Medrano v. Aramark Healthcare Techs., LLC

• Decision Date: 11 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14-CV-6777 (RA),14-CV-6777 (RA)
• Parties: DILCIA MEDRANO, Plaintiff, v. ARAMARK HEALTHCARE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC and MARK PERRI (a/k/a Mark Perez), Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

DILCIA MEDRANO, Plaintiff, v. ARAMARK HEALTHCARE TECHNOLOGIES, LLCand MARK PERRI (a/k/a Mark Perez), Defendants.

No. 14-CV-6777 (RA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

August 11, 2015

OPINION & ORDER

RONNIE ABRAMS, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is Plaintiff Dilcia Medrano's motion to remand this state law personal injury action to New York State Supreme Court, Bronx County, where the case was originally filed. Defendants Aramark Healthcare Technologies, LLC and Mark Perri removed the action to this Court, arguing that Perri had been fraudulently joined for the sole purpose of destroying diversity jurisdiction. Medrano contends otherwise, arguing that Perri was properly joined, and that this Court thus lacks subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's motion to remand is granted, while her related application for costs and fees is denied.

BACKGROUND¹

Medrano filed this action against Aramark and Perri in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Bronx County, on July 18, 2014. See Mot. to Remand, Dkt. 5, Ex. B. She alleges that on July 25, 2011, while performing her duties at Bronx Lebanon Hospital Center ("BronxLebanon"), she was directed by Perri, an employee of Aramark, to move a food cart. Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 3. Medrano asserts that the cart had been "improperly stacked too high with food boxes" by others under the management of Perri, and that while guiding the cart through a doorway, her hand was crushed as she attempted to steady the boxes. Id. Plaintiff claims that the dangerous manner in which food carts were stacked was an ongoing issue of which Perri was aware, in light of her and other workers' prior complaints. Id. ¶¶ 3-4.

Medrano contends that she was employed as a "food service person" by Bronx Lebanon, and not Aramark, although her "employment duties were being directly managed by [Perri] on the day of the accident and for years preceding the accident." Id. ¶ 1-2. In addition, she alleges that Perri was the direct manager responsible for supervising all aspects of food services performed by Aramark at Bronx Lebanon, including the stacking of food carts. Id. ¶ 4.

Plaintiff brings causes of action for negligence against Perri and for negligence and a violation of New York Labor Law § 200 against Aramark. On August 21, 2014, Defendants removed this action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, asserting that Perri, the non-diverse defendant, had been fraudulently joined.² Plaintiff now moves to remand the action to state court, arguing that her claims against Perri are valid and that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear them. Plaintiff seeks recovery of all costs and fees incurred as a consequence of the removal.

DISCUSSION

A. Fraudulent Joinder

Defendants contend that Perri was fraudulently joined for the sole purpose of defeating diversity jurisdiction and preserving Medrano's choice of forum. The doctrine of fraudulent joinder "allows the federal district court, in matters removed from state courts, to strike nondiverse defendants who have no real connection with the dispute, or who have no real liability because there is no possibility of recovery against them." Hosein v. CDL West 45th Street, LLC, No. 12-CV-6903 (LGS), 2013 WL 4780051, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013). See also Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 460-61 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that the doctrine prevents plaintiffs from defeating "a federal court's diversity jurisdiction and a defendant's right of removal by merely joining as defendants parties with no real connection with the controversy").

In order to show fraudulent joinder, a defendant "must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, either that there has been outright fraud committed in the plaintiff s pleadings, or that there is no possibility, based on the pleadings, that a plaintiff can state a cause of action against the non-diverse defendant in state court." Id. at 461. In evaluating a claim of fraudulent joinder, "all factual and legal issues must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff." Id.

Here, Defendants contend that New York State law bars Medrano from bringing a negligence suit against Perri, and that he was thus fraudulently joined. First, they argue that Medrano's "allegations map out the elements of the doctrine of respondeat superior in New York," and that Medrano has otherwise failed to "allege that Perri acted outside the scope of his employment with Aramark." Defs.' Opp. (Dkt. 7) at 2. Only Aramark can be held liable for Perri's purported negligence, Defendants argue, not Perri. Id. Second, Defendants assert that Medranowas a "special employee" of Aramark, and that New York Workers' Comp. Law §§ 11 and 29(6) thus provide an exclusive remedy for her injuries. Id. at 3.

