging another inmate in the bathroom, which was reported to be sexual in nature. Again, McCullough recommended the punishment, with Ferguson this time agreeing to the recommendation as assistant superintendent and Milner approving it as superintendent. These restrictions on visitation expired on March 13, 2012.

The visitation restrictions were imposed pursuant to a rule of the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”), No. 02–01–102, providing that “[U]pon recommendation of staff and approval of the Facility Head, an offender may be considered for non-contact or video visits for violations of other disciplinary codes, including but not limited to: ... Sex related offenses; Physically resisting staff....” App. p. 91. The rule provides that visitation may be restricted for six months for a first offense, twelve months for a second offense, and permanently for a third offense.² Furthermore, the rule, which we refer to as the “three strikes” policy, states that “[t]hese restrictions shall not be considered as a part of any disciplinary action taken against the offender for guilty findings for any of the indicated offenses; but, shall be an administrative action in addition to any disciplinary action taken against the offender.” Id. at 93.

Medley filed grievances regarding these visitation restrictions. They were initially denied by White, a grievance specialist at Rockville, and subsequently by VanNatta, a DOC Central Office grievance specialist. Medley also wrote to Pavese, DOC Policy Manager, regarding the restriction of her visitation, and she claimed that she was being treated unfairly as compared to other inmates who committed similar conduct violations. After the restriction of her visitation, Medley was temporarily transferred to the Indiana Women's Prison (“IWP”) from January through May 2011.

On May 7, 2012, Medley filed a “Civil Rights Complaint” against Lemmon (the DOC Commissioner), Pavese, Stout, Milner, Ferguson, McCullough, White, and VanNatta. Id. at 16. She stated that she was bringing the suit “pursuant to 42 USC section 1983” and alleged violations of the United States and Indiana Constitutions and Indiana statutes in connection with the restriction of her visitation privileges. Id. Medley also alleged that her temporary transfer to IWP was done in retaliation for her filing of multiple grievances and that she has continued to be retaliated against since her transfer back to Rockville, such as by being placed in an “observation” unit and by restriction of access to the law library. She also claimed that the visitation restrictions were imposed in personal retaliation for her filing of grievances, and that the restrictions were also generally related to a misleading survey conducted of inmates that labeled Rockville one of the worst prisons in America for prison rape. Medley sought injunctive relief prohibiting enforcement of the DOC's “three strikes” policy regarding non-contact visitation, as well as monetary damages against the Defendants.

On July 5, 2012, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Medley's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court granted this motion in its entirety on August 13, 2012. Medley now appeals.

Analysis

We review de novo a ruling on a motion to dismiss a civil complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6). Putnam County Sheriff v. Price, 954 N.E.2d 451, 453 (Ind.2011). “Such a motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim, not the facts supporting it.” Caesars Riverboat Casino, LLC v. Kephart, 934 N.E.2d 1120, 1122 (Ind.2010). “That is to say, it tests whether the allegations in the complaint establish any set of circumstances under which a plaintiff would be entitled to relief.” Price, 954 N.E.2d at 453. In ruling on a Rule 12(B)(6) motion, courts are required to view the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and with every inference in its favor. Id.

Before turning to the merits of Medley's particular claims, we address her argument that the trial court should not have dismissed her complaint upon the Defendants' motion because it had already declined to dismiss the complaint under Indiana Code Section 34–58–1–2(a)(2). That statute provides, “A court shall review a complaint or petition filed by an offender and shall determine if the claim may proceed. A claim may not proceed if the court determines that the claim ... is not a claim upon which relief may be granted....” We have noted that this statute “is akin to a legislative interpretation of Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6), a rule which has given judges in civil cases the authority ‘to consider a case in its early stages and, taking everything the plaintiff has alleged as true, determine whether it can proceed.’ ” Guillen v. R.D.C. Mail Clerk, 922 N.E.2d 121, 122–23 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (quoting Peterson v. Lambert, 885 N.E.2d 719, 720 (Ind.Ct.App.2008)). The statute provides the same authority as Trial Rule 12(B)(6) in civil cases involving prisoners acting pro se, but “without requiring a motion by the defendant to trigger the determination.” Id. at 123.

Although Indiana Code Section 34–58–1–2(a)(2) and Trial Rule 12(B)(6) are very similar, we see nothing in the statute that would either preclude a defendant from moving to dismiss a pro se prisoner's complaint under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) or a trial court from granting such a motion. Certainly, nothing in the statute indicates that permitting a pro se offender's civil lawsuit to proceed is a final, irrevocable ruling that the complaint is legally sufficient. Additionally, it is well-settled that a trial court has the inherent authority to reconsider any previous rulings it has made, so long as the case remains pending (or “in fieri”). Yeager v. McManama, 874 N.E.2d 629, 639 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). Thus, nothing prohibited the trial court here from reconsidering its prior decision to allow Medley's lawsuit to proceed upon the presentation of a motion to dismiss and supporting argument by the Defendants.

We also note that the State argues that Medley's appeal is moot to the extent it claims she seeks injunctive relief regarding her six-month and one-year visitation restrictions, which expired on March 13, 2012. “Generally, an issue is deemed to be moot when the case is no longer live and the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of its resolution or where no effective relief can be rendered to the parties.” Lake County Bd. of Elections and Registration v. Copeland, 880 N.E.2d 1288, 1291 (Ind.Ct.App.2008). However, it does not appear to us that Medley is requesting any kind of injunctive relief with respect to her personal visitation restrictions, as opposed to monetary damages for them having been imposed. She does seek injunctive relief with respect to barring the DOC from generally and prospectively enforcing its “three strikes” visitation policy, and that claim is not moot, nor are her claims seeking damages.

I. Statutory Claims

We first turn to Medley's claims that the “three strikes” DOC visitation policy, generally and as applied to her, violates two statutes governing prison discipline and visitation, Indiana Code Sections 11–11–5–4 and 11–11–3–9. She notes that Indiana Code Section 11–11–5–4(4) states in part that the DOC “may not impose the following as disciplinary action: ... Restrictions on clothing, bedding, mail, visitation, reading and writing materials, or the use of hygienic facilities, except for abuse of these.” She contends that the “three strikes” policy violates this statute because it is used to restrict prisoner visitation for conduct offenses that have nothing to do with visitation and that her visitation was in fact restricted on the basis of conduct offenses that were unrelated to any “abuse” of her visitation.

Both the trial court and this court are unequivocally precluded from considering Medley's claims regarding Section 11–11–5–4. In Blanck v. Indiana Department of Correction, 829 N.E.2d 505 (Ind.2005), our supreme court addressed a prisoner lawsuit alleging that DOC discipline of him violated several statutes,...