MEDRANO-QUIROZ v. U.S.
| Decision Date | 30 October 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-CF-1611,No. 95-CF-1564,No. 94-CF-1517,94-CF-1517,94-CF-1611,95-CF-1564 |
| Citation | 705 A.2d 642 |
| Parties | David MEDRANO-QUIROZ, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. Ronald W. SERMENO, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT, TRUMAN A. MORRISON, III, J.
THIS PAGE CONTAINED HEADNOTES AND HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.
Jaclyn S. Frankfurt, Public Defender Service, with whom James Klein and Cynthia Goode, Public Defender Service, were on the brief, for appellant David Medrano-Quiroz.
Tamara A. Shockley, Washington, DC, filed a brief for appellant Ronald W. Sermeno.
James E. Boasberg, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and John R. Fisher and Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.
Before SCHWELB and FARRELL, Associate Judges, and PRYOR, Senior Judge.
David Medrano-Quiroz and Ronald W. Sermeno were convicted by a jury of distribution of cocaine and of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute it, in violation of D.C Code § 33-541(a)(1) (1993).1 On appeal, their principal contention is that the trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to disqualify a juror for misconduct.2 We affirm.
The prosecution presented evidence which, if credited, established that on September 1, 1993, officers of the Metropolitan Police Department, who were in a concealed observation post and using binoculars, saw Medrano-Quiroz and Sermeno sell two small white objects to their codefendant, Larry Peay.3 The officers in the observation post broadcast descriptions of all three participants in the transaction. Other officers promptly apprehended Peay and recovered from his person two white rocks of crack cocaine.
Soon thereafter, Medrano-Quiroz and Sermeno were also arrested. Immediately before his apprehension in a pool hall, and upon making eye-contact with an officer, Medrano-Quiroz threw into a trash can some white paper which he was holding in his hands. Anofficer retrieved the paper, which contained twelve rocks of crack cocaine. Medrano-Quiroz had $158.00 on his person.
Sermeno was apprehended while he was seated on a bicycle. Upon the approach of the officers, he attempted to stuff three loose white rocks into a hollow in the handlebars. The rocks were recovered and also proved to be crack cocaine. Upon searching Sermeno, the officers found $90.00.
None of the defendants testified or called any witnesses.
The trial of the case against Medrano-Quiroz, Sermeno and Peay began on June 13, 1994. As a part of his preliminary instructions, which were delivered prior to opening statements, the judge ordered the jurors not to discuss with one another, or with anyone else, "anything at all about the case, no matter how insignificant it may seem to you."
During her opening statement, Peay's attorney told the jurors that the police had planted on her client the crack cocaine that they claimed to have found in his possession. She stated that
when the officers stopped Mr. Peay, they threw him up against the wall, and they searched him. Those officers did not find any drugs on Mr. Peay. At that point, ladies and gentlemen, the officers had a choice to make. They could either let Mr. Peay go, and not go back around the corner and arrest two men that they thought were selling drugs, or they could say that they found drugs on Mr. Peay. And, that way they could go right back around and look for the two men that they thought were selling drugs. And, that's exactly what those police officers did, ladies and gentlemen.
Following the completion of counsel's opening statements, the deputy clerk, Mr. Evan's, led the jurors to the jury room. While en route, Evans heard one of the jurors — Juror No. 9 — say to no one in particular something to the effect that "isn't that incredible, [that] the police would just plant something on somebody?" Evans told Juror No. 9 that "you're not supposed to be talking about the case." At this point however, Evans did not report the incident to the judge.
The trial proceeded until, on June 16, 1994, the judge was obliged to take a lengthy recess because appellant Sermeno failed to appear. While waiting for the trial to resume, Juror No. 9 was sitting in a hallway near the jury room when Daniel Harn, Esquire, a criminal defense attorney who practices in the Superior Court, walked by. Harn and Juror No. 9 were friends and neighbors, and they struck up a conversation with one another.