1. Respondeat Superior

"Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is answerable for the tortious acts of its employees if those acts were within the scope of employment and in furtherance of the employer's business." Compass Grp., USA v. Mazula, 795 N.Y.S.2d 395, 396 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). The doctrine is one of vicarious liability, Riviello v. Waldron, 391 N.E.2d 1278, 1280-81 (N.Y. 1979), pursuant to which "liability for another person's wrongdoing is imputed to the defendant." Bros. v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 898 N.E.2d 539, 542 (N.Y. 2008).

Here, although Medrano's Amended Complaint does not expressly assert respondeat superior as a theory of recovery, the Court can nonetheless infer such a theory from the face of Medrano's pleadings. See Rodriguez v. New York City Transit Auth., 938 N.Y.S.2d 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011), aff'd in part, modified in part, 943 N.Y.S.2d 94 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). Medrano alleges that Perri was an Aramark employee, and that Medrano's injuries arose from his purportedly negligent performance of his employment duties. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21-26. In her Affidavit, moreover, she expressly asserts that her injuries arose from Perri's purportedly negligent performance of his duties as "the direct manager responsible for supervising all aspects of the food service operation performed by defendant ARAMARK." Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 4.

But the mere fact that Medrano has asserted respondeat superior as a theory of recovery, at least impliedly, does not mean that Perri was fraudulently joined, named only to defeat diversity jurisdiction. As an initial matter, Medrano's ability to prevail on this theory of liability depends on several questions—whether Perri's purported tortious act fell within the scope of his employment, whether it furthered Aramark's business, and thus whether Aramark can be held vicariouslyliable—all of which are ordinarily reserved for the jury. See Quadrozzi v. Norcem, Inc., 509 N.Y.S.2d 835, 837 (N.Y. App Div. 1986). If Aramark cannot be held vicariously liable, Medrano's claims against Perri are proper.

Even if the Court could resolve such factual questions as a matter of law and find that Perri's negligence is necessarily imputed to Aramark, a determination that Perri was fraudulently joined would still be improper. It is true that in her Amended Complaint and Affidavit Medrano nowhere alleges that Perri's tortious acts fell outside the scope of his employment. It is also true that multiple New York cases have held that, "[i]n an action against an employer based upon the doctrine . . . the employee allegedly committing the tortious conduct is not a necessary party." Trivedi v. Golub, 847 N.Y.S.2d 211, 212 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). See also Rock v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 623 N.Y.S.2d 9, 10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Shaw v. Vill. of Hempstead, 246 N.Y.S.2d 557, 558 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964).

Nonetheless, it does not follow that Perri, although not necessary to the action, is improperly named as a defendant, or that recovery against him would be impossible. Indeed, numerous New York cases suggest otherwise. See, e.g., Wilson v. City of New York, 131 N.Y.S.2d 47, 50 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) (finding, in the context of respondeat superior, that "[a] master and servant may be joined in a single action as theirs is a liability which must be considered as that of one tort-feasor and is a consolidated and unified one"). See also G. ex rel. G. v. Athletic Alliance Risk Purchasing Grp., 747 N.Y.S.2d 884, 887 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), on reargument in part sub nom. Goodwin v. Athletic Alliance Risk Purchasing Grp. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) ("It is beyond question that an individual may be held liable for his own affirmative acts of negligence, whether or not such acts are within the scope of his employment."); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Morris Associates, P.C., 607 N.Y.S.2d 106, 108 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) ("[I]t is well settled that an agent can be held liablefor his own negligent acts."); Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 7.01 (2006) ("An agent is subject to liability to a third party harmed by the agent's tortious conduct. Unless an applicable statute provides otherwise, an actor remains subject to liability although the actor acts as an agent or an employee . . . or within the scope of employment."); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 343 (1958) (same).

The Court cannot find it "obvious according to the settled rules of New York, Raphael v. 18 Rest., Inc., 954 F. Supp. 549, 551 (E.D.N. Y. 1996), that the vicarious liability of Aramark would preclude a finding of liability against Perri. Defendants have thus failed to meet their "heavy burden," id., of showing that Perri was fraudulently joined on this basis.

2. Workers' Compensation

In New York, "[i]t is well settled that Workers' Compensation is the exclusive remedy for any employee injured as a result of negligence attributable to his employer." Quinlan v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 2d 681, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). See also N.Y. Workers' Comp. Law § 11 ("The liability of an employer [under the statute] shall be exclusive and in place of any other whatsoever, to such employee . . . on account of such injury or death or liability arising...