Medley v. United States

• Citation: 104 A.3d 115
• Decision Date: 18 December 2014
• Docket Number: 11–CF–1671,Nos. 11–CF–1670,12–CF–7.,s. 11–CF–1670
• Parties: Jamarr MEDLEY, Antoine Richardson and Lucious McLeod, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Columbia District

104 A.3d 115

Jamarr MEDLEY, Antoine Richardson and Lucious McLeod, Appellants

v.UNITED STATES, Appellee.

Nos. 11–CF–1670

11–CF–1671

12–CF–7.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued Sept. 16, 2014.

Decided Dec. 18, 2014.

Mikel–Meredith Weidman, Public Defender Service, with whom James Klein, Jaclyn Frankfurt and Shilpa Satoskar, Public Defender Service, were on the brief, for appellant Medley.

Antoine F. Richardson, pro se.

Cory L. Carlyle for appellant McLeod.

Nicholas P. Coleman, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Ronald C. Machen, Jr., United States Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, John P. Mannarino and David Gorman, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief for appellee.

Before BLACKBURNE–RIGSBY and THOMPSON, Associate Judges, and REID, Senior Judge.

Opinion

THOMPSON, Associate Judge:

Following a joint jury trial, appellants Antoine Richardson and Jamarr Medley were found guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon (ADW), aggravated assault while armed (AAWA), and assault with significant bodily injury (ASBI), and appellant Lucious McLeod was found guilty of assault with intent to kill while armed (AWIKWA), AAWA, ASBI, and obstruction of justice. Appellants raised several claims on appeal. Richardson argues that the trials were misjoined under Super. Ct.Crim. R. 8(b). Each appellant argues that his trial should have been severed from the trial of the other appellants. Medley and McLeod contend that statements made by appellant Richardson during recorded jail calls should not have been admitted without (further) redaction and also argue that some of their convictions merge. Richardson and Medley argue that the victim did not suffer “serious bodily injury” for purposes of the AAWA statute, and therefore that their AAWA convictions should be reversed. In addition, Richardson assigns as error the trial court's (1) admission of evidence that he previously assaulted another individual; (2) failure to instruct the jury that Richardson's initial encounter with the victim was not part of the charged conduct; and (3) refusal to provide a missing evidence instruction to the jury. Richardson also raises an issue with respect to the Bureau of Prison's payment schedule for the fines imposed as part of his sentence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm but remand for the trial court to vacate the convictions that merge with appellants' AAWA convictions.

I. Background

Appellants' convictions arose out of two assault incidents, involving the same victim but transpiring a year apart from each other. Only Medley and Richardson were charged with the first assault; only McLeod was charged with the second assault. The jury heard the following evidence.

A. The November 10, 2009, Assault (Richardson and Medley)

Cordell Brown testified that on November 10, 2009, he was walking on B Street, S.E., near its intersection with Bass Place, when appellant Richardson approached him. According to Brown, Richardson asked him why he had provided cocaine to Jeanetta Smith, a young woman with whom Richardson was romantically involved. Although Brown denied having given cocaine to Smith, Richardson responded by hitting Brown on the head with a pole.

Brown testified that he walked around a corner to escape Richardson, but saw Richardson come around the corner, following him. When Brown approached Richardson and said, “Man, you hit me,” Richardson again used the pole to hit him. Brown and Richardson began grappling, with Brown pinning Richardson's arms, pushing him against a wall, and head-butting him. Brown then felt something hit his back. He turned and saw appellant Medley (and no one else) directly behind him. Moments later, Brown felt something stab him in his side.

Cheryl Jones, Brown's girlfriend at the time, testified that she was in a first floor apartment on Bass Place on November 10, 2009, when she heard Brown, from outside, saying that a man had hit him for no reason. Jones came outside and saw that Brown had a bleeding knot on his head. Brown told her that Richardson had just hit him, and, a moment later, Jones saw Richardson come around the corner. Brown then approached Richardson, and the two began fighting. Jones saw Richardson hit Brown with a “black gate” and saw Medley hit Brown with a chair. Richardson and Medley fled soon after.

B. Richardson's calls from jail

Richardson was arrested on December 6, 2009, but Medley was not arrested until May 7, 2010. While in jail, Richardson made a series of phone calls that were recorded and which the government introduced at trial, with some redactions. In one call, Richardson said that he needed McLeod to “get on top of” the situation and to “talk to people.” A few seconds later, Richardson added that Medley “need[ed] to do something” as well. In still another call, Richardson asked the other speaker to find McLeod and tell him, “[Richardson] says he needs you on this.”

