Medley v. State

• Decision Date: 11 June 1908
• Citation: 156 Ala. 78,47 So. 218
• Parties: MEDLEY v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

47 So. 218

156 Ala. 78

MEDLEY v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 11, 1908

Rehearing Denied July 3, 1908.

Appeal from City Court of Gadsden; Alto V. Lee, Judge.

Will Medley was convicted of assault and battery with a weapon and he appeals. Affirmed.

The following portions of the oral charge of the court were excepted to:

"If you find from the evidence that defendant has proven a good character, you may look to that fact, along with the other facts in the case, to generate a reasonable doubt of his guilt; and this fact may entitle him to an acquittal when upon all the facts in the case proven, there would be no reasonable doubt of his guilt without proof of such good character."

"If a juror has a personal knowledge respecting any fact in controversy, he must declare it in open court during the trial; and if, during the retirement of the jury, a juror declares a fact as of his own knowledge which could be evidenced in the cause, the jury must forthwith return into court, and such juror must, in either case, be sworn and examined as a witness in the presence of the parties."

"Gentlemen, you are bound by the evidence in this case and the legitimate conclusions to be drawn therefrom. You cannot go outside of the evidence for any purpose. You are bound absolutely by the evidence in the case, by the statements made by the witnesses on the stand. You saw the witnesses. You heard what they said. You observed their manner. Now, from what they said on the witness stand, looking to that, and to that only, and applying your common sense, what do you find."

"I charge you that, if you find from the evidence that this was a 22-caliber Winchester rifle, it was a deadly weapon. If it was a Winchester rifle, then I charge you it was a deadly weapon."

"Where death ensues, there can be no trial for an assault with intent to murder, if the man assaulted was killed."

"I charge you that, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun was purposely pointed at Will Lokey by the defendant when he fired, then the defendant would be guilty of one of the charges embraced in the indictment."

"I charge you there is little distinction, except in degree, between a positive will to do wrong and an indifference whether wrong is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies the place of the direct criminal intent. Our Supreme Court's adjudications are in line with this idea, and always predicate criminality, not upon mere negligence or carelessness, but upon the degree of negligence or carelessness which is denominated 'gross,' and which constitutes such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily careful and prudent man under the same circumstances as to furnish evidence of that indifference to consequences which in some offenses takes the place of intent. There must be a criminal intent, or negligence so gross as to imply it. The carelessness must be aggravated. It must be gross, so to speak, implying an indifference to consequences. If the defendant negligently handled the gun that inflicted the wound, in disregard of the safety of others, he would be guilty of an assault and battery with a weapon."

The following written charges were refused to the defendant:

"(1) The court charges the jury that good character itself may, in connection with all the evidence, generate a reasonable doubt and entitle defendant to an acquittal, even though without such proof of good character you would convict.

"(2) The court charges the jury that before the jury can convict the defendant they must be satisfied to a moral certainty that the proof is consistent with defendant's guilt, but that it is wholly inconsistent with every rational conclusion, and, unless the jury are so convinced by the evidence of the defendant's guilt that they would each venture to act upon that decision in matters of highest concern and important to his own interest, then they must find defendant not guilty.

"(3) The court charges the jury that it is a well-settled rule of law that if there be two reasonable constructions which can be given to facts proven, one favorable and the other unfavorable to defendant, it is the duty of the jury to give that which is favorable rather than that which is unfavorable to the accused party.

"(4) The court charges the jury that unless the jury believe from the evidence in this case that the defendant intended to shoot Will Lokey with malice they cannot find him guilty of an assault with intent to murder, and if the jury have a reasonable doubt as to whether he had an intent to shoot Will Lokey at the time he was shot and not doing an unlawful act their verdict must be for the defendant.

"(5) The court charges the jury that a person charged with a felony should not be convicted upon circumstantial evidence unless it shows by the full measure of proof that he is guilty. Such proof is always insufficient unless it excludes to a moral certainty every other reasonable hypothesis but that of the guilt of the accused. No matter how strong the circumstances may be, if they can be reconciled with the theory

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