According to the account later provided to the court by Harn, Juror No. 9 told Harn that he was a member of a jury in a criminal case, but that he believed that there might be a mistrial in his case because nothing had happened all day. Harn explained that there could be all kinds of reasons for the delay. The juror told Harn that the judge had ordered the jurors not to discuss the case. Juror No. 9 then followed Harn into another courtroom and observed proceedings in an unrelated matter in which Harn was appearing before a different judge. After Harn's case had been completed, the two men left the courthouse together and rode the Metro to a station near their residences. Harn then drove Juror No. 9 home in Harn's private automobile.
While Juror No. 9 was riding in Harn's car, he told Harn that the case in which he was a juror involved two defendants charged with selling drugs and one charged with possession. According to Harn, Juror No. 9 then stated "something to the effect [that] it was all he could do to restrain himself when he heard the lawyers say that the police planted the drugs in the pocket of the man charged with possession because they wanted to get the seller so bad." Harn said that he made no verbal response to Juror No. 9's comment, but that Juror No. 9 "may have been sort of giggling, and I might have involuntarily sort of giggled along with him." According to Harn,
I did not say anything and he did not say anything more. He did not tell me what stage the trial was in; did not tell me whether or not there was any testimony. And that was it. Our conversationbasically ended with well, I hope that you're right that there is a mistrial so you don't miss work. And he said no, I hope there isn't a mistrial because it's an interesting case. I want to sit on it.
Meanwhile, the judge had issued a bench warrant for Sermeno, and the warrant was executed later on June 16, 1994. The trial resumed on the following day, Friday, June 17. Following closing arguments and the court's instructions, the jury began to deliberate at 3:45 p.m. Shortly thereafter, the jurors were excused for the weekend.
On Monday, June 20, Harn encountered Eric Yaffe, Esquire, who was prosecuting the three defendants. Harn told Yaffe that he had heard that there would be a mistrial in a case that Yaffe was handling. Yaffe explained that no mistrial was anticipated, and Harn then related his conversation with Juror No. 9. Harn told the court that he "gave [Yaffe] that little nugget, that theory of defense, and that was it." Yaffe appropriately reported to the court the facts that he had learned from Harn and, on the morning of June 21, 1994, the judge convened a hearing on the matter.
The hearing regarding Juror No. 9's conduct began before the jury resumed deliberations. The proceedings were conducted outside the presence of the jury. After discussing with counsel the manner in which the matter should be handled, the judge called in first Harn and then Juror No. 9 and interrogated each regarding the incidents which the prosecutor had reported to the court.
Harn's account of his conversations with Juror No. 9 has been set forth in Part II.B of this opinion. When it was Juror No. 9's turn to respond to questions from the judge, the juror confirmed that he had encountered Harn outside the jury room, that he had watched proceedings in another courtroom, and that he had ridden home with Harn. Juror No. 9 denied, however, that there had been any conversation in Harn's car regarding the case before the court. After the questioning of Juror No. 9 had been completed, Deputy Clerk Evans reported to the court the comments that this juror had made immediately after opening statements.
The judge asked the attorneys to state their positions in light of the foregoing disclosures. In response, counsel for all three defendants argued that Juror No. 9 should be disqualified.4 There were, however, differences between the attorneys as to how the court should proceed. Peay's counsel urged the judge to reopen the questioning of Juror No. 9 and to confront him with Harn's account of the conversation in the car. The attorneys for Medrano-Quiroz and Sermeno, however, were reluctant for tactical reasons to agree to further interrogation of Juror No. 9 prior to verdict, lest further questioning prejudice him against the defense.
The judge declined to disqualify the juror or to declare a mistrial "at this point."5 He expressly credited Harn's description of his conversation with Juror No. 9. The judge also commented that
I don't think it's likely [that] this juror forgot. He remembers the details of a conversation essentially the way Mr. Harn does that happened an hour and a half earlier, and it's not likely, really, that he forgot.
The judge stated:
[I]t does seem to me that the potential problems, whatever their extent may be with this person, there is no particular reason frankly in my mind to believe fromeverything that we have heard that this problem is any more serious than this person having from the first moment forward been not enthusiastic about Mr....
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