C. Medley's and McLeod's repeated approaches to Brown and Jones

The jury heard from Jones, who confirmed her grand jury testimony, that, shortly after the 2009 assault, Medley approached her twice, once in a laundromat to ask her for Brown's location, and once to ask her to “make peace” and have Brown drop the charges. Brown testified that, on one occasion after the November 2009 assault, he was at the Benco Shopping Center, a few blocks from the scene of the assault, when he saw McLeod and Medley coming towards him.¹ At seeing Medley, Brown fled to the nearby Metro station. Jones testified similarly about the event, adding that Medley specifically asked to speak with Brown during this incident.

On another occasion after the November 2009 assault, McLeod approached Brown and repeatedly said, “I know you ain't going to court[.]” Brown responded by expressing his intention to testify against his assailants. On a third occasion, McLeod offered Brown money to not go to court.

D. The November 1, 2010, Assault (McLeod)

On November 1, 2010, four weeks before the scheduled trial date for the 2009 assault, Brown was attacked again. According to Brown's testimony, he was walking alone on Texas Avenue, heard someone call his name, turned around, and saw appellant McLeod, whom he had known for several years as a friend of Richardson's, immediately behind him. McLeod stabbed Brown in his left breast and said, as Brown slumped to the ground, “I knew I would catch you by yourself.” Brown testified that McLeod struck him several times before he was able to escape down Texas Avenue. He remembered stopping to throw up blood, and the next thing he knew, he was in an ambulance.

II. Analysis

A. Joinder

Richardson challenges the trial court's decision to join appellants' trials under Super. Ct.Crim. R. 8(b), a decision the court based on its finding that the two assaults were part of the “same series of acts or transactions [.]”² Super. Ct.Crim. R. 8(b). Our case law establishes that separate offenses can constitute a joinable “series of acts or transactions” where “one offense logically leads to another[.]” Settles v. United States, 522 A.2d 348, 352 (D.C.1987) (quoting Davis v. United States, 367 A.2d 1254, 1262 (D.C.1976) ). An offense leads logically to another when one crime is a “sequel” to the other. Bush v. United States, 516 A.2d 186, 192 (D.C.1986). “Sequel” offenses include, inter alia, attempts to obstruct justice, which make appropriate the joint trial of an underlying offense and additional offenses committed by others in an attempt to hide the underlying offense. See id.³

Here, trials for the 2009 and 2010 assaults were properly joined because “joinder of defendants is proper under Rule 8(b) ‘if they are alleged to have participated in the ... same series of acts or transactions [.]’ ” Jackson, 329 A.2d at 787 (emphasis in original). The 2010 assault was motivated, according to the government's theory of the case, by McLeod's desire to prevent Brown from testifying against Richardson as to the 2009 assault, and the government so alleged in the indictment. Further, the government introduced evidence at trial to corroborate its theory, including evidence that Richardson and McLeod were friends, that Richardson asserted in telephone calls made from jail that he needed McLeod to “get on top of” the situation, and that McLeod repeatedly attempted to talk Brown out of testifying before he resorted to violence. Thus, “while [the government's theory] rest [ed] upon inference, the evidence show[ed] a sufficient nexus between [Richardson and McLeod] to support the inclusion in the indictment of a charge” that McLeod endeavored forcibly to obstruct justice by assaulting Brown. Id.

B. Severance

Even in cases where joinder under Rule 8(b) is appropriate, severance may still be necessary under Rule 14, which protects parties from “manifest prejudice as a result of being tried jointly.” Harrison v. United States, 76 A.3d 826, 834 (D.C.2013) (quoting Hargraves v. United States, 62 A.3d 107, 115–16 (D.C.2013) ) (internal quotation marks omitted); Super. Ct.Crim. R. 14. A party seeking reversal based on the trial court's refusal to sever properly joined offenses must show the “most compelling prejudice.”

Winestock v. United States, 429 A.2d 519, 527 (D.C.1981) (quoting United States v. Rhodes, 569 F.2d 384, 390 (5th Cir.1978) ). “[S]ome amount of prejudice will be permitted in favor of judicial economy and the concomitant expedition of cases.” Carpenter, 430 A.2d at 502. The decision to sever properly joined offenses is committed to the discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only when the appellant makes a “clear showing that [the trial court] has abused its considerable discretion.” Sterling v. United States, 691 A.2d 126, 135 (D.C.1997).

1. Medley's arguments

Medley argues that he suffered compelling prejudice from joinder because it enabled the prosecutors, in their opening statement and closing argument, to portray the two assaults as if they were part of “a protracted joint campaign” or “uncharged conspiracy to obstruct justice,